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Abstract 
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience that one is the author of 
their actions and the ensuing outcomes of these actions. Previous research have suggested 
that both sensorimotor processes and high level inferences can contribute to the SoA. In 
five experiments, the present thesis examined the effects of action selection processes and 
the valence of action-outcomes on the SoA. The majority of these experiments measured 
the SoA by obtaining both subjective feeling of control (FoC) judgments over the action-
outcomes, and assessing the size of intentional binding. Intentional binding refers to the 
perceived temporal attraction between actions and their outcomes, and has been 
suggested as an implicit measure of the SoA. Experiment 1 manipulated the number of 
action alternatives as low, medium, and high and examined the effect of choice-level on 
intentional binding. The results showed that binding was strongest when participants had 
the maximum number of alternatives, intermediate when they had medium choice-level, 
and lowest when they had no choice. Experiment 2 recruited western and non-western 
participants and focused on the impact of pleasantness of action outcomes on both 
intentional binding and FoC judgment. The results revealed that both western and non-
western groups showed greater FoC ratings for the pleasant compared to unpleasant 
outcomes. Moreover, for the western group only, binding was stronger for pleasant 
compared to unpleasant outcomes. In Experiment 3, participants performed freely 
selected and instructed actions, which could produce pleasant or unpleasant outcomes. 
The results revealed stronger binding and higher FoC ratings in the free- compared to 
instructed-choice condition. Additionally, FoC ratings were higher for the pleasant 
compared to the unpleasant outcomes. Similarly, Experiment 4 varied the choice-level 
between one (instructed), two, three, and four alternatives while the outcome of any 
choice could be pleasant or unpleasant. The results showed that binding was stronger in 
the four-choice condition compared to one-, two-, and three-choice conditions, while FoC 
ratings were systematically increased as the choice-level varied from one to four, and 
were higher for pleasant compared to unpleasant outcomes. In Experiment 5, participants 
were primed with either action or neutral images and performed either free or instructed 
actions. Free actions could be preceded by either neutral (neutral-free) or action primes 
(primed-free), and instructed actions indicated performing either prime-compatible or 
prime-incompatible actions. The findings showed that both binding and FoC ratings 
indicated stronger SoA in the neutral-free condition compared to all remaining modes of 
action selection. Moreover, these two measures of the SoA were significantly correlated. 
The overall results from these studies indicate that situational factors surrounding actions 
determine the contribution of predictive, prospective, and retrospective mechanisms to 
intentional binding and subjective judgments of agency. Among these factors, the present 
thesis highlights that one’s freedom in action selection and the availability of various 
action alternatives can strongly influence the SoA. 
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1.1 The sense of agency  
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience that one is the author of 
their actions and the ensuing outcomes of these actions (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; 
Gallagher, 2000; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). This 
experience is a crucial aspect of self-consciousness; it not only entails the distinction 
between one’s self and others as “the actor” but also conveys the sense of having control 
over what one’s actions change in the environment. When we switch on a light, for 
example, we unquestionably know that the lightening is changed by our pressing the 
switch.   
The SoA has important implications in morality and taking responsibility for one’s 
actions (Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009), and it is closely linked 
to the notion of free will (Aarts & van den Bos, 2011; Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & 
Oakley, 2004; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Haggard, 2008). Aside from the 
influence of SoA on responsibility and morality, it is imperative to understand the very 
nature of how we experience the SoA. Most of the time, the SoA in our daily routine of 
actions is so pervasive and diffused in ourselves that we do not reflect on our authorship 
of our actions or their consequences. In simple terms, we just know we are the actors who 
control external events occurring through our actions. There are times, however, that our 
agentic experience is distorted when we lose control over what action to take or when the 
consequences of our actions conflict with our intentions. The SoA, therefore, is a 
vulnerable phenomenon; it can be amenable to several factors and even fail to inform us 
of who is in control of the actions. This has been shown in both healthy individuals and 
several psychological and neurological disorders. For instance, individuals with no 
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medical conditions can experience anomalous SoA when the source of actions or 
outcomes is ambiguous (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Haggard et al., 2004; Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999). Moreover, disturbances of the SoA such as feeling a lack of control 
or misattributing agency have been observed in several disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Farrer et al., 2004; Frith, 2005; Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 
2003; Jeannerod, 2009; Kircher & Leube, 2003; Werner, Trapp, Wüstenberg, & Voss, 
2014), motor conversion disorder (Kranick et al., 2013), obsessive compulsive disorder 
(Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010; Belayachi & Van Der Linden, 2010), and anarchic 
hand syndrome (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). 
Since the late 1990s, therefore, the quest to understand how the SoA comes about 
and what specific mechanisms are affected in the above-mentioned disorders have 
sparked great interest in both psychology and neuroscience domains of research. As is the 
case with other aspects of self-consciousness, the SoA is a difficult topic of study due to 
its subjective nature. Thus, the scientific investigation of the SoA requires careful 
establishment of the relevant concepts and theoretical frameworks as well as appropriate 
experimental designs and measures. The following sections provide a brief overview of 
these components pertaining to the examination of the SoA.  The survey will begin with 
introducing the conceptualization of the SoA, which identifies the levels at which the 
SoA is experienced. The next section will then discuss how the SoA has been measured 
in experimental settings based on the changes in one’s perception of their actions and the 
outcomes of these actions. These measures have been used extensively to test the 
accounts of the mechanisms of the SoA, which are presented in the following section.  
We shall see that the nature of the SoA is multi-faceted, and there are numerous factors 
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that contribute the subjective experience of actions including motor planning and control 
mechanisms, prior thoughts, high level inferences, and various situational cues. The last 
section is devoted to the scope of the present dissertation, which mainly focuses on the 
role of freedom and choice level in action selection, and the nature of the consequences 
of actions.  
1.2 Conceptualization of the SoA 
As noted before, we commonly experience the SoA in the form a tacit and 
unquestioned state of a phenomenon. According to the recently developed two-level 
account of the SoA (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008), this 
experience is described as the low level, non-conceptual, and pre-reflective SoA 
(Gallagher, 2000, 2007, 2011). At a higher level, the SoA is experienced through the 
reasoning that incorporates retrospective judgments and inferences. The high level SoA is 
thus conceptual and reflective in nature.  
Although the distinction between the low and high levels of the SoA has provided a 
conceptual framework, it has also raised questions regarding how to measure these levels 
and the potential differences between the underlying mechanisms. Regarding the 
measures of the SoA (see section 1.3), it was contended that the low level SoA could be 
indexed by implicit measures while explicit self-reports would quantify the higher level 
SoA. Furthermore, it was proposed that low level SoA emerges from sensorimotor 
processes that operate mainly prior to the movement by producing the motor commands 
and the anticipations of the consequences of the movement (see section 1.4.1., Blakemore 
et al., 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Frith, 2005). The high level SoA, on the 
other hand, was suggested to rely on inferences drawn from the observation of actions 
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and their outcomes as well situational cues (see section 1.4.2, Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; 
Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012; Obhi & Hall, 2011; Synofzik et al., 2008; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003, 2004).  
However, accumulating research to date has shown that the relationship between 
the low and high levels of the SoA and the sensorimotor versus inferential processes, 
respectively, might not be straightforward. Indeed, recent findings and theorizing suggest 
that, low-level and high-level agency can be influenced by sensorimotor or inferential 
processes. Before reviewing these processes and the relevant research, it is important to 
conceive the measures that are most commonly employed in the literature.    
1.3 Measuring the SoA in experimental settings  
The methodologies of the relevant research have employed both explicit/direct and 
implicit/indirect procedures to measure the SoA. The former are concerned with 
conscious self-reports about subjective control and agency attribution. The implicit 
measures, on the other hand, rely on changes in subjective perception of the timing of 
actions and their outcomes as well as on the perceived intensity of sensory outcomes. 
1.3.1 Explicit/Direct measures 
One way to measure the SoA is to directly obtain one’s self-reflection on their 
sense of control or authorship. These explicit measures thus most commonly require 
participants to rate on a scale (e.g., a 10-point Likert scale) to indicate how much control 
they feel over action outcomes (e.g., Balslev, Cole, & Miall, 2007; Barlas & Obhi, 2014; 
Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Linser & Goschke, 2007; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Sato & 
Yasuda, 2005; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010) or over their actions (e.g., Sebanz & 
Lackner, 2007; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Additionally, in the contexts 
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where the source of the action-outcomes is rendered ambiguous, participants are asked to 
make direct judgments about the cause (i.e., me, computer, or a confederate) of the 
observed outcomes of actions (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2009; Aarts, Custers, & 
Wegner, 2005; Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, & Aarts, 2008; Spengler, von Cramon, & 
Brass, 2009; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  
1.3.2 Implicit/Indirect measures 
Administration of the explicit measures based on self-report has been suggested to 
be highly prone to contamination by issues such as social desirability, impression 
management, and the limits of introspection on the part of participants (Metcalfe & 
Greene, 2007; Obhi, 2012; Schüür & Haggard, 2011). Alternative methodologies were 
then employed to include indirect measures to overcome these issues with the explicit 
measures. Two such indirect measures are sensory attenuation and intentional binding. 
1.3.2.1 Sensory attenuation 
Sensory attenuation refers to reduced perception of the sensory outcomes produced 
by self-generated actions (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & 
Frith, 1998, 2000; Blakemore, 2003; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013; Macerollo et 
al., 2015; Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Weiss & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012). 
Sensory attenuation is proposed to rely on the processes involved in motor preparation. 
More specifically, models of motor control system (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 
2000; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Wolpert, 1997) suggest that before the 
movement takes place, a copy of the motor command is sent to the so called forward 
model (see Section 1.4.1) which produces the predictions towards the sensory 
consequences of the movement. It is also proposed that these predictions are then 
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compared to the actual outcomes of the movement, and sensory attenuation is suggested 
to result from the matching between predicted and actual outcomes (Blakemore et al., 
1998, 2000; Frith et al., 2000). One common example is that self-tickling is experienced 
as less intense compared to being tickled by someone else (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2000). 
Sensory attenuation therefore enables the distinction between self and other generated 
actions, and is suggested to be a low-level sensory measure of the SoA (Synofzik et al., 
2008).  
Sensory attenuation can be measured by its electrophysiological correlates or 
behaviorally by obtaining perceived intensity of sensory stimuli. The most prominent 
electrophysiological marker of sensory attenuation is the N1 potential, which is found to 
be reduced in response to a self-generated auditory stimulus relative to when the same 
stimulus is externally generated (Bäß, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008). Reduction in N1 
amplitude has also been demonstrated when the stimuli are produced by voluntary 
compared to involuntary [e.g., Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) induced] 
movements (Timm, SanMiguel, Keil, Schröger, & Schönwiesner, 2014). Additionally, 
sensory outcomes produced by their associated actions were shown to yield N1 
attenuation more strongly than those that are incongruent with the actions (Hughes et al., 
2013; Kühn et al., 2011). Importantly, studies with disorders have shown that N1 
attenuation was reduced or absent in schizophrenia (e.g., Ford, Mathalon, Kalba, Marsh, 
& Pfefferbaum, 2001; Ford, Mathalon, Heinks, et al., 2001) and in patients with 
psychogenic movement disorder, who report having reduced or no control over their 
movements (Macerollo et al., 2015).  
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Behavioral studies have provided further evidence that causal beliefs can influence 
the perceived loudness of outcome tones. It was found, for instance, that perceived 
loudness of the tones was reduced when participants believed that the tones were 
produced by their actions as opposed to by another person (Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Waszak, 2012).   
In sum, previous research suggests that sensory attenuation can be used as an 
implicit marker of the SoA and is prone to be influenced by both sensorimotor processes 
and causal beliefs.   
1.3.2.2 Intentional binding 
Another implicit measure of the SoA relies on the perceived times of actions and 
their effects.  In their seminal study, Haggard et al. (2002) measured the perceived times 
of actions and their outcomes while participants made voluntary key presses and passive 
(TMS induced to motor cortex) movements as they viewed a conventional clock (Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) on the screen. These key presses would sometimes 
produce a tone after 250 ms delay, and the association between key presses and tones was 
varied using baseline and operant conditions. In one block of the baseline condition 
(action-only), participants made a key press at a time of their choosing while fixating a 
rotating clock-hand on an on-screen clock. The key press did not produce any tone and 
participants judged the onset time of their key press by reporting the position of the 
clock-hand at the time of their movement. In a second block of the baseline condition 
(outcome-only), participants passively listened for a tone in each trial and judged the 
onset of the tone. In the operant conditions, the key presses would always produce a tone 
after a 250 ms delay and in separate blocks of trials, participants judged either the onset 
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time of the key press or the tone. In this way, the authors could calculate the perceptual 
shifts in the times of key presses and tones across baseline and operant conditions (i.e., by 
calculating the difference between the judgment errors across these two conditions for 
key presses and tones). Interestingly, examination of these shifts showed that key presses 
in the operant voluntary condition were perceived to be occurring later (closer to the 
tone). In contrast, the onset of the tones was perceived earlier (closer to the key press). 
The perceived times of key presses and tones, therefore, were attracted towards each 
other in the voluntary actions (see Figure 1.1). However, this temporal attraction effect 
was not observed for the TMS induced passive movements. Haggard et al. (2002) 
suggested that perceived temporal attraction between actions and their outcomes was 
distinct to the voluntary actions. The authors thus coined the term intentional binding to 
refer to this effect.  
Since then intentional binding has received great attention of the relevant research 
to explore its relationship with the SoA. Although the clock paradigm has been used quite 
frequently, an alternative procedure to measure the intentional binding effect was also 
developed. This procedure involves obtaining the perceived duration estimates of the 
actions-outcome interval (Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; 
Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; Moore & Haggard, 2010; Moore, Wegner, & 
Haggard, 2009; Obhi, Swiderski, & Farquhar, 2013). Notwithstanding the type of the 
procedure (i.e., the clock or the interval estimation paradigm), the purported link between 
intentional binding and the SoA is that greater perceptual shifts binding the times of 
actions and outcomes, as well as shorter estimations of the action-outcome interval, imply 
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a stronger SoA (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Ku, Brass, 
Haggard, & Kühn, 2012; Moore & Obhi, 2012; Wenke & Haggard, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.1 Demonstration of the intentional binding effect. In the baseline 
conditions, actions and outcomes occur independently. That is, in the action-only 
condition participants press a key which does not produce any outcome and they 
judge the onset time of their key press. In the outcome-only condition participants 
passively observe the outcomes (e.g., tones) and judge the onset of the outcomes. In 
the operant conditions, participants’ actions always produce the outcomes and they 
judge the onset times of either their actions or the outcomes of these actions. 
Perceptual shifts for actions and outcomes are calculated by subtracting the 
Baseline: Temporal judgments of individual events 
Action-only 
Outcome-only 
Action Outcome 
Perceived  
times 
Operant: Temporal judgments of causal events        
Intentional binding 
Action  
perceptual shift 
Outcome 
perceptual shift 
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judgment errors in the operant conditions from the corresponding baseline 
conditions for each judged event (e.g., action and outcome). In a typical binding 
effect, these shifts demonstrate that the perceived times of actions and their 
outcomes are shifted towards each other.    
Studies using these paradigms have further investigated whether intentional binding 
could indeed be specific to self-generated actions. In this regard, one line of evidence 
favors the intentional binding effect as a reliable measure of the self-agency. Haggard and 
Clark (2003), for example, compared the intentional binding effect between voluntary 
movements and movements that were intended but the execution of which was disrupted 
by TMS. Replicating the results of the previous study (Haggard et al., 2002), they 
observed the binding of actions and outcomes in voluntary movements. When these 
movements were disrupted by TMS, however, a reversal of intentional binding was 
found. That is, the perceived times of movements and resulting outcome tones were 
shifted away from each other (i.e., a repulsion effect). These results suggested that the 
intentional binding effect required not only the presence of intentions but also the 
successful execution of intended movements. The same repulsion effect was also 
observed, particularly on the perceived times of outcome tones, when participants 
themselves inhibited their intended actions (Haggard, Poonian, & Walsh, 2009).  
Further research provided evidence that intentional binding can be influenced by 
several agency related cues. Stronger binding of actions and outcomes was reported, for 
example, when one believed themselves as the source of the action-outcomes (Desantis, 
Roussel, & Waszak, 2011), with positive or pleasant compared to negative outcomes 
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(Barlas & Obhi, 2014; Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), and when the 
number of available action alternatives is at maximum within a specific context (Barlas & 
Obhi, 2013).  
Studies examining aberrant SoA in certain disorders have also reported that the 
intentional binding effect was reduced in high functioning autism spectrum disorder 
(Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2013) and motor conversion disorder (Kranick et al., 
2013) while it was found to be exaggerated in schizophrenia (Synofzik & Voss, 2010; 
Voss et al., 2010). Finally, recent research on the brain mechanisms behind this effect 
suggests the involvement of pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). Accordingly, 
disrupting this area by theta-burst TMS (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 
2010b) and by transcranial direct current stimulation-tDCS (Cavazzana, Penolazzi, 
Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2015) have been shown to the reduce the intentional binding 
effect. 
Although these findings lend support to the view that intentional binding is strongly 
associated with the SoA, another line of evidence has challenged its specificity to self-
generated actions. One counter notion is that intentional binding might simply reflect  the 
perception of causality between two events (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 
2012). Another line of research have shown that the size of binding was indifferent 
between self-generated and observed actions (Moore, Teufel, Subramaniam, Davis, & 
Fletcher, 2013; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013; Wohlschläger, Haggard, Gesierich, & 
Prinz, 2003; but see Engbert et al., 2007). One interpretation of these findings is that 
there might be overlapping mechanisms through which agency is inferred in self- and 
other-generated actions (Moore et al., 2013; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013).  
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The resolution of the debate whether intentional binding can merely be related to 
self-agency requires further investigation. At the moment, however, intentional binding 
remains a promising phenomenon in SoA research which could further elucidate its 
underlying processes and relationship with the SoA (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a 
review of intentional binding).    
1.4 Underlying mechanisms of the SoA 
An important question probed by the relevant research is concerned with the 
underlying mechanisms that give rise to the SoA. On this line, two main streams of 
processes have been suggested to play important roles in influencing the subjective 
experience of agency. These processes are described under the terms of predictive 
(sensory-motor) and postdictive (inferential) accounts. Briefly put, the predictive account 
is based on the computational models of motor control mechanisms that are responsible 
for the acquisition and control of movements by calculating the sensory consequences of 
these movements. Importantly, the predictive account is heavily dependent on the 
processes that occur before the movement (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000; 
Frith, 2005; Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert, 1997). The postdictive account, on the other 
hand, relies more strongly on the post-movement processes that operate on the perception 
of causality and inferences drawn upon the observation of both the movement and its 
outcomes (e.g., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004; Wegner, 2004). 
Initially, these two streams of processes were viewed as (virtually) mutually exclusive in 
terms of how they address the underlying mechanisms of the SoA. Recent findings, 
however, have resulted in agreement that both streams of processes can influence the 
SoA and the degree of their contribution is determined on contextual and various other 
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factors (Desantis, Weiss, et al., 2012; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Moore, Wegner, et al., 
2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). 
1.4.1 The role of predictive processes 
As noted above, the predictive account of the SoA emerged out of popular 
computational models of motor control system (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000; 
Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert, 1997). According to the so called comparator model (see 
Figure 1.2), motor learning and motor control are managed by the coupling of two main 
internal models, namely the inverse and forward models, and the three comparators that 
hold various functions. The major role of the inverse models is to issue the motor 
command to reach the desired state of the body in accordance with the goals of the agent. 
Once the motor command is issued, the efferent copy of this command is simultaneously 
sent to the forward models. The main function of the forward models is to predict the 
post-movement state of the body and the consequences of the movement. At this point, 
the role of the comparators becomes critical. The first comparator between the predicted 
state and the desired state informs the inverse models in case of a discrepancy so that any 
required adjustments to the motor planning can be performed before the movement takes 
place. The second comparator between the desired state and actual state, similarly, serves 
to tune the functioning of the inverse models for the improvement of motor learning of 
new actions. Finally, the third comparator detects the discrepancies between the predicted 
state and the actual state, and signals the outcome of this comparison back to the forward 
models. This comparison is crucial for two reasons. First, it helps the forward models 
improve their functioning in case of a mismatch between predictions and actual 
outcomes. Second, and more importantly, the result of this comparison is suggested to 
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allow the distinction between self and other produced actions. More clearly, the greater 
the discrepancy between the predicted and actual states the more likely that agency is 
attributed to the others or the experience of self-agency is weakened. 
In support of the role of internal models on the SoA, Sato and Yasuda (2005) 
manipulated the congruency between actions (left and right key presses) and outcomes 
(high and low pitch tones) by rendering the outcomes unpredicted in terms of their timing 
and frequency. Their results showed the subjective ratings of being in control of the 
outcomes were reduced when the timing and the frequency of these outcomes were 
incongruent with the previously learned action-outcome associations. Furthermore, in a 
second experiment, they showed that participants could experience illusory sense of 
control over prediction-matching outcomes when in reality they were externally 
produced. These results suggested that the matching between predicted and actual 
outcomes could remarkably influence one’s subjective feeling of control (FoC).  
In a similar vein, Linser and Goschke (2007) used subliminal priming of action-
effects and examined the influence of congruency between these primes and actual 
action-effects on participants’ subjective FoC over the outcomes. The results showed that 
the FoC was greater when the primed effects were compatible with the actual outcomes, 
suggesting that unconscious modulation of the internal predictions could influence the 
subjective FoC. Further support to the role of the predictive mechanisms came from a 
study which showed that deafferented patients failed to discriminate between self and 
other generated cursor movements on the screen in the absence of visual feedback ,while 
the control group of healthy participants was better able to do so (Balslev et al., 2007).  
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These results highlighted the contribution of the matching between predicted state of the 
body and the proprioceptive input. 
 
Figure 1.2 The comparator model, adapted from Frith et al. (2002). 
Although the role of action control mechanisms and internal models appears to be 
indispensable in giving rise to the SoA, the predictive account cannot explain, for 
instance, the cases in which one can still experience some degree of authorship when the 
pre-movement predictions do not match the actual outcomes. The main drawback of the 
predictive account is that it does not, in its basic form, incorporate the contribution of 
other potential cues such as background beliefs, conscious judgments, and inferential 
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processing linked to the SoA (for a critical review see, de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; 
Pacherie, 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008, 2013).      
1.4.2 The role of postdictive processes 
The postdictive (inferential) account is based on the Humean analysis on the 
perception of causality (Hume, 1888). Within this analysis, we perceive two events as 
causally related when they are temporally contingent and consistent. Along the same 
lines of causality and our interpretation of it, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) suggested that 
we infer that our actions or conscious thoughts are the cause of external events when (1) 
our thoughts or intentions occur before the observed events, (2) our intentions are 
consistent with the observed events, and (3) there are no other agents that could 
potentially cause the same events. As such, this account emphasizes the contribution of 
higher level inferences drawn retrospectively based on our observations of our actions 
and following events (see also, Wegner & Sparrow, 2004; Wegner, 2004).  
Support for this view came from the studies demonstrating that the SoA could 
occur even when the sensory-motor predictive signals are lacking. Wegner and Wheatley 
(1999), for example, conducted a study in which the participant and confederate 
simultaneously performed cursor movements on the screen.  In some trials, the image on 
which the cursor would stop was presented through the headphones. When the primed 
image matched the actual image where the cursor was moved to, participants claimed 
authorship over these movements. Importantly, participants’ illusory judgment of agency 
occurred despite the fact that it was the confederate who actually caused the movements. 
In a similar vein, another study showed that participants could experience vicarious 
SoA over someone else’s movements (Wegner et al., 2004). In this study, participants 
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viewed their mirror reflection while the confederate stood behind the participant 
positioning their arms in the place of the participant’s arms. In the mirror thus, it looked 
as if the confederate’s arms belonged to the participant. Through headphones, movement 
instructions were delivered to both the participant and the confederate. Examination of 
the participant’s judgments of how much control they felt over the mirror reflected 
movements revealed that the experience of agency was enhanced when the instructions 
and actual movements were the same.  
Taken together, these results supported the notion that the SoA is influenced by 
prior thoughts and situational cues. Nonetheless, the postdictive account too has its own 
inadequacies as a full-fledged account of the SoA. In essence, the main problem is that it 
merely emphasises post-movement cues and thoughts, leaving no role for internal pre-
movement processes. It cannot explain thus, how in everyday life we experience the low 
level, pre-reflective SoA (see Section 1.2) without having to rely on high level judgments 
and inferences. 
1.4.3 The interplay between predictive and postdictive processes 
The above mentioned drawbacks of predictive and postdictive accounts have led to 
the emergence of a new approach that combined the both processes into a unifying 
framework. This framework proposed a Bayesian model of cue integration process that 
estimates the weighting of both internal (sensory-motor, predictive) and external 
(postdictive, inferential) cues that are available in the context of actions. According to 
this model, the weighting of these cues determines their reliability and thus their 
differential influence on the SoA (Farrer, Valentin, & Hupé, 2013; Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013).  
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Moore and Haggard (2008), for example, manipulated the probability of action-
effects to occur as high (75%) and low (50%), and measured the intentional binding 
effect using the clock paradigm. Participants made voluntary key presses and reported the 
onset time of either their key press or the auditory tone. The results showed that in the 
high probability condition, the perceived times of key presses were still shifted later in 
time when these key presses did not produce the tone. When the probability was low, on 
the other hand, perceptual shifts were still observed for the trials in which key presses 
produced the tone. The authors suggested that the former set of results pointed to the role 
of predictive processes while the latter indicated the contribution of retrospective 
inferences.  
In another study, participants were primed with auditory outcomes (low or high 
pitch) of voluntary and involuntary movements (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). 
These primes could be either congruent or incongruent with the actual outcomes and 
participants estimated the temporal delay between their movements and auditory 
outcomes. It was found that binding was stronger in voluntary than involuntary 
movements and when the primes were congruent with the outcomes than they were 
incongruent. Importantly, however, the influence of prime compatibility was stronger in 
the involuntary condition compared to the voluntary condition. These findings indicated 
that when predictive cues are absent (as in the involuntary condition), external cues (i.e., 
the compatibility of the primes) can become more reliable and therefore influence  the 
SoA (see also Stenner et al., 2014). 
Studies probing the neural structures associated with the SoA also support the 
multiple cue integration view. These studies suggest that a wide network of brain 
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structures including the fronto-parietal network (Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & 
Haggard, 2013; Dogge, Hofman, Boersma, Dijkerman, & Aarts, 2014) is linked to the 
SoA. Among these areas, the cerebellum was proposed to be engaged in pre-motor 
predictions of the consequences of actions (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; 
Blakemore et al., 1998) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC) was related to 
voluntary action initiation (Jahanshahi et al., 1995) and action monitoring (Rowe, 
Hughes, & Nimmo-Smith, 2010).  
Additionally, right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) was found to show increased activity 
when visual feedback is incongruent with the intended movement (David, 2010; David et 
al., 2007; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010). Accordingly, it was found that repetitive 
TMS applied over the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) resulted in rejection of self-agency 
for unperturbed feedback of the movements (Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Karabanov, 
Christensen, & Nielsen, 2014), suggesting that increased activity in this area signals the 
discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes of actions. Detection of such 
discrepancies and attribution of agency to the others was found to be particularly 
associated with angular gyrus (AG) in the right IPL (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 
2008; Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011; Spengler et al., 2009). In contrast, pre-
SMA and rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) are suggested to mediate self-generated 
movements and action selection (Forstmann et al., 2008; Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & 
Cramon, 2006; Miele et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2010). As noted before, the pre-SMA is 
also suggested to be a major area underlying intentional binding (Cavazzana et al., 2015; 
Kühn et al., 2012; Moore et al., 2010b). Finally, conscious judgments of the degree of 
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control over action-outcomes was linked to the increased activity in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) (Miele et al., 2011). 
1.5 Present dissertation: The influence of freedom and choice in action selection 
and the valence of action-outcomes on the SoA 
Majority of the previous studies examining the role of predictive and postdictive 
processes have mainly focused on the compatibility of pre-motor predictions, prior 
thoughts and goals with the observed action-outcomes. However, it is also fundamental to 
human actions that performed actions are the result of a selection process among different 
actions. These processes can play important role in determining the right action to 
achieve one’s intentions. In fact, several processes can be involved in the time course 
between the emergence of intentions and the outcomes of performed actions. 
In this regard, Pacherie (2008) proposed a comprehensive framework within which 
intentions are distinguished at three levels1 based on their content and function to control 
and monitor human actions. According to this model, distal intentions (D-intentions) are 
represented at an abstract level and their realization to actions may occur within some 
flexible temporal delay (e.g., going to the park tomorrow). Proximal intentions (P-
intentions), on the other hand, construct the representational plan of the action by 
integrating the conceptual information preserved in D-intentions and the current 
situational constraints (e.g., determining whether to walk or drive to go to the park based 
on time and weather constraints). Finally, motor intentions (M-intentions) are involved in 
                                                 
1 Pacherie (2008) established this framework by integrating previous views that distinguished between, for 
instance, prior intentions and intentions-in-action (Searle, 1983), future-directed and present-directed 
intentions (Bratman, 1987). 
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the specification of the motor representations in terms of the spatial positions of the limbs 
to perform the action (e.g., different action plans would be programmed depending on 
whether one walks or drives to the park). It is important to note that both P-intentions and 
M-intentions can represent the selection of a specific action and the manner of action 
execution at different levels of specificity. Of more interest, this model also suggests that 
the subjective experience of agency is directly related to P-intentions and M-intentions as 
these levels are closely engaged in the monitoring and control of actions. 
The goal of the present thesis is twofold. First, it aims to uncover how the 
subjective experience of agency would be influenced when one’s freedom in action 
selection (i.e., freely selected vs. instructed) and the number of available actions are 
manipulated. With respect to the dynamic theory of intentions (Pacherie, 2008) 
mentioned above, this manipulation specifically calls upon the levels of P-intentions and 
M-intentions which represent the selection and execution of actions. Second, the present 
thesis also aims to investigate the influence of perceived valence (e.g., pleasantness) of 
action-outcomes on the SoA. Importantly, these two manipulations (i.e., freedom and 
choice-level in action selection and the outcome-valence) were attempted to be 
implemented in both separate and common experimental contexts.  
Regarding the influence of externally perturbing the selection of actions on the 
SoA, Sebanz and Lackner (2007) found that FoC was reduced when external vocal 
instructions were incompatible with the stimulus guided actions. Under such external 
perturbations on action selection and execution, it was also found that participants felt 
stronger control when they could freely choose one of two actions compared to when 
they performed stimulus guided actions. These results suggested that external 
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disturbances at the level of action selection (P-intentions) and action execution (M-
intentions) can influence one’s subjective experience of agency. 
A different line of research has suggested that action selection processes provide 
prospective cues to the SoA (Chambon et al., 2013). Relevant studies in this stream 
examined the role of action selection processes on the SoA along the lines of fluency 
(i.e., effortless processing of action selection) and the source (i.e., self vs. other) of action 
selection. More specifically, the role of selection fluency has been examined by using 
subliminal and supraliminal priming of actions. The particular goal of these studies was 
to investigate whether the compatibility of these primes with the actions would influence 
the SoA (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014; 
Sidarus, Chambon, & Haggard, 2013; Wenke et al., 2010). Overall findings of this line of 
research suggested that compatible action primes, when subliminally presented, increased 
one’s FoC over the action-outcomes (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 
2010). The authors of these studies suggested that compatible primes could facilitate the 
selection processes, which in turn enhanced the sense of being in control of the outcomes 
produced by fluently selected actions (see Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014 for a 
review).  
Studies investigating how the SoA could be influenced by self vs. other selected 
actions commonly included two alternative actions in their design. Wenke, Waszak, and 
Haggard (2009), for example, varied the timing and the choice of actions such that 
participants could either freely choose one of two keys or press the instructed key at a 
time of either their own choice or during a pre-specified interval. Across these conditions, 
the authors measured the size of intentional binding effect. Their results showed that the 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                                           
24 
 
size of the binding between the perceived times of key presses and tones was greater 
when both the choice and timing of actions were specified by the same source, i.e., either 
freely selected or instructed, compared to when these dimensions were determined by 
different sources. The conclusion based on these results was that the SoA indexed by 
intentional binding could be enhanced when the decisive source of both the what- and the 
when-dimension of actions are the same as opposed to when different sources determine 
the timing and the type of actions.  
Regarding the second goal of the present thesis (i.e., the influence of outcome 
valence on the SoA), previous studies have shown that negative action outcomes (e.g. 
vocalization of fear) had an attenuating effect on intentional binding compared to positive 
(e.g., vocalization of amusement) or neutral (a pure tone) outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013) and positive monetary gains enhanced the binding effect. Also, priming 
participants with positive pictures compared to neutral ones was found to increase the 
intentional binding effect (Aarts et al., 2012). These results have commonly been 
interpreted with the notion of self-serving bias (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Miller & Ross, 
1975; Taylor & Brown, 1994), which refers to the stronger tendency to attribute the self 
as the cause of positive than negative or undesirable events.   
In the present thesis, the role of action selection processes and the role of outcome 
valence were investigated in five experiments. The majority of these experiments 
measured the SoA using both the intentional binding paradigms and self-report measures 
of subjective control. In this way, we could observe the influence of these factors on both 
low SoA as purportedly indexed by intentional binding and high level of the SoA 
quantified by self-reports.   
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1.5.1 Preview of the experiments in this dissertation 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine how intentional binding is affected when 
the number of action alternatives is manipulated from low (no choice) to medium and 
high level of choice. In the no choice condition, participants could press the pre-
determined button on the response pad. In the medium-choice condition, they were free 
to choose among three buttons and in the high-choice condition, they were allowed to 
press any of the seven buttons. Participants reported the onset times of either the key 
presses or the outcome tones and we measured the size of binding in each condition. 
Experiment 2 examined the effect of outcome valence (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant) 
on the SoA. We recruited both western and non-western participants in order to explore 
any potential cultural differences in the effect of outcome valence. Participants completed 
a modified version of the intentional binding task in which they freely selected one of 
two keys, which produced either pleasant or unpleasant outcomes. We measured both 
intentional binding and FoC ratings over the outcomes.  
The goal of Experiment 3 was to investigate the influence of the origin of action 
selection (i.e., free vs. instructed) and the valence of the action-outcomes on both 
intentional binding and the FoC ratings. Participants performed either freely selected or 
externally instructed key presses among four options and each key press produced either 
a pleasant or an unpleasant auditory stimulus.  
Experiment 4 examined the influence of the number of action alternatives and the 
outcome valence on both intentional binding and FoC ratings. Participants were either 
free to choose a key among two, three, or four key alternatives or had only one 
(externally determined) option. Each key press could randomly produce either a pleasant 
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or an unpleasant auditory stimulus. We also obtained the subjective ratings of mental 
effort experienced in key selection in each condition.  
The focus of Experiment 5 was the influence of freedom and fluency in action 
selection on the SoA. Accordingly, we used supraliminal action primes and participants 
performed either free or instructed actions in response to a symbolic target cue. The 
modes of action selection included free selections preceded by either neutral (neutral-
free) or action primes (primed-free), and instructed selections required to perform either 
prime-compatible or prime-incompatible actions. All actions produced a tone after a 
jittered delay. Participants estimated the action-outcome delay and reported FoC 
judgments over the action-outcomes. Additionally, we obtained a subjective measure of 
perceived effort in action selection.  
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2.1 Abstract  
The sense of agency (SoA) is an intriguing aspect of human consciousness and is 
commonly defined as the sense that one is the author of their own actions and their 
consequences. In the current study, we varied the number of action alternatives (one, 
three, seven) that participants could select from and determined the effects on intentional 
binding which is believed to index the low-level SoA. Participants made self-paced 
button presses while viewing a conventional Libet clock and reported the perceived onset 
time of either the button presses or consequent auditory tones. We found that the binding 
effect was strongest when participants had the maximum number of alternatives, 
intermediate when they had medium level of action choice and lowest when they had no 
choice. We interpret these results in relation to the potential link between agency and the 
freedom to choose one’s actions. 
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2.2 Introduction 
One of the most fundamental aspects of human actions is the capacity to choose 
one’s actions depending on the availability of a number of action alternatives (Haggard, 
2008; Nichols, 2011). This capacity, however, is bound to the environmental 
circumstances that determine whether the environment offers a range of action 
alternatives and whether one can freely choose an action among these options or perform 
an action that is specified by external sources. The critical aspect of free actions is that 
the decisions that determine whether to act or not, what action to perform, and when to 
perform an action are self-generated (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Although a fine-grained 
scientific definition of self-generated actions (also referred to as voluntary, internally 
generated, or endogenous) is yet to be accomplished (for a discussion on this topic see 
Nachev & Husain, 2010; Obhi, 2012; Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010a, 2010b; 
Schüür & Haggard, 2011), one approach is to consider it as in contrast to, for example, 
reflexes that are primarily stimulus driven actions. It is, however, important to note that 
this contrast does not mean that self-generated actions are completely independent from 
environmental sources (Filevich et al., 2013; Schüür & Haggard, 2011). When driving 
from one place to another, for example, the environment determines the possible routes, 
the distance to be travelled on each route, and the road conditions. In this case, one’s 
decisions on the way to the destination would be dependent on these environmental 
constraints although one can still freely determine whether to drive or not, what route to 
take, and when to go. In this scenario, one’s self involvement in making these decisions 
would be reduced if someone else, or an emergency situation, required one to travel at a 
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specific time while one could still decide on what route to take. It would be even more 
reduced if an external source determined all decisions including which route to take. 
The critical point here is that freedom and self-generation of actions can be graded 
depending on the degree of self-involvement or endogenous processing (Passingham et 
al., 2010a, 2010b) in action selection, preparation, and execution. This is in line with the 
view that purports a continuum between self-generated actions and simple reflexes rather 
than placing the self-generated and externally influenced actions under two distinct 
categories (Haggard, 2008; Passingham et al., 2010a). 
Although the primary aim of this chapter, as well as the present thesis, is not to 
propose an extensive discussion on the conceptualization of self-generated actions, the 
term self-generated will be used to refer to relatively greater freedom and self-
involvement (internal or endogenous processing) that the experimental context allows 
compared to more constrained conditions. As exemplified above, the degree of self-
involvement can vary depending on who determines either the type or the timing of 
actions. The goal of the present chapter is to further unpack the what dimension of 
actions by varying the number of action alternatives and examine how the SoA as 
indexed by intentional binding would be influenced by this manipulation of choice-level 
in action selection.    
In this regard, the relationship between agency and freedom in action selection and 
the choice-level has been considered from various perspectives. From a broad 
perspective, agency and freedom are often considered to be tightly intertwined. More 
specifically, agency is thought to be strongest in an ‘environment of opportunities’ (Pettit, 
2001). Indeed, if a person cannot freely choose a course of action, the very notion that 
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they are an autonomous agent is undermined. Given this, it might be expected that agency 
and freedom are related such that increasing levels of freedom to choose a course of 
action correspond to increasing levels of agency. This prediction is based on the 
abovementioned notion of greater self-involvement and internal processing in self-
generated actions that are freely selected within some level of choice space.   
One relevant line of research examining the neural basis of free and instructed 
actions, for example, found increased BOLD (Blood-oxygen-level dependent) contrast in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior parietal lobe (IPL), rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ), and supplementary motor area (SMA) when actions were freely selected as 
opposed to when they were performed as instructed (Cunnington, Windischberger, 
Deecke, & Moser, 2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Waszak et al., 2005). Among these areas, 
importantly, RCZ is suggested to be linked to free choice of varying number of action 
alternatives (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2006).  
Greater internal processing in free actions is also supported by the computational 
models of action selection. One such model, called the affordance competition hypothesis 
(Cisek, 2007), suggests that action selection relies on dynamic processing of 
representations of potential actions and sensory information related to the surrounding 
context. According to this model, critically, the representations of potential actions are in 
competition with each other to go under further processing during the course of action 
selection. Furthermore, it is suggested that the dorsal visual system involves in specifying 
the potential actions while the competition process among the representations of actions 
takes place in the fronto-parietal cortex. The competition of these representations consists 
of dynamic excitation and inhibition among the populations of neurons until one reaches 
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a threshold activity strength. Additionally, this process also computes the sensory 
information received from prefrontal regions and basal ganglia. Therefore, this model 
confirms that self-generated actions are the outcome of the internal processes involving 
the agent’s current needs, sensory information, and the representations of potential 
actions.  
The core idea of greater endogenous processing in free actions provides the 
theoretical grounds to examine how one’s freedom to choose among a varying number of 
potential actions could influence the SoA. However, very few studies have addressed this 
question. Although it was not a direct examination of the link between freedom and 
agency, Wenke et al. (2010) assessed the subjective judgments of control when the 
compatibility between subliminal action primes and performed actions was manipulated 
in addition to varying the proportion of free versus cued trials. More specifically, 
participants could perform either freely selected (among two options) or cued (instructed) 
actions when the proportion of free trials was either high (75%) or low (25%). 
Additionally, subliminal action primes presented prior to the action selection could be 
either compatible or incompatible with the performed actions. The results showed that 
participants felt greater control over the outcomes when the primes were compatible with 
the performed actions, suggesting the effect of facilitating the action selection processes 
(see Chapter 6). Of more interest, the control ratings were higher when the proportion of 
free trials was high (75%) compared to when it was low (25%). This study suggested an 
intriguing link between one’s freedom to choose an action and their feeling of control 
(FoC) over the consequences of their action. 
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By extension, and reducing the general idea of a link between freedom and agency 
to a testable laboratory task, intentional binding might also be expected to vary with 
differences in the degree of freedom to choose an action. Again, agency and freedom are 
often talked about together and the feeling of freedom has been linked to choice (e.g., 
Markus & Schwartz, 2010). In this light, it is interesting to note that most previous 
intentional binding experiments have required participants to make a pre-specified action 
which is followed by a sensory event such as an auditory tone. In such cases, the 
participant is free to select when to make an action, but is not free to select which action 
to make. As proposed by Brass and Haggard (2008), decisions on which action to take 
(what), the timing of executing an action (when), and whether or not to execute an action 
(whether) are three important components of intentional actions(see also Haggard, 2008). 
By simply changing the number of action alternatives that are available to participants, it 
is possible to parametrically manipulate the ‘environment of opportunities’ (i.e., choice) 
and thus ascertain the effect that the number of choice alternatives has on intentional 
binding. The fundamental question is, do more action alternatives produce greater levels 
of intentional binding than a more constrained choice set, where the agent is less involved 
in selecting which action to make? 
To this end, in the present study we examined how agency as purportedly indexed 
by intentional binding (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Ku, 
Brass, Haggard, & Kühn, 2012; Moore & Obhi, 2012; Wenke & Haggard, 2009), is 
affected when the number of action alternatives is manipulated. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study that addresses the potential relationship between freedom of action choice 
and the SoA and intentional binding in particular. Accordingly, in the present study 
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participants were requested to make a key press on a seven-button response pad while 
watching a conventional Libet clock on the screen. They reported their perceived times of 
key press or the auditory tone that was produced by their key press. In the no choice 
condition, they were told to press only one specific button on the response pad. In the 
medium-choice condition, they were free to choose among three buttons and in the high-
choice condition they were allowed to press any of the seven buttons. For reports of the 
timing of actions and effects, we employed a similar paradigm to that of Libet, Gleason, 
Wright, and Pearl (1983) (see also Haggard et al., 2002; Obhi, Planetta, & Scantlebury, 
2009). Based on the previously surveyed views regarding the relationship between 
freedom, choice, and the SoA as well as the emphasis on internal processing in free 
actions, we predicted that intentional binding would parametrically increase from the no-
choice condition to medium-choice and to high-choice conditions.   
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
24 right-handed participants (18 women; age range=17-22) took part in the study. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and received partial course 
credits for their participation. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of 
Wilfrid Laurier University, and all participants gave written informed consent prior to 
beginning the study. One participant’s data was not included in the analyses due to not 
following the experimental instructions. 
2.3.2 Apparatus and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, USA) and 
ran on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz). The stimuli were presented on a 20 inch 
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monitor (1600x1200). Participants sat approximately 60 cm away from the computer 
monitor and the responses were recorded on a laptop by the experimenter. The 
experiment consisted of baseline and operant conditions in which the number of keys to 
press (high: 7, medium: 3, no choice: 1) and the critical event (key press, tone) that 
participants judged the timing were manipulated. Similar to Haggard et al.’s (2002) 
study, the baseline condition consisted of single events with either the key presses or the 
auditory tones. The key press single event condition included seven (high level of choice 
condition), three (medium level of choice condition), and one (no choice condition) key 
press choices. In the no choice condition, participants could only press the blue button 
centrally placed on the response pad. In the medium level of choice condition, they could 
choose any of the three buttons on the right side of the response pad. In the high level of 
choice condition, participants were free to choose any of the seven buttons on the 
response pad. When the critical event was the auditory tone, participants did not make 
any key press but only reported the time when they heard the tone. In the operant 
conditions, participants’ key press was followed by a 1000 Hz tone (duration: 100 ms, bit 
rate: 160 Kbps) presented after a delay of 200 ms and they were asked to report the time 
of either their key press or the tone. The condition (2: baseline, operant) together with the 
level of action choices (3: High, Medium, No choice), and the critical event (2: Key 
press, Tone) in total were tested in ten separate blocks with 30 trials each (see Table 2.1 
for a list of different block types). The order of the blocks was randomized across 
participants. At the beginning of each block, participants were informed which key or 
keys they were allowed to press and which of the two events’ timing (key press or the 
tone) they were going to report. Participants completed 6 practice trials prior to the 
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beginning of each block. Sixty practice trials in total thus were excluded from the data 
analysis. 
Each trial began with a warning signal noting that a new trial will begin, which 
remained on the screen for 1 s. The fixation cross was then presented for 500 ms and 
followed by the display of the Libet clock (1.8 cm in diameter) with a minute hand 
pointing to one of 12 positions marked at 5-minute intervals. Participants were told to 
report their judgments between 0 (12 o’clock position) and 59, including the intermediate 
values. The minute hand remained stationary at the center of the screen for 500 ms and 
then started rotating clockwise at a 2.5 s period. In the baseline- where the single event 
was the key press only- and in the operant conditions, participants were told to make the 
key press at their own pace using their right index finger after the clock started rotating. 
They were instructed not to give stereotyped responses in the high and medium level of 
choice conditions and not to press the key at predetermined minute hand positions. In the 
baseline tone-only condition, participants did not make any key press but reported the 
onset of the tone occurred at a random time (jittered between 200 and 2000 ms) after the 
clock hand rotation started. The clock continued rotating for about 2000 ms after the 
participants reported the timing of the critical event. The perceptual times were verbally 
reported as minute hand positions and recorded by the experimenter on a laptop. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in 
the study (See Figure 2.1 for a sample trial procedure).  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
37 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Trial procedure in the operant condition. Each trial began with a fixation 
cross displayed for 500 ms. Participants then made a key press at their own pace after the 
clock started rotating. They were told to press a specific button in the no-choice condition 
or select one of three (medium level of choice) or seven (high level of choice) buttons on 
the response pad. The key press was followed by the auditory tone after a delay of 200 
ms. In the baseline condition, participants either made a key press without hearing the 
tone and judged the timing of their key press, or heard the tone which occurred alone and 
judged the timing of the tone. 
+ 
    Fixation, 500 ms 
Medium choice-level (three buttons) 
No choice (one button) 
High choice-level (seven buttons) 
“28” 
Consequent auditory tone 
Libet clock 
Key press 
Participant’s estimation 
of the key press or the 
tone onset in terms of 
the clock hand position 
Delay, 200 ms 
Time 
Action Selection and Outcome 
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2.4 Results 
The experiment comprised a 2 (Condition: Baseline, Operant) x 3 (Level of choice: 
High, Medium, No choice) x 2 (Critical Event: Action, Tone) repeated measures design. 
After converting the clock hand judgments to time values in milliseconds, we calculated 
the judgment errors for each condition as the difference between perceived and actual 
times of events (Table 2.1). Trials with key press response times (RT) shorter than or 
equal to 500 ms and with judgment errors three standard deviations away from 
participant’s average judgment error were excluded from the analysis. In addition, trials 
in which participants made a key press other than the permitted ones were removed from 
the data. The exclusion criteria resulted in the removal of 3.06% of all trials (range: 1-
11%).  
Table 2.1. Mean judgment errors in each condition. For each event and each 
condition, perceived times were subtracted from the actual time of the corresponding 
events. Asterisks indicate the judged event (i.e., the onset time of key press or tone). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of Choice 
 
Individual 
Event 
Mean 
Judgment 
Error 
 
SD 
No Choice 
Key press alone -35.96 67.85 
Key* tone -12.68 81.19 
Key tone* -106.12 135.21 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
Key press alone -19.24 83.33 
Key* tone -13.21 63.10 
Key tone* -141.55 114.60 
 
High 
 
Key press alone -58.19 62.18 
Key* tone -11.34 83.65 
Key tone* -137.73 143.22 
Tone alone -117.44 97.56 
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We then obtained the perceptual shifts in terms of the difference between judgment 
errors between operant and the corresponding single event baseline conditions for both 
key press and tone judgments. For example, the perceptual shift for the high level action 
choice condition was calculated as the difference between the judgment errors in the 
operant-high-level condition from the baseline-high-level condition. Similarly, the 
perceptual shifts for the tone judgments were calculated as the difference between the 
judgment errors in each choice level-tone judgment condition and baseline-tone only 
condition. The positive shifts in the key press judgments and the negative shifts in the 
tone judgments relative to the corresponding baseline conditions demonstrate the 
temporal attraction, i.e. the intentional binding effect, between actions and effects (see 
Figure 2.2).  
We performed a 3 (Level of choice: High, Medium, No choice) x 2 (Critical event: 
Key press, Tone) repeated measures ANOVA to examine the effect of having different 
number of action choices on the perceptual shifts. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of key press choice (F(2,44)=3.36, p=.044, ƞ2 = .13) and a significant main 
effect of critical event (F(1,22)=5.15, p=.003, ƞ2 = .19). The interaction between these 
factors was also significant (F(2,44)=3.39, p=.043, ƞ2 = .13). We predicted that binding 
would be least for the no choice condition, strongest for the high level of choice 
condition, and intermediate for the medium level condition. We thus conducted one-
tailed paired samples t tests to examine the two-way interaction in more detail.  
The t tests performed on the perceived times of actions revealed that when 
participants had high number of choices among which keys they could press, their 
perceptual shift in key press judgments from baseline condition was moved significantly 
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further toward the tone compared to when they had medium level of choices (t(22)=2.29, 
p=.016) and to when they had no choice (t(22)=1.79, p=.043) . The difference between 
medium level of choice condition and no choice condition was not significant (p>.05). 
With respect to the tone judgments, the perceptual shifts moved toward the 
perceived action onsets for both medium and high levels of choices. The size of the shift 
was greater for the medium level than the high level and it was in the opposite direction 
for the no choice condition. We found a significant difference in the perceptual shifts 
between high level of choice and no choice conditions (t(22)=-2.19, p=.020) and also 
between medium level of choice and no choice conditions (t(22)=-2.26, p=.017). The 
difference in the perceptual shifts between high and medium level of choices was not 
significant (p>.05). 
 
Figure 2.2 Mean perceptual shifts (difference between the judgment errors in the 
operant and baseline conditions) for key press and tone judgments (*p<.05). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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We sought further the effect of choice levels on the mean overall binding which 
was calculated by subtracting the tone perceptual shift from the key press perceptual shift 
for each condition (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009). We conducted a 3 (Level of 
choice: High, Medium, No choice) repeated measures ANOVA and found a significant 
main effect of action choice level on overall binding (F(2,44)=3.39, p=.043, ƞ2 = .13). As 
expected, we found that overall binding was strongest in the high level of action choice 
condition, intermediate for the medium level of choice condition, and lowest for the no 
choice condition (see Figure 2.3). We performed one-tailed t tests to examine the 
differences across the three choice levels. The results showed that overall binding in the 
high level of choice condition was significantly greater compared to no choice 
(t(22)=1.99, p=.018) condition. However, the difference between high level of choice and 
medium level of choice condition as well as the difference between medium level of 
choice and no choice conditions were not significant (p>.05). 
 
Figure 2.3 Mean overall binding as a function of action choice. Error bars represent 
SEM (*p<.05).                                                             
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2.5 Discussion 
Previous research focusing on different forms of the SoA has examined the 
contribution of various factors including predictive and retrospective processes (see 
Moore & Obhi, 2012 for a full review of these studies). Action selection is a crucial 
aspect of the agentic experience and has been shown to enhance the explicit feeling of 
control when facilitated by the subliminal priming of action alternatives (Wenke et al., 
2010). The goal of the present study was to examine how intentional binding would be 
influenced by different levels of action choice. This is an important question given 
popular notions about how freedom and agency are intertwined (e.g., Pettit, 2001).  
We measured the perceived times of individual key press and tone events 
separately in both baseline and operant conditions which allowed us to compare the size 
of the perceptual shift between each level of action choice. First, we found that perceived 
times of key presses for all levels of choices were shifted forward in time. In the medium 
level and high level conditions, the direction of the perceived time of the tones was 
shifted toward the key press whereas, somewhat surprisingly, this was not the case for the 
no-choice condition. Importantly though, as Figure 2.2 shows, the overall shift for each 
individual event (i.e. key press and tone) were in the expected direction and demonstrate 
the intentional binding effect. Of more interest, we found that the degree of overall 
binding was greatest when participants had the highest level of action alternatives to 
choose from. In the medium choice condition, binding was not significantly different 
from the no choice condition, but both these conditions displayed less binding than the 
high choice condition. Moreover, the magnitude of the binding in three conditions 
displayed a parametric trend increasing from none to three and seven alternatives (see 
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Figure 2.3). Thus, these results provide support for the notion that a high degree of choice 
is associated with greater action-effect binding than lower degrees of choice. These 
results serve to connect the SoA to free-choice and are also consistent with the common 
societal notion that the exercise of personal choice, freedom and agency are intimately 
intertwined (Hirschmann, 2003; Krause, 2012).  
What could be driving our observed effects of choice on intentional binding and by 
extension, the SoA? Given that all possible actions in the set of alternatives produced the 
same auditory event, our method could be construed as a true test of action selection on 
the SoA. That is, there is no obvious reason why an individual participant may have 
chosen one action over another, given that the outcome, or reward value of each possible 
action was fixed. Several explanations are possible.    
First, the results we report here are consistent with the finding that intentional 
binding is stronger when participants specify both the what and the when component of a 
pending action, compared to when they specify just one of these dimensions (i.e. “when” 
or “what” - (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Wenke et al., 2009). Participants in the present 
study were always responsible for specifying the when component, but had varying levels 
of choice about what action to make. Specifically, participants were constrained to just 
one possible action (no choice condition), three possible actions (medium choice 
condition) or seven possible actions (high choice condition). Thus, in the no choice 
condition, the action is completely specified externally by the experimenter whereas in 
both the medium and high choice conditions, the participant must internally specify 
which action they will ultimately select. By some accounts, the no choice condition can 
be thought of as more externally triggered than the medium and high choice conditions 
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(see Obhi & Haggard, 2004; Obhi, 2012; Schüür & Haggard, 2011). Correspondingly, it 
has been shown that activation in areas associated with voluntary preparation to act, such 
as the supplementary motor area (SMA) is greater for actions that are more internally 
specified than externally specified (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). Thus one broad explanation 
for our findings is that more internal, endogenous processing prior to action production is 
linked to higher levels of agency experience, which manifests as greater intentional 
binding. 
Another interesting framework within which to consider the results of the present 
study is based on the affordance competition hypothesis that models behaviour as 
resulting from competition between different representations of potential actions (Cisek, 
2007). In this model, action representations are thought of as distributed neural 
populations that are activated via selective attentional mechanisms (Tipper, Lortie, & 
Baylis, 1992). By such a view, the action that is finally selected and executed is chosen 
based on a dynamic reciprocal process operating largely within fronto-parietal circuits 
which involves mutual inhibition between potential action representations and is subject 
to biasing by excitatory inputs, some of which arise from cognitive decision making 
processes (see Cisek, 2007 for a detailed discussion).   
Within this framework, we suggest that high, medium, and no choice conditions 
differ in the degree of this dynamic activation and inhibition process that is ultimately 
responsible for action selection. Specifically, the no-choice condition may not involve the 
same degree of this dynamic inhibitory and excitatory activity as the high choice 
condition. We suggest that this difference might result in stronger activation of the 
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representation of the action selected among many, such as in the high choice condition of 
the present experiment.  
This is akin to more endogenous processing being linked to greater agency, as 
suggested above, with the endogenous activity being specifically the dynamic interplay 
between excitatory and inhibitory processes during action selection. This explanation also 
predicts greater binding for the medium choice condition compared to the no choice 
condition as reported in our study, although the difference was not significant. From the 
present study, it appears that when seven alternative actions are available, this is 
sufficient to change the subjective experience of actions compared to when there is no 
alternative. However, three alternatives demonstrate no difference from seven or no 
alternatives. Clearly, more work is required to determine if this suggestion is tenable, but 
at the very least, our data do indicate that high choice affects binding in a way that no 
choice does not.  
One might argue that the cognitive load varied across three levels of action choices 
in our study, which could have contaminated our results. However, as previous studies 
discussed this concern in detail (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002), the errors in time judgments in 
the operant condition are subtracted from their corresponding baseline conditions (e.g. 
high level of choice action judgment errors in the baseline condition are subtracted from 
high level of choice action judgment errors in the operant condition) to calculate the 
perceptual shifts for each event and condition. Since the potential effect of either 
cognitive or attentional requirements varying across different levels of choice should be 
present in both baseline and operant conditions, this effect would diminish as a result of 
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the subtraction we used to obtain the perceptual shifts. We thus feel confident in ruling 
out the effect of differential cognitive load across conditions. 
Having demonstrated that a high degree of choice is linked to increased binding, it 
is important to consider that there are limitations to the present study. For example, we 
did not assess the explicit SoA in this study and so cannot speak to how the number of 
action choice alternatives might affect the explicit feeling of agency. In addition, we did 
not manipulate the outcome of the different action alternatives. This is an obvious 
extension of the current work (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) and would allow for 
determining the influence of reward on intentional binding and the SoA.  
Despite these limitations, showing that intentional binding is influenced by the 
degree of action choice is an important finding and we believe the current study provides 
a new set of questions relating to how choice affects the SoA, which could apply to many 
domains that extend beyond a fundamental consideration of how the SoA arises.   
Finally, the current results bolster the notion that intentional binding is linked, in 
some complex way to agentic experience. It has previously been shown that priming low 
power reduces binding and activating memories of depression reduces binding (Obhi et 
al., 2013), whereas less versus more control of an aircraft, when control is shared with an 
automatic pilot, reduces binding (Berberian, Sarrazin, Le Blaye, & Haggard, 2012). 
Given that these scenarios are all accompanied by real changes in the degree of control 
that an individual either perceives themselves as having, or actually has, the idea that 
binding and agency are linked is strengthened. The key is for future work to understand 
why and precisely how the SoA and binding are affected by these kinds of manipulations. 
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For now though, the current results reinforce the suggestion that increased personal 
choice increases agency which could form the foundation for a sense of freedom.  
In the following chapter, we turn our attention to the influence of the valence (i.e., 
pleasant vs. unpleasant) of action-outcomes on the SoA. After we examine how outcome 
pleasantness per se can influence the SoA in Chapter 3, we return back to the freedom 
and choice-level aspects of action selection and their link to the SoA. In Chapters 4-5, we 
advance the current design of study in such a way that free versus instructed actions 
(Chapter 4) or dynamically varying types of actions in different choice-levels (Chapter 5) 
can produce pleasant and unpleasant outcomes.   
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3.1 Abstract  
The sense of agency (SoA) is suggested to occur at both low and high levels by the 
involvement of sensorimotor processes and the contribution of retrospective inferences 
based on contextual cues. In the current study, we recruited western and non-western 
participants and examined the effect of pleasantness of action outcomes on both feeling 
of control (FoC) ratings and intentional binding which refers to the perceived 
compression of the temporal delay between actions and outcomes. We found that both 
western and non-western groups showed greater FoC ratings for the consonant (pleasant) 
compared to dissonant (unpleasant) outcomes. The intentional binding effect, on the other 
hand, was stronger for the consonant compared to dissonant outcomes in the western 
group only. We discuss the results in relation to how cultural background might 
differentially influence the effect of outcome pleasantness on low and high levels of the 
SoA.  
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3.2 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined the effect of having a varying number of 
action alternatives on intentional binding. One of several other questions regarding 
agentic experience concerns situations where actions generate outcomes that differ in 
their valence or reward value. Indeed, most human actions are goal-directed and 
inextricably linked to the outcomes they produce (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 
2002; Haggard, 2008; Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007).  
Previous research has examined how the reward value of action-outcomes can 
influence adaptive behavior and cognition in action control (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & 
Marien, 2008; Marien, Aarts, & Custers, 2012, 2013). This line of research has suggested 
that the reward signals related to the action-outcomes can increase the motivation and 
facilitate adaptive control of actions. Aarts et al. (2008), for example, showed that 
subliminally priming participants with words representing exertion paired with positive 
words increased the amount of effort displayed during squeezing a hand grip compared to 
priming with only exertion or positive words. These results suggested that positive 
primes could have acted as reward signals and thus enhanced the motivation to exert 
more effort in squeezing the hand grip.   
An intriguing question that results from these findings is whether and how the 
reward or positive value of action-outcomes would affect the subjective experience 
surrounding actions and the SoA. Previous studies in this vein have shown that negative 
action outcomes (e.g. vocalization of fear) had an attenuating effect on intentional 
binding compared to positive (e.g., vocalization of amusement) or neutral (a pure tone) 
outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) and positive monetary gains enhanced the binding 
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effect (Takahata et al., 2012). Also, priming participants with positive pictures compared 
to neutral ones was found to increase the intentional binding effect (Aarts et al., 2012). In 
their study, Aarts et al. (2012) presented neutral or positive pictures at the beginning of 
each trial and measured intentional binding using the clock paradigm (Haggard et al., 
2002) and also the eye-blink rate (EBR) of the participants. The reason to include the 
EBR measurement in their design was to investigate whether potential influence of 
positive primes on binding could be mediated by EBR, which indirectly reflects the 
functioning of the dopaminergic system. Notably, previous studies showed that EBR was 
positively correlated with the concentration of dopamine (e.g., Taylor et al., 1999). Other 
studies have shown that dopamine agonists and antagonists had increasing and decreasing 
effects, respectively, on the EBR (e.g., Lawrence & Redmond, 1991). Moreover, 
dopaminergic system has long been known to involve in the processing of rewards (for a 
review see Ikemoto, Yang, & Tan, 2015) and in association of actions with their 
outcomes (Schultz, 2002). Given these findings regarding the link between dopamine and 
reward processing, action-outcome association, and EBR, Aarts et al. (2012) could 
examine if the potential effect of positive primes on binding could be explained by 
changes in EBR. Accordingly, their results showed that binding was stronger with 
positive than neutral primes. More interestingly, this effect was found to be moderated by 
individual differences in EBR. That is the difference in binding between positive and 
neutral primes was greater in individuals with higher spontaneous EBR compared to 
those with lower. Overall, these results suggested that the influence of positive valence 
on the SoA, as indexed by intentional binding, was mediated by the dopaminergic 
system.   
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From the perspective of social psychology, the abovementioned findings indicating 
stronger binding with positive or rewarding outcomes can be interpreted with the notion 
of self-serving bias. Self-serving bias refers to that the tendency to attribute the self as the 
cause of outcomes is stronger for positive compared to negative or undesirable events 
(Duval & Silvia, 2002; Miller & Ross, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1994). It has been argued, 
however, that there might be cultural differences in this bias. A recent meta-analysis of 
the relevant research examining cross-cultural differences in self-serving bias suggested 
that the self serving bias is stronger in U.S. and western than Asian samples (Mezulis, 
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).    
A critical extension to the abovementioned studies examining the relationship 
between the valence of action-outcomes and the SoA is whether perceived pleasantness 
can affect the SoA differentially based on potential cultural variations. Thus, in the 
present chapter we examined how intentional binding and the explicit FoC over action 
outcomes would be influenced when these outcomes differed in terms of their perceived 
pleasantness, which is potentially shaped by cultural differences.  
As action outcomes, we used consonant and dissonant piano chords that have long 
been subject to the study by researchers interested in music perception due to the 
different sensations they evoke in listeners. According to the Pythagorian view, the 
relative simplicity of the frequency ratio of two tones played simultaneously determines 
the pleasantness of the outcome sound (Helmholtz, 1877; Tenney, 1988). Consonance, in 
this regard, refers to the pleasantness produced by the co-occurrence of two tones 
whereas dissonance is described as unpleasant due to the beating and roughness 
(Dell’Acqua, Sessa, Jolicoeur, & Robitaille, 2006; Dellacherie, Roy, Hugueville, Peretz, 
CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                             
53 
 
& Samson, 2011; Plantinga & Trehub, 2013; Shapira Lots & Stone, 2008). The major 
view regarding the perception of these tonal structures suggests that stability and 
pleasant-sounding attributes make consonance preferred over instable and rough-
sounding dissonance (Bidelman, Krishnan, & Bidelman, Gavin M.; Krishnan, 2009; 
McDermott & Hauser, 2004).  
However, the issue regarding the relationship between psychological and 
neurophysiological basis of consonance preference and its universal prevalence remains 
unresolved. One contention is that preference for consonance is innate and is due to 
certain constraints in the auditory system (Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996a; Tramo, 
Cariani, Delgutte, & Braida, 2001). In support of this view, studies with infants 
measuring their looking-time preference suggests that infants as young as 2 and 4-month-
olds (Trainor, Tsang, & Cheung, 2002) and 2-day-olds (Masataka, 2006) prefer to listen 
to consonant excerpts over dissonant ones. However, there is also accumulating evidence 
suggesting that consonant preference is the product of learning mechanisms. Vassilakis 
(2005), for example, examined Middle Eastern, North Indian, and Bosnian musical 
structures and noted that beats, which are thought to reside in dissonance, are well 
accepted in the musical structure of these cultures. In addition, Plantinga and Trehub 
(2013) tested consonance preference among 6-year-old infants and found that the 
listening time to the consonant chords was not longer than dissonant ones. Moreover, 
they showed that after a 3-minute exposure to either consonant or dissonant stimuli, 
infants listened to the familiar intervals longer, regardless of their consonant or dissonant 
status.  
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The current study takes into account both lines of findings suggesting enhanced 
SoA over positive outcomes and cultural variances in the perceived pleasantness of 
consonance to address two important questions. First, these two types of stimuli would 
allow us to investigate whether low and high levels of the SoA are similarly affected by 
the pleasantness of action outcomes. Second, as consonance preference is suggested to 
vary across different cultures (e.g. Vassilakis, 2005), our design could reveal whether this 
variance can manifest itself on either low or high levels of the SoA.  
In the current study, participants completed a computer based task in which they 
made a voluntary right or left key press which was followed by either consonant or 
dissonant piano chords. We determined the intentional binding effect, subjective feelings 
of control (FoC) over the chords, and participants’ ratings for how much they liked each 
of consonant and dissonant chords. 
Based on the common bias towards attribution of the self as a cause of positive 
outcomes (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), we predicted that the perceived pleasantness of 
consonant chords would produce higher FoC and liking ratings as well as stronger 
binding effect (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) compared to the dissonant ones. As consonant 
and dissonant chords are based specifically on western tonal structure, our second 
prediction was that we would observe a greater effect of consonance in the western group 
compared to the non-western group.  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
In total, 34 right-handed participants were recruited from the participant pool of 
Wilfrid Laurier University. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of 
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Wilfrid Laurier University, and all participants gave written informed consent prior to 
beginning the study. We excluded four participants who, in at least one condition, had 
their mean judgment errors two standard deviations away from the sample mean. In 
addition, the data of one participant who could not follow the instructions were excluded 
from the analyses. Inclusion of these participants’ data was not found to affect the results 
reported below. 
We divided the remaining 29 participants into two groups based on the post-
experimental questionnaire that gathered information about their cultural background. In 
this questionnaire, they indicated their country of origin and for how long they have been 
living in Canada. Additionally, they rated on two 10-point scales to indicate their lifetime 
level of exposure to and preference for western and non-western (i.e., Asian, African, and 
Middle East) music. For each participant, we calculated the index of exposure to western 
music by dividing the exposure rating for western music by the sum of ratings for 
western and non-western music. Similarly, we calculated the index of preference for 
western music over non-western music to examine the differences between the two 
groups (see Results). 
The western group included 17 participants (6 male, Mage = 21.5, SD= 5.2) who 
were born and raised in Canada, USA, or Western Europe. The non-western group 
consisted of 12 participants (5 male, Mage = 21.2, SD = 1.66) who were born in one of the 
non-western countries listed in Table 3.1. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and had no hearing problems. 23 of the participants received 11 CAD 
while the remaining group was granted with 1 course credit in return to their 
participation.  
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Table 3.1 Demographic information for the western and non-western group. 
Group Age 
Exposure 
rate for 
Western 
music 
Preference 
rate for 
Western 
music 
Number of 
years spent 
in Canada 
Western (n=17) 
Canada   
USA  
Western Europe  
21.5 (5.2)  .88 (.13)  .66 (.14)  18 (6.7)  
Non-Western (n=12) 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  
China  
Hong Kong  
Iran 
Malaysia  
Pakistan  
United Arab Emirates  
21.2 (1.66)  .68 (.32)  .53 (.23)  7.6 (4.9)  
 
3.3.2 Apparatus and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, USA) and 
ran on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz). Participants sat approximately 50 cm away 
from a 20 inch monitor (1600x1200) and the responses were recorded on a laptop by the 
experimenter. 
The auditory stimuli consisted of three consonant (perfect fifth, minor third, and 
perfect fourth) and three dissonant (minor second, major second, and tritone) piano 
chords and were recorded using Audacity 2.0.3. All of the chords had the same 44.1 KHz 
sampling rate, 16 bit stereo format, and were 1.5 s in duration. The sound level of the 
chords was set to 80 dB (See Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Consonant and dissonant chords used in the study. 
Chord 
Frequency 
Ratio 
Consonants 
Minor Third  6:5 
Perfect Fourth  4:3 
Perfect Fifth  3:2 
Dissonants 
Minor Second  16:15 
Major Second  9:8 
Tritone  45:32 
 
The first part of the experiment measured the effect of consonance status of the 
outcomes on intentional binding and consisted of two baseline and two operant 
conditions. Each of these four conditions was presented in randomly ordered blocks with 
72 trials each.  
Each trial in the baseline-key press and operant conditions began with the screen 
indicating the start of a new trial (250 ms) which was followed by the fixation cross 
presented for 250 ms. The next display prompted the participants to choose either left or 
right button. Participants were free to choose either the left or the right button at a time of 
their choosing on a response pad using their right and left index fingers. They were told 
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not to give any stereotyped responses when choosing right or left button and not to press 
the button at a predetermined time. 
The first key press then brought up the screen with a Libet clock on which the clock 
hand remained stationary for 500 ms and then started its rotation. Participants were told 
to press the same button at their own pace during the rotation. The reason why 
participants pressed the same key twice before and after rotation was to avoid any 
potential effect of the clock hand position (i.e. on the right or left half of the clock) 
biasing the participants’ right or left button choice. In the operant conditions, the second 
key press produced one of the six chords after a delay of 250 ms. For half of the 
participants, consonant and dissonant chords were produced by left and right button 
presses, respectively, and this matching was reversed for the remaining participants. In 
this way, left button press, for example, randomly produced one of the three consonant 
chords while the right button produced one of the three dissonant chords. The mapping of 
the key press and chord type was kept constant throughout the experiment for each 
participant. Depending on the critical event to be reported in a particular operant block, 
participants then judged the clock hand position (0 to 59) when either they pressed the 
button or when they first heard the chord (see Figure 3.1 (A)). In the baseline-key press 
condition the second key press did not produce any chord and participants judged the 
timing of their key press. The clock hand continued rotating for 2000 to 2500 ms after 
their verbal response regarding the time judgments and then the next trial began.  
In the baseline-outcome condition, each trial began with a warning signal followed 
by the fixation cross. The clock was then appeared and one of six different chords was 
randomly presented during the rotation. Participants judged the clock hand position when 
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they first heard the chord. Time judgments were verbally reported and recorded on a 
laptop by the experimenter. 
After the intentional binding session was completed, participants performed another 
block of 72 trials to report their FoC over the chords (see Figure 3.1 (B)). Each trial in 
this block began with the message indicating the trial initiation (250 ms) followed by the 
fixation cross (250 ms). The next screen prompted the participants to freely choose one of 
the two buttons as in the intentional binding blocks. Their key press produced one of the 
six chords after a 250 ms delay and participants rated their FoC over the chord on a 10-
point scale (1: not at all, 10: full control).  
In the last part of the experiment, participants passively heard each chord and rated 
on a 10-point scale to indicate how much they liked it (1: not at all, 10: very much). This 
block consisted of 18 trials in which all six chords were equally presented in a 
randomized order (see Figure 3.1 (C)). In total thus, participants completed five blocks 
with 72 trials each and one block with 18 trials throughout the experiment. 
After the experimental blocks, participants completed a demographic questionnaire 
which included items to note their origin of country, weekly amount of exposure to 
western and non-western music as well as their preference for each. Finally, they were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of a sample trial in the operant condition in the intentional 
binding (A), subjective FoC judgment (B), and liking judgment (C) sessions. 
3.4 Results 
We excluded the trials with key press response times (RT) shorter than 600 ms and 
with time judgment errors being three standard deviations away from participant’s 
average judgment error. In addition, trials in which participants made the second key 
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press during the clock rotation different than the one on the previous step were removed 
from the data. The exclusion criteria resulted in the removal of 3.4 % of all trials (range: 
0.7-7.5%). 
3.4.1 Musical Exposure and Preference 
We first compared the two groups in terms of their exposure to and preference for 
western music. Independent samples t test revealed that the exposure score was 
significantly higher in western (M=.87, SD=.13, N=17) than in non-western (M=.68, 
SD=.32, N=12) group, t(27)=2.17, p=.039, two-tailed. Similarly, the western group’s 
ratings score for preferring western music (M=.69, SD=.14, N=17) was significantly 
higher than that of the non-western group (M=.53, SD=.23, N=12), t(27)=2.23, p=.034, 
two-tailed. 
3.4.2 Button Choice 
We first examined whether the mapping between right/left button and 
consonant/dissonant outcome biased participants’ choice of key press. For each 
participant, we calculated the proportion of choosing right versus left button as well as 
the proportion of choosing the button that produced consonant chords. Paired samples t 
test revealed that participants chose the right button more often than the left one 
(M=52.80, t(28)= 3.19, p=.004). Although the ratio of choosing the button that produced 
consonant chords was higher than that produced dissonance (M= 50.40), the difference 
was not significant (p>.05). 
3.4.3 Intentional Binding 
In order to analyze the effect of consonance versus dissonance of action outcomes 
on intentional binding, we first obtained the perceptual shifts as the difference in the 
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judgment errors between operant and the corresponding single event baseline conditions 
for both key press and chord judgments (see Table 3.3). Accordingly, the perceptual 
shifts for the key presses which produced consonant/dissonant chords were calculated as 
the difference between the judgment errors in the operant-consonant/dissonant (key press 
judgment) condition and the baseline (key press only) condition. Similarly, the perceptual 
shifts for the onset of the chord judgments were calculated as the difference between the 
judgment errors in the operant-consonant/dissonant (chord judgment) condition and 
baseline (chord only) condition. The positive shifts in the key press judgments and the 
negative shifts in the tone judgments relative to the corresponding baseline conditions 
demonstrate the temporal attraction, i.e. the intentional binding effect, between actions 
and outcomes (Haggard et al., 2002). 
Table 3.3 Mean judgment errors in each condition (C and D refers to consonant 
and dissonant, respectively. For the key presses, they refer to the associated the chord 
type). 
Condition Error (SD) 
Western Non-Western 
Baseline   
             Key Press (C)  -30.72 (33.78)  -42.61 (48.96)  
             Key Press (D)  -27.87 (33.20)  -42.10 (44.08)  
             Chord (C)  -13.43 (35.36)  -38.41 (58.18)  
             Chord (D)  -26.19 (45.29)  -33.84 (43.66)  
Operant   
             Key Press (C)  31.49 (68.91)  15.21 (76.50)  
             Key Press (D)  30.26 (71.12)  15.33 (77.18)  
             Chord (C)  -124.66 (98.32)  -139.79 (108.96)  
             Chord (D) -122.91 (101.59)  -145.89 (110.55)  
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We first conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design, repeated measures ANOVA with 
chord (consonant, dissonant) and event (key press, chord) as the within subjects factors, 
and group (western, non-western) as the between subjects factor. The analysis yielded a 
main effect of event (F(1,27) = 90.16, p<.001, ƞ2 = .77) suggesting that the perceptual 
shifts in key press and chord judgments were significantly different. Although we did not 
observe a main effect of chord on the perceptual shifts (p>.05), there was a significant 
three-way interaction between event, chord, and group (F(1,27) = 6.66, p=.016, ƞ2 = .20). 
In order to examine the three-way interaction, we conducted 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with chord (consonant, dissonant) and event (key press, chord) for each group 
(see Figure 3.2 (A) & (B)).  
For the western group, we found a significant main effect of event (F(1,16) = 
53.04, p<.001, ƞ2 = .77) as well as a significant interaction between chord and event 
(F(1,27) = 7.23, p=.016, ƞ2 = .31). Paired samples t tests revealed that the difference in 
the perceptual shifts of key press judgments as well as the difference between the chord 
judgments for consonant and dissonant chords were not significant (all tests, p>.05). For 
the non-western group, the only main effect we observed was of event (F(1,11) = 39.9, 
p<.001, ƞ2 = .78).   
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Figure 3.2 Mean perceptual shifts in key press and chord judgments as a function of 
chord type for the western (A) and non-western (B) groups. Error bars represent SEM.  
Second, we calculated the overall binding by subtracting the tone perceptual shifts 
from the key press perceptual shifts (Wenke, Waszak, & Haggard, 2009). We then 
conducted a 2 x 2 mixed-design, repeated measures ANOVA with chord (consonant, 
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dissonant) as the within subjects factor and group (western, non-western) as the between 
subjects factor. The test yielded a significant interaction between chord and group 
(F(1,27) = 6.66, p =.016, ƞ2 = .20). We then examined the effect of chord type for each 
group separately and found that for the western group, the overall binding was 
significantly greater when the key presses produced consonant chords compared to 
dissonant ones (F(1,16) = 7.23, p=.016, ƞ2 = .31). For the non-western group, however, 
the overall binding did not show difference between consonant and dissonant chords (all 
tests, p>.05, see Figure 3.3).  
  
Figure 3.3 Mean overall binding as a function of chord type for both western and 
non-western groups. Error bars represent SEM (* indicates p<.05). 
Finally, we conducted linear regression analyses to explore if the time participants 
spent in Canada or the level of exposure to western music would predict the overall 
binding for consonant and dissonant chords. The dependent variables were overall 
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consonant and dissonant chords. Number of years spent in Canada and the ratio of 
exposure to western music were simultaneously entered as the independent variables. 
None of the tests revealed any significant relationship between the level of familiarity 
with western music and intentional binding (all tests, p>.05).  
3.4.4 FoC Judgments 
In order to examine the effect of consonance versus dissonance on FoC judgments, 
we performed a 2 x 2 mixed-design, repeated measures ANOVA with chord (consonant, 
dissonant) as the within subjects factor and group (western, non-western) as the between 
subjects factor. The test revealed a main effect of chord (F(1,27) = 16.52, p<.001, ƞ2 = 
.38) suggesting that participants felt significantly more in control over the consonant 
chords than the dissonant chords (see Figure 3.4). The interaction between the chord and 
group was not significant (p>.05). 
 
Figure 3.4 Mean FoC ratings across both groups as a function of chord type. Error 
bars represent SEM (* indicates p<.05). 
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3.4.5 Liking Judgments 
A 2 x 2 mixed-design, repeated measures ANOVA with chord (consonant, 
dissonant) as the within subjects factor and group (western, non-western) as the between 
subjects factor yielded that participants’ liking ratings for consonant chords were 
significantly higher than dissonant ones (F(1,27)=63.70, p<.001, ƞ2 = .70). There was no 
interaction between chord and group (p>.05). See Figure 3.5. 
 
  
Figure 3.5 Mean liking ratings across both groups as a function of chord type. Error 
bars represent SEM (* indicates p<.05). 
Finally, we calculated the difference between consonance and dissonance in overall 
binding, FoC ratings, and liking ratings. Bivariate correlation analysis showed that the 
difference score in the subjective control ratings significantly correlated with that in 
liking ratings (r (27) =.48, p<.001).     
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3.5 Discussion 
In the current study, we examined the effect of perceived pleasantness of the action 
outcomes on both intentional binding and subjective judgments of agency in western and 
non-western participants. We found that both groups felt significantly more control over 
the consonant chords than the dissonant ones and gave higher ratings of liking the former 
than the latter. The low level SoA indexed by the intentional binding effect was 
influenced by chord type in the western group only. That is, overall binding was 
significantly greater when western listeners’ actions produced consonant rather than 
dissonant chords whereas non-western listeners showed no differences in the binding 
effect between the two chord types. Another important result of the current study was that 
participants’ ratings for liking the consonant chords over the dissonant ones correlated 
with their respective FoC judgments. These results are noteworthy both in terms of 
consonance preference and cross cultural examination of the SoA at both low and high 
levels.  
Regarding consonance preference, both groups in our study reported liking 
consonant chords more than dissonant chords. Although the discussion about whether 
consonance preference is culture dependent or innate is beyond the scope of this paper, 
our results seem to support the notion of a universal preference for consonance. However, 
the group of non-western listeners in the current study was not completely isolated from 
exposure to western music. A cross-cultural comparison including a group with a 
completely different background of musical experience would provide a more solid 
ground to investigate this issue. For the moment, however, the explicit liking measure 
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suggests a strong preference for consonance across individuals from various cultures (see 
also Fritz et al., 2009).  
Of more interest are the results regarding the effect of consonance status on the low 
and high level SoA and the differences between the two groups. Regarding the high level 
of the SoA as indexed by the FoC ratings in our study, the finding that both groups 
reported higher FoC over consonant than dissonant chords could strongly be related to 
the self-serving bias according to which causal attributions to self are stronger for 
positive than negative action outcomes (e.g., Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). The potential 
effect of self-serving bias on the FoC judgments becomes more tenable as we consider 
the finding that both groups reported to have found the consonant chords more pleasant 
than the dissonant ones. Moreover, this was positively correlated with the FoC ratings. It 
is thus fair to suggest that the difference we observed in agency judgments for two types 
of outcomes was driven by the self-serving bias.  
A more intriguing aspect of our findings concerns the differential effect of 
consonance status of action outcomes on intentional binding between two groups. To 
reiterate, we found that the western group showed greater binding for consonance than 
dissonance whereas the non-western group did not exhibit such an effect by the chord 
type. The crucial question here is why the western group showed stronger SoA over more 
pleasant outcomes at both low and high levels while the non-western group displayed the 
same effect only at the high level. If self-serving bias was the driving force for stronger 
agentic experience at the low level, we would expect both groups to display similar 
results on the intentional binding effect. However, previous studies provide deeper 
insight into how culture specific variations might influence the self serving bias and self 
CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                             
70 
 
evaluations in general. It has been suggested, for example, that the self serving bias is 
stronger in western than most of the Asian cultures (Mezulis et al., 2004). More 
importantly, cross cultural differences in the degree of self-evaluations and self-
enhancement were found to be more apparent on implicit measures while explicit 
measures might not reveal any such difference (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999). 
Accordingly, Hetts et al. (1999) showed that Eastern immigrants showed conflicting 
results in associating self relevant prime words with positive or negative target words. 
That is, while the explicit measure of self-evaluation suggested that Eastern participants 
tend to associate the self concept more with the positive words just as American 
participants, response times taken as the implicit measure did show any bias towards self-
enhancement in Eastern participants. On the basis of their results, the authors suggested 
that implicit measures reflect culture specific attitudes more readily than conscious 
evaluations of the self, which might be vulnerable to situational factors. Regarding our 
results, it is therefore fair to suggest that non-western participants showed a similar self-
serving bias as the western group on the explicit judgments of agency while the two 
groups diverged in the effect of pleasantness of action outcomes on the low level SoA. In 
other words, relatively weaker bias of self-enhancement in non-western participants 
might have yielded no effect of outcome type on their low level SoA.  
An alternative explanation of our results concerns the potential difference in the 
degree of familiarity with consonance versus dissonance. It is possible that, for the 
western group who are more familiar with consonance than dissonance there is a 
difference in the quality of predictions produced by the forward model for consonant 
chords compared to the dissonant chords. Specifically, for the western participants, this 
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difference in the quality of predictions or amount of motor preparation for consonant and 
dissonant chords might have yielded stronger overall binding between key presses and 
consonant chords. For the non-western group, on the other hand, the difference in the 
strength of predictions towards consonance versus dissonance might not be that obvious 
as they have presumably been exposed to the both in their cultural origin (Vassilakis, 
2005). 
Taken together, our results suggest that pre-reflective and conscious experience of 
agency may be differentially affected by the cultural background of participants. This 
difference in the effects of cultural background on low level and high level agency 
supports the notion that the two forms of agency may be supported by dissociable neural 
mechanisms (Moore & Obhi, 2012).  
There are certain limitations to the current study that need to be addressed in future 
research. For example, for westerners we made an assumption that greater exposure to 
western music would imply a higher level of familiarity with and preference for 
consonant chords compared to dissonant chords. Similarly, we considered the non-
western listeners’ reporting lower exposure to western music would bring about milder 
difference between consonant and dissonant chords. However, although the level of 
exposure might be a potential cause for the difference in how chord type affected the 
intentional binding in two groups, we did not find a significant relationship between the 
level of familiarity with western music and the binding effect. Further research should 
employ a more precise method to measure the level of exposure to western music by 
recruiting participants with a wider range of exposure from high to low. Another 
limitation of our study is that we did not measure our participants’ implicit or explicit 
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status of self-serving bias as applied in previous studies which reported a conflict in the 
implicit and explicit belief systems in Eastern cultures (e.g. Hetts et al., 1999). Future 
experiments would provide a deeper insight if they employed valid measures of culture 
specific variations in the mechanism of self-evaluation. Finally, the baseline-chord 
condition in our study was different from the operant-chord condition in terms the 
predictability of the chord type and timing. However, we believe it is unlikely for this to 
contaminate our results as we did not find any effect of chord type on the chord judgment 
errors in the baseline and operant conditions. 
In sum, the current study raises several important ideas concerning the SoA and 
potential differences across cultures. First, we have shown that the perceived pleasantness 
of action outcomes influences the subjective judgement of the SoA such that more 
control is felt over desirable outcomes of actions. Second, the low level SoA indexed by 
the intentional binding effect can either parallel or not parallel the higher level judgment 
of agency depending on several possible factors, one of which appears to be cultural 
background and the level of prior exposure to consonant and dissonant tones. The current 
study also opens up a relatively new dimension of research concerning cross-cultural 
differences in the SoA. How culture interacts with the brain to shape an individual’s 
phenomenological experience of their own actions is a fundamental question that we 
hope will spawn many interesting experiments in years to come.  
In the following chapter, the question of interest is how the SoA would be altered 
when actions are either freely chosen or performed as instructed and when these actions 
can produce either pleasant or unpleasant outcomes.  
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4.1 Abstract 
Actions can be freely chosen or instructed and action outcomes can vary in 
pleasantness. To assess how these factors affect the sense of agency, participants 
performed freely selected or instructed key presses which could produce pleasant or 
unpleasant chords. We obtained estimates of the key press-chord intervals and feeling of 
control ratings (FoC) over the outcomes. Interval estimates were used to index intentional 
binding - the perceived temporal attraction between actions and their outcomes. Results 
showed stronger binding and higher FoC ratings in the free compared to instructed 
condition. Additionally, FoC was stronger for pleasant compared to unpleasant outcomes, 
and for pleasant outcomes that were produced by freely selected compared to instructed 
actions. These results highlight the importance of free action selection on the SoA. They 
also reveal how freedom of action selection and pleasantness of action outcome interact 
to affect the feeling of control. 
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4.2 Introduction 
The capacity to freely choose one’s actions is fundamental to action control 
(Haggard, 2008; Nichols, 2011). Environmental conditions, however, can impose various 
factors that modulate one’s freedom and self-involvement in action selection. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the degree of self-involvement in actions can be varied by how 
much of the decisions regarding whether to act or not, what action to perform, and when 
to perform an action (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2008) is self-determined.  
In the study presented in Chapter 2, we manipulated the what dimension of actions 
such that the number of action alternatives could be either one, three, or seven. We 
reported that binding, as an indirect index of the SoA, was strongest when the context 
provided the highest number of alternatives (i.e., seven). Based on these results, we 
suggested that one’s freedom to choose an action among (relatively) higher number of 
alternatives would bolster the SoA due to greater endogenous processing in the case of a 
large choice space. More clearly, selection of an action among high number of 
alternatives would result in greater activation of the final selection of an action compared 
to when one has none or few options. To reiterate, this interpretation was based on the 
affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek, 2007) that accounted for internal processing of 
action alternatives and suggested that an action is selective through the mechanism of 
dynamic inhibition and excitation of action representations. We also speculated that 
predictions produced by forward model (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002) 
towards the outcome of the selected action could also be stronger in the high-choice 
condition, which in turn could have led to greater binding compared to the no-choice 
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condition. This study was the first to manipulate the choice-level in action selection and 
examine its impact on the SoA.  
Earlier research, in a similar vein, manipulated the source of at least one dimension 
of action decisions (i.e., whether, what, and when) as freely determined or externally 
instructed while the actions were limited to two alternatives. Wenke, Waszak, and 
Haggard (2009), for example, varied the timing and the choice of actions such that 
participants could either freely choose one of two keys or press the instructed key at a 
time of either their own choice or during a pre-specified interval. Using a similar 
paradigm to Haggard et al. (2002), participants were instructed to judge the time of either 
their key press or the resulting tone, in order to determine the size of the intentional 
binding effect across free and instructed choice conditions. Wenke et al. (2009) found 
that binding between the perceived times of key presses and tones was greater when both 
the choice and timing of actions were specified by the same source, (i.e., either freely 
selected or instructed), compared to when these dimensions were determined by different 
sources. On the basis of their results, the authors suggested that pronounced binding 
found in their study was owed to the compatibility of sources determining both the what- 
and the when-dimensions of actions. In their view, therefore, a conflict between the 
regarding sources would result in weaker binding. 
Another line of research investigated the neural basis of free versus instructed 
actions and have shown that the contrast between free choice and instructed actions was 
associated with increased BOLD activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), and supplementary motor area 
(SMA) (Cunnington et al., 2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Waszak et al., 2005). In an earlier 
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study, the time of actions (i.e., extension of a finger) could be either self-initiated or 
externally triggered by the onset of auditory stimulus (Jahanshahi et al., 1995) and a PET 
(Positron Emission Tomography) scanning procedure was employed to measure the brain 
activity and the changes in movement related cortical potentials. Their results showed 
that self-initiated movements were associated with a specific network of brain areas 
including DLPFC, SMA, anterior cingulate, insular cortex, the lateral PMC, parietal area 
40, the thalamus, and the putamen. Moreover, the peak amplitude of a movement related 
cortical potential, namely the readiness potential (RP), was greater in self-initiated 
compared to externally triggered movements. 
In another study, similarly, Obhi and Haggard (2004) assessed electromyographic 
(EMG) activity (reflecting the preparation of the muscles) in the right first dorsal 
interosseous while the onset time of participants’ finger press actions could be either self-
initiated or triggered by a tactile stimulus. The results showed that the EMG activity prior 
to action execution was greater when actions were self-initiated compared to when they 
were externally triggered. These results landed further support to the physical differences 
between self-initiated and externally triggered actions.    
Although the studies mentioned above, including the study in Chapter 2, attempted 
to understand the differences between free versus instructed actions on the basis of the 
underlying neural structures and the phenomenology of actions, questions remain 
whether these differences could also be salient depending on the value of action-
outcomes. As noted in Chapter 3, most human actions are goal-directed and related to the 
outcomes they produce (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 2002; Haggard, 2008; 
Herwig et al., 2007). In this regard, the reward or positive value of action-outcomes has 
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been shown to enhance the motivational behaviour in actions (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & 
Marien, 2008) and also enhance the SoA indexed by intentional binding (Aarts et al., 
2012; Takahata et al., 2012).  
In order to extend this line of research concerning the valence of outcomes, in 
Chapter 3, we examined the influence of pleasantness of outcome tones on both 
intentional binding and FoC ratings. Specifically, we used consonant and dissonant piano 
chords as outcome sounds that are- according to several physiological and psychological 
accounts of music perception- regarded as pleasant versus unpleasant, respectively 
(Dell’Acqua, Sessa, Jolicoeur, & Robitaille, 2006; Dellacherie, Roy, Hugueville, Peretz, 
& Samson, 2011; Helmholtz, 1877; Plantinga & Trehub, 2013; Shapira Lots & Stone, 
2008; Tenney, 1988; Bidelman & Krishnan, 2009; McDermott & Hauser, 2004; 
Schellenberg & Trehub, 2013; Tramo, Cariani, Delgutte, & Braida, 2001). To reiterate, 
the study of Chapter 3 assessed both FoC judgments and intentional binding while 
participants’ right or left key presses could produce either pleasant or unpleasant 
outcomes. We found that the amount of binding (in the western group only) and the 
subjective FoC over the chords was stronger when the outcome chords were pleasant 
compared to when they were unpleasant. These results supported the notion that positive 
or desired outcomes tend to be perceived as more strongly self-caused compared to 
negative, relatively undesirable outcomes. Moreover, this study promoted the 
investigation of cross-cultural differences in how agency (particularly at the low level) 
can be shaped by the valence of action-outcomes. 
To summarize, abovementioned findings demonstrate (i) activation differences in 
the brain between self-generated versus externally triggered actions (Cunnington et al., 
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2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., 2008, 2006; Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Waszak 
et al., 2005), (ii) the influence of source compatibility between the what and when 
dimension of action on binding (Wenke et al., 2009), (iii) stronger binding with high 
number of action alternatives (Chapter 2), and (iv) greater binding and FoC with pleasant 
compared to unpleasant outcomes (Chapter 3). One question, at this point, is to further 
probe how the SoA would be affected when the context includes both the manipulation of 
the source of action selection (free vs. instructed) and the valence of action-outcomes 
(pleasant vs. unpleasant).   
The goal of the present chapter is to address this question. Accordingly, participants 
performed either self-selected (free-choice) or externally specified (instructed) key 
presses that could randomly produce either a pleasant or an unpleasant chord. In the free-
choice condition, participants could choose a key among four alternatives while in the 
instructed-choice condition, the selection was based on an instruction stimulus indicating 
which of the four keys to press. Between participants, we obtained estimations of the 
temporal interval between key presses and chords and FoC ratings over the chords. Based 
on the findings presented in Chapters 2-3, we expected stronger binding and higher FoC 
ratings in the free-choice than instructed-choice condition and when the outcome chords 
were pleasant than when they were unpleasant.  
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
In total, we recruited 46 undergraduate students from Wilfrid Laurier University. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the interval estimation or the FoC rating 
task condition. Accordingly, 23 participants completed the interval estimation task (5 
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male, 2 left-handed, Mage = 18.87, SD= 1.10) while the remaining 23 participants 
completed the FoC rating task (8 male, 5 left-handed, Mage = 19.17, SD= 1.77). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no hearing problems. The 
study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of Wilfrid Laurier University and 
participants gave written informed consent prior to beginning the study. Participants were 
compensated with course credits in exchange for their time. 
4.3.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was developed using Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, USA) 
software and run on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz). Participants sat approximately 
60 cm away from a 20 inch monitor (resolution: 1600x1200). Presentation of all stimuli 
was centered on a white background. Responses were made on a 5-key response pad. On 
this pad, four keys were placed on the right, left, up, and down side of the central key. An 
optical wheel mouse was used to indicate responses on visual analogue scales presented 
on the screen for interval estimation, FoC rating, and pleasantness rating tasks. The 
interval estimation scale was ranged from 1 to 1000 ms and marked at 50 ms intervals. 
FoC and pleasantness rating scales were marked at 0.5 point intervals from 1 to 6.  
Auditory stimuli consisted of two consonant (perfect fifth and perfect fourth) and 
two dissonant (minor second, major second) piano chords. These chords were recorded 
using Audacity 2.0.3, sampled at 44.1 kHz with a 16 bit stereo format. Each chord was 1 
s in duration and was presented at 60 dB through the headphones. 
4.3.3 Procedure 
A schematic of the tasks and the procedure is given in Figure 4.1. For each task of 
interval estimation and FoC rating, participants were first familiarized with the tasks and 
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the stimuli, and completed 10 practice trials. Practice session was repeated only once for 
the participants who had difficulty in understanding the task and who made any errors in 
instructed-choice trials. Each task consisted of 288 trials in total, which were presented in 
a random order within 6 mixed blocks of 48 trials each. After completing each block, the 
experiment paused to allow participants to take a break, and continued after the 
experimental instructions for each task were presented on the screen.   
Each trial began with a 1 s presentation of an image representing the central key on 
the response pad. Participants were instructed to rest their left index finger on the central 
key when this image was presented. The following screen displayed one of five images 
representing either a specific key (right, left, up, down) or all four keys placed around the 
central key (see Figure 4.1). In the instructed-choice condition, only one specific key was 
presented and participants were required to press that exact key. In the free-choice 
condition, all four keys were presented and participants were free to choose any of the 
four keys. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to the target stimulus 
and avoid giving stereotyped responses in the free-choice condition. The target stimulus 
remained on the screen until one of four keys was pressed. In case of an erroneous key 
press in the instructed-choice condition, a cross sign appeared on the screen and the trial 
ended. A valid response was followed by one of three delays (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) 
before one of four auditory stimuli (1 s in duration) was presented. In the interval 
estimation task, participants were told that keypress-chord intervals would randomly vary 
between 1 and 1000 ms. After the chord was presented, the interval estimation scale was 
presented on the screen and participants were to indicate their estimation of the delay 
using the mouse with their right hand. No prior training was given for interval 
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estimations and participants were told to rely merely on their sense of time when 
performing the interval estimations. In the FoC rating task, instead, the chord was 
followed by a 6-point visual analogue scale (1: the lowest level of control; 6: the highest 
level of control) participants were required to indicate the degree of control they felt over 
the production of the chord. They were told not to base their judgments on how fast or 
accurately they responded when making the key presses. Participants again used the 
mouse with their right hand and moved the cursor to any point on the scale and clicked to 
indicate FoC judgments. Inter-trial interval was set to 500 ms during which a blank 
screen was presented.  
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Figure 4.1 Schematic illustration of the tasks completed by each group of participants 
(upper panel) and the sample trial procedure in the interval estimation and FoC rating 
tasks (lower panel).  
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Each group of participants completing either the interval estimation or the FoC 
rating task finally performed the pleasantness rating task which aimed at measuring the 
subjective pleasantness of the chords used in the experiment. This task consisted of a 
block of 20 trials. Each chord was thus presented four times in a random order. The trials 
began with a 1500 ms presentation of the text message “Listen”. One of four chords was 
then delivered through the headphones and participants rated on a 6-point scale (1: very 
unpleasant; 6: very pleasant) to indicate how pleasant they found the chord. A 500 ms 
interval was placed before the next trial was presented.        
 At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed about the goal of the 
study and thanked for their time. 
4.3.4 Data processing 
4.3.4.1 Raw data outlier exclusion  
For the interval estimation task, trials with RTs or interval estimations being three 
standard deviations away from the mean, or those with incorrect responses (pressing the 
wrong key in the instructed-choice condition) were excluded (Mexcluded = 2.18%, SD= 
.64% of all trials). The same criteria (except the interval estimation criterion) were also 
applied for the FoC rating task data (Mexcluded = 2.49%, SD= .73% of all trials). 
4.3.4.2 Participant exclusion  
The criteria to exclude a participant’s data was having more than 20% of all trials 
excluded or failing to demonstrate a monotonic increase across the mean estimations of 
100 ms, 300 ms, and 500 ms delays. No participant’s data were excluded due to these 
criteria. 
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4.3.4.3 Data analyses 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the 
effects of choice (free, instructed) and valence (pleasant, unpleasant) on interval 
estimations and FoC ratings. RTs were analyzed as a function of key (right, left, up, 
down) and choice (free, instructed) while pleasantness ratings were analyzed by factoring 
in chord (perfect fifth, perfect fourth, minor second, major second). RTs and pleasantness 
ratings were analyzed combining the data from both interval estimation and FoC rating 
tasks. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
violated. Post hoc multiple comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) were performed where 
differences across variable levels were examined. Additionally, two-tailed paired samples 
t-tests and one sample t-tests were conducted where appropriate. All data analyses were 
conducted using SPSS (version 16.0) and the significance level was set to .05. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Accuracy 
Mean percentages of accuracy in the instructed-choice condition was 99.34% 
(SD=.86) and 99.05% (SD=.98) in the interval estimation and FoC rating tasks, 
respectively. 
4.4.2 Interval estimation 
We calculated the mean interval estimations for each level of choice, outcome 
valence, and delay. Accordingly, estimate data were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated 
measures ANOVA with choice (free, instructed), valence (pleasant, unpleasant), and 
delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) as within subjects factors. The analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of choice (F(1,22) = 5.71, p=.026, ƞ2 = .21) such that interval 
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estimations were significantly shorter when participants freely chose (M=420.59, 
SD=105.75) which key to press than when the key press was instructed (M=433.43, 
SD=108.77, see Figure 4.2). The main effect of delay was also significant (F(2,44) = 
133.52, p<.001, ƞ2 = .86), indicating that perceived intervals were significantly increased 
(p<.001, at all levels) across 100 ms (M=271.63, SD=90.50), 300 ms (M=428.37, 
SD=99.17), and 500 ms (M=581.03, SD=132.12). Outcome valence2 did not have any 
significant effect or interactions with choice and delay on the perceived intervals (Fs<1, 
ps>.5). Finally, there was a significant interaction between choice and delay (F(2,44) = 
4.20, p=.021, ƞ2 = .16). In order to resolve the interaction, we performed paired samples t 
tests to compare the choice levels at each delay. Accordingly, the test revealed that 
perceived intervals at 100 ms were not significantly different between free (M=273.52, 
SD=84.99) and instructed (M=269.73, SD=86.59) conditions; t(22)= .48, p=.633, two-
tailed. At 300 ms, free choices yielded significantly shorter interval estimations 
(M=420.39, SD=94.68) compared to the instructed choices (M=436.34, SD=97.08); 
t(22)= -2.22, p=.037, two-tailed. Finally, at 500 ms, perceived intervals in the free 
condition (M=567.85, SD=126.84) were significantly shorter than the instructed 
condition (M=594.22, SD=129.52); t(22)= -2.85, p=.009, two-tailed (see Figure 4.3).  
 
 
                                                 
2Although the number of trials for each condition is rather low (12), we also analyzed the influence of 
valence on the interval estimations by factoring in the chord type (perfect fifth, perfect fourth, minor 
second, major second) and yet did not find any significant effects. 
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Figure 4.2 Mean perceived intervals in free-choice and instructed choice conditions 
(* p<.05). Error bars represent SEM. 
  
Figure 4.3 Mean perceived intervals as a function of choice (free, instructed) and 
delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) (* p<.05). Error bars represent SEM. 
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4.4.3 FoC ratings 
Mean FoC ratings were calculated for each choice type, outcome valence, and 
delay condition and were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with choice 
(free, instructed), valence (pleasant, unpleasant), and delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) as 
within subjects factors. The test revealed significant main effects of choice (F(1,22) = 
8.03, p=.010, ƞ2 = .27), valence (F(1,22) = 28.55, p<.001, ƞ2 = .56), delay (F(2,44) = 
9.09, p=.002, ƞ2 = .29), and a significant interaction between choice and valence (F(1,22) 
= 8.61, p=.008, ƞ2 = .28). No other significant effects or interactions were found by the 
analysis of FoC ratings (All Fs<1, ps>.6).  
More specifically, FoC ratings (see Figure 4.4) were significantly higher when 
choices were freely chosen (M=3.96, SD=.77) than instructed (M=3.79, SD=.67) and 
when outcome chords were pleasant (M=4.33, SD=.66) than they were unpleasant 
(M=3.43, SD=.78). Regarding the main effect of delay, post hoc tests showed that FoC 
ratings were systematically decreased (see Figure 4.5) as the delay increased from 100 ms 
(M=3.99, SD=.71), to 300 ms (M=3.85, SD=.72) and 500 ms (M=3.78, SD=.73). FoC 
ratings at 100 ms were significantly higher than both at 300 ms (p=.006) and 500 ms 
(p=.008). However, FoC ratings at 300 ms did not significantly differ from that at 500 ms 
(p>.4).  
Further analysis of the interaction between choice and valence revealed that FoC 
ratings were significantly higher over the pleasant outcomes when participants freely 
chose (M=4.46, SD=.67) which key to press than it was instructed (M=4.19, SD=.58); 
t(22)= 3.59, p=.002, two-tailed. However, the difference in the FoC ratings between free 
(M=3.46, SD=.83) and instructed (M=3.39, SD=.69) choices for the unpleasant outcomes 
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was not significant; t(22)= 1.06, p=.302, two-tailed. Finally, for both free (Mpleasant=4.46, 
SDpleasant=.67; Munpleasant=3.46, SDunpleasant=.83) and instructed choices (Mpleasant=4.19, 
SDpleasant=.58; Munpleasant=3.39, SDunpleasant=.69) differences in the FoC ratings between 
pleasant and unpleasant outcomes were significant (t(22)= 5.28, p<.001; t(22)= 5.25, 
p<.001 for free and instructed choices, respectively). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Mean FoC ratings as a function of choice (free, instructed) and outcome 
valence (pleasant, unpleasant) (* p<.05, **p<.001). Error bars represent SEM. 
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Figure 4.5 Mean FoC ratings as a function of delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) (* 
p<.05). Error bars represent SEM. 
4.4.4 Response times (RTs) 
RTs (see Figures 4.6 & 4.7) were analyzed by a 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA 
with choice (free, instructed) and key (right, left, up, down) as within subjects factor. The 
test revealed a main effect of choice (F(1,45) = 22.68, p<.001, ƞ2 = .33) such that choices 
were significantly slower in the free (M=636.32, SD=142.97) than instructed (M=586.71, 
SD=86.49) condition. The main effect of key was also significant (F(3,135) = 23.34, 
p<.001, ƞ2 = .34). Post hoc tests revealed that pressing right (M=590.64, SD=107.26) and 
left (M=595.68, SD=107.02) keys were both significantly faster than pressing up 
(M=635.90, SD=125.85) and down (M=623.85, SD=118.77) keys (p right-up<.001, p right-
down<.001, p left-up<.001, p left-down=.001). Differences between right-left and up-down keys 
were not significant (all ps>.5). The interaction between choice and key was not 
significant (F(3,135) = 2.25, p=.107, ƞ2 = .05). 
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Figure 4.6 Mean RTs in the free-choice and instructed-choice conditions (** 
p<.001). Error bars represent SEM. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Mean RTs in pressing each key (* p<.05, ** p<.001). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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4.4.5 Pleasantness ratings for the outcome chords 
As noted before, key press outcomes were one of two consonant (perfect fifth and 
perfect fourth) and two dissonant (minor second and major second) chords. We 
calculated the mean pleasantness ratings for each valence and ran paired samples t tests to 
compare the ratings. The test showed that consonant chords were perceived as more 
pleasant (M=4.51, SD=.64) than dissonant chords (M=2.48, SD=.42); t(1,45)=18.73, 
p<.001. We also conducted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with chord (perfect 
fifth, perfect fourth, minor second, major second) as a within subjects factor in order to 
examine differences across the four chords. The test revealed a significant main effect of 
chord (F(3,135) = 255.90, p<.001, ƞ2 = .85). Post hoc tests indicated that perfect fifth 
(M=4.70, SD=.81) was perceived as more pleasant compared to perfect fourth (M=4.33, 
SD=.57, p=.001), major second (M=3.14, SD=.59, p<.001), and minor second (M=1.82, 
SD=.46, p<.001). Perfect fourth was also perceived as more pleasant compared to both 
minor second (p<.001) and major second (p<.001). Finally, minor second was perceived 
as more unpleasant compared to major second (p<.001). These results overall confirm 
that the consonant and dissonant chords we included in the experiment were indeed 
classified as pleasant and unpleasant action-outcomes.  
4.4.6 Key selection in the free condition 
We also examined how the choice of key among for key alternatives in the free 
condition was distributed. Accordingly, the proportions of selecting right, left, up, and 
down keys were 28.79% (SD=11.61), 27.80% (SD=8.87), 21.27% (SD=7.27), and 
22.13% (SD=8.51), respectively. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with key (right, 
left, up, down) as within subjects factor revealed a main effect of key (F(3,135) = 6.01, 
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p=.002, ƞ2 = .85). Post hoc comparisons showed that the right key was selected more 
often than the up key (p=.019) and the left key was selected more often than the up key 
(p=.009). No other comparisons were significant (p>.05).  
4.4.7 Correlation Analyses 
4.4.7.1 FoC and pleasantness ratings 
In order to examine the relationship between FoC ratings and pleasantness ratings, 
we first calculated the difference in the mean FoC ratings in each choice (free, instructed) 
between pleasant and unpleasant outcomes (MFree(pleasant-unpleasant)=1.00, SDFree(pleasant-
unpleasant)=91; MInstructed(pleasant-unpleasant)=.80, SDInstructed(pleasant-unpleasant)=73). These 
differences were then subjected to bivariate Pearson correlation tests with the difference 
in the mean pleasantness ratings between pleasant and unpleasant outcomes (M(pleasant-
unpleasant)=2.25, SD(pleasant-unpleasant)=.73). The test revealed that the difference in the FoC 
ratings between the pleasant and unpleasant outcomes for both free (r=.50, p=.015) and 
instructed (r=.47, p=.024) conditions were significantly correlated with the difference in 
the pleasantness ratings, indicating that the more distant participants perceived the 
valence of the outcomes, the greater differences were felt in the FoC ratings between 
pleasant and unpleasant outcomes (see Figures 4.8 & 4.9).   
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Figure 4.8 Correlation between the pleasant versus unpleasant difference scores of 
FoC and pleasantness ratings in the free-choice condition. 
 
Figure 4.9 Correlation between the pleasant versus unpleasant difference scores of 
FoC and pleasantness ratings in the instructed-choice condition. 
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4.4.7.2 Interval estimations and pleasantness ratings  
The same line of correlation analyses as conducted between FoC and pleasantness 
ratings showed, between the inter interval estimations and pleasantness ratings, 
differences in the interval estimations (MFree(pleasant-unpleasant)=-3.32, SDFree(pleasant-
unpleasant)=44.02; MInstructed(pleasant-unpleasant)=-9.20, SDInstructed(pleasant-unpleasant)=48.48) and the 
pleasantness ratings outcomes (M(pleasant-unpleasant) =1.81, SD(pleasant-unpleasant)=.69) between 
pleasant and unpleasant outcomes did not correlate in either free or instructed conditions 
(rs<.1, ps>.7). 
4.4.7.3 Interval estimations and FoC ratings 
We examined the relationship between the interval estimations and FoC ratings by 
subjecting the means of these measures in each choice (free, instructed) and valence 
(pleasant, unpleasant) condition to bivariate Pearson correlation analyses. The tests, 
however, did not reveal any significant correlation (rs<.2, ps>.3).  
4.5 Discussion 
Previous research has provided evidence that distinct neural structures are involved 
in freely selected versus externally determined actions (Cunnington et al., 2002; Filevich 
et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., 2008, 2006; Waszak et al., 2005). Moreover, subjective 
experience of actions in these two modes appears to be influenced by the compatibility of 
the source specifying the type and timing of actions (Wenke et al., 2009) as well as by the 
number of action alternatives (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). A separate line of research 
examined the effect of outcome valence and showed that positive or desirable outcomes 
are associated with stronger SoA than negative or undesirable outcomes (Barlas & Obhi, 
2014; Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). In the present study, we 
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investigated the influence of both of these factors on intentional binding and FoC ratings 
when both free and instructed actions randomly produced pleasant and unpleasant 
outcomes. A strength of the current study is that we determined the effects of these 
variables on both implicit and explicit measures of SoA. 
To begin with, our results with the pleasantness ratings obtained at the end of 
interval estimation and FoC rating tasks confirmed that the consonant auditory stimuli 
were indeed perceived as more pleasant sounding than the dissonant stimuli, in line with 
the previous investigations of consonance preference (Bidelman et al., 2009; McDermott 
& Hauser, 2004; Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996b; Tramo et al., 2001). 
One important finding is that both interval estimations and FoC ratings indicated 
stronger SoA when action was freely chosen as opposed to when action was instructed. 
This finding is an important contribution because research on SoA has rarely examined 
the effects of freedom of choice (or self-involvement) in action selection. The finding of 
higher FoC ratings in the free-choice condition is consistent with the notion that people 
tend to feel stronger control over actions that are based on self-generated decisions and 
intentions (Haggard, 2008; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007). 
Why might we have observed more binding in the free versus fixed choice 
conditions? One interpretation of stronger binding in the free-choice condition relates to 
the underlying neural structures involved in free action selection and binding. Previous 
research has consistently highlighted the importance of the SMA in internally generated 
action selection (Cunnington et al., 2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & 
Passingham, 2004; Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006; Waszak et al., 2005). Importantly, 
recent studies examining the neural correlates of the intentional binding effect found that 
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activity in the SMA was positively correlated with the degree of binding (Kühn et al., 
2012). Furthermore, disruption of pre-SMA, in particular, caused a reduction in the 
binding effect (Cavazzana et al., 2015; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 
2010a). Based on these studies, it seems plausible that greater SMA activation in the free-
choice condition in our study could have led to greater binding of actions and their 
effects.  
Regarding outcome valence, we previously reported that the same pleasant chords 
we used in the present experiment led to stronger binding compared to more unpleasant 
outcomes (Barlas & Obhi, 2014). Our current results, however, did not reveal any 
significant effect of outcome valence on interval estimation. It is, however, important to 
note that key presses and the ensuing chords were non-contingent in the current study 
while in the earlier experiment one of the two keys (right or left key) would consistently 
produce either a pleasant or unpleasant chord. Thus, in the current study, pre-movement 
processes could not predict specific outcomes (Blakemore et al., 2001; Frith et al., 2000). 
Given the importance of premotor prediction and action-effect contingency (Haggard, 
2005; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009), the null 
finding for outcome valence might be a reasonable observation in our particular study 
design. Additionally, although retrospective processes have previously been shown to 
influence binding (Moore & Haggard, 2008), the current results did not demonstrate such 
effects, at least with respect to the type of outcome produced. However, participants 
reported having a stronger FoC over the pleasant compared to the unpleasant outcomes. 
Correlation analyses also revealed that the FoC and pleasantness ratings were 
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significantly correlated when the corresponding ratings for pleasant and unpleasant 
chords were contrasted. This finding is in line with the notion of the self-serving bias.  
Another very important finding in the current study is the interaction between 
choice level and outcome valence on FoC. Specifically, participants felt more in control 
of pleasant outcomes when these outcomes were produced by freely selected key presses 
than when they were produced by instructed key presses. The FoC ratings, however, did 
not differ as a function of choice for the unpleasant outcomes. This result might again be 
associated with the self-serving bias in that participants could have felt even stronger 
control over pleasant outcomes when these outcomes were produced by the participants’ 
own choice of actions. In contrast, the desire to mitigate perceived authorship of 
unpleasant outcomes might over-ride any differences relating to free action versus 
instructed action. This finding has potential implications for social situations in which 
individuals are forced to perform actions that produce unpleasant outcomes (e.g., in the 
classic Milgram obedience experiments, Stanley, 1963). In such cases, the current results 
suggest that it may be the outcome that prevails, with the processes leading to the 
outcome being given less weight in the computation of agentic experience when the 
outcome is negative. 
Consistent with previous reports, we also found that FoC ratings were lower for 
longer action-outcome delays. This supports the view that action-outcome intervals are 
important retrospective cues that influence FoC judgments (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; 
Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010).  
The finding that RTs were longer in the free-choice compared to instructed-choice 
condition is in accordance with a previous finding that free-choice conditions (2 and 3 
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level of choice) required more time for participants to make a selection compared to a 
forced-choice condition (Forstmann et al., 2006). Longer RTs in the free-choice condition 
presumably reflect more complex decision processes in action selection. An important 
question for future studies is to understand the potential relationship between such action 
selection processing and the SoA.  
One aspect of our design that could be seen as a limitation is that the actions in our 
experiment randomly produced one of four chords, thereby making actions and outcomes 
non-contingent. It has previously been pointed out that voluntary/intentional actions often 
involve anticipation of outcomes (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 2002; Haggard, 
2008; Herwig et al., 2007). In this regard, some may argue that the free-choice actions in 
our study were not “normal” voluntary/intentional actions. However, we sometimes make 
decisions about actions without having a clear pre-specification of the consequences. 
Examination of actions that are not predictive of specific outcomes also allowed us to 
determine the pure effects of free-choice versus fixed action on SoA. We suggest that the 
free-choice actions in our study, while being non-predictive of outcome, did involve other 
decision processes that are fundamentally linked to naturalistic volitional action.  
 Another possible limitation of our study is that the free-choice condition included 
all possible action alternatives – that is, we did not systematically vary the degree of 
choice across many alternatives. In a previous study we found that a medium level of 
choice (3 keys) did not differ from either high level of choice (7 keys) or no-choice 
conditions (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). Thus, further work is needed in which the number of 
action alternatives is parametrically varied, and effects on SoA (binding and FoC) are 
assessed. One interesting possibility is that beyond a certain “optimum” choice level, 
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SoA may be reduced. Knowing the relationship between choice level and agency has 
important implications for product designers – the level of choice that optimizes agency 
experience might be critical for the design of devices as varied as smart phones to self-
driving vehicles. Given that choices are often effortful (e.g., Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 
1990) it is also important to investigate how this variable affects different measures of 
SoA and furthermore how this effort might interact with choice to affect agency. In a 
follow-up study, we are implementing our current design but with four choice levels and 
are also collecting subjective effort ratings to examine how perceived effort in selection 
affects agency. 
 To conclude, the findings of the present study underline the importance of 
freedom to choose actions and the valence of action-outcomes on the SoA. It appears that 
one’s freedom to select an action among several alternatives has a crucial impact on both 
the low level SoA, indexed by intentional binding, and higher level feelings of control. 
For conscious judgments of control, the valence of these outcomes is also important. 
Specifically, the conscious FoC is boosted when we are both free to select our actions 
and when these actions produce more desirable outcomes. More work is necessary to 
fully understand whether freedom always produces a greater SoA or whether there are 
certain situations in which too much freedom, for example, can diminish the experience 
of control.  
The objective of the following chapter is to extend the present study’s manipulation 
regarding the choice (i.e., free vs. instructed) to a wider range of actions alternatives (i.e., 
ranged from 1 to 4) and again examine the impact of choice level and outcome 
pleasantness on the SoA.   
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5.1 Abstract 
We examined the influence of the action choice-level (varied from one to four) and 
the outcome valence on the sense of agency (SoA). Participants performed either freely 
chosen or instructed key presses which could produce pleasant or unpleasant chords. We 
obtained estimates of the key press-chord intervals, feeling of control (FoC) ratings over 
the outcomes, and subjective ratings of mental effort in key selection. Interval estimates 
were used to index intentional binding - the perceived temporal attraction between 
actions and their outcomes. Results showed stronger binding in the four-choice condition 
compared to remaining choice-level conditions. FoC ratings were increased as the choice-
level varied from one to four, and were higher for pleasant than unpleasant outcomes. 
Additionally, greater effort was experienced in performing instructed than freely chosen 
actions. These results emphasize the importance of freedom and choice-level in action 
selection and the outcome valence on the SoA.  
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5.2 Introduction 
Freedom in action selection is not always an all-or-none phenomenon. That is, our 
freedom to choose an action can also be constrained by the number of action alternatives 
available in a certain context. For example, one who wants to engage in regular physical 
activities can choose to join a basketball or football team or go to the gym depending on 
the alternatives available in their environment and society. In a small town, the only 
option can be going to a gym while in metropolitan cities there can be a greater variety of 
options. In addition to the variety of alternatives, one’s decision on which activity to 
engage would also involve their needs and desires regarding what is expected out of these 
activities. For instance, one might find playing basketball more enjoyable than going to 
the gym while another would rather go to the gym regularly to achieve their goals with 
greater level of exercise. Furthermore, these decisions could be made by either one’s self 
or others. Indeed, according to Schwartz (2012), the most fundamental value of choice is 
that freedom to choose enables people to express their autonomy and preferences as an 
individual. Given the prevalence of choice and making decisions on actions, one 
interesting question is how the subjective experience of agency would be affected under 
the scenarios similar to those exemplified above.   
Several views consider the SoA to be closely linked to the notion of free will (Aarts 
& van den Bos, 2011; Haggard et al., 2004, 2002) and choice has long been the subject of 
theories of decision making and social psychological studies (e.g., Kitayama & Snibbe, 
2004; Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010; Schwartz, 2012). Furthermore, 
most human actions are performed to achieve a specific goal or cause changes in the 
environment (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 2002; Haggard, 2008; Herwig et al., 
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2007). Given these views, it is surprising that research on agency has scarcely examined 
the relationship between the SoA and choice, freedom, and the value of action-outcomes. 
As previously surveyed (see Chapters 2-4), the majority of previous research in this 
regard have focused on the source (i.e., self vs other) of either what (Sebanz & Lackner, 
2007; Wenke et al., 2009) or when (Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Obhi & Haggard, 2004; 
Wenke et al., 2009) dimension of action selection. Other studies examined the effect of 
selection fluency on the SoA by manipulating the compatibility between action primes 
and performed actions (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Damen et al., 2014; Sidarus et al., 
2013; Wenke et al., 2010). These studies, overall, suggested that self-generated actions 
and effortless processing of action selection (see Chapter 6) can lead to stronger SoA. 
With respect to the influence of outcome valence on the SoA, it was found that outcomes 
that are attached to positive or rewarding values enhanced the binding effect (Aarts et al., 
2012; Takahata et al., 2012).  
In the present thesis, thus far, we examined the issue regarding how the SoA would 
be influenced in a context with varying actions and differentially valued outcomes was 
examined from different perspectives. First, Chapter 2 examined the conditions in which 
on the number of alternative actions was varied while the outcome of each and every 
alternative was the same. Briefly put, the number of action alternatives was manipulated 
as fixed-choice (i.e., instructed), three-choice, and seven-choice. The results of this study 
showed that the amount of binding, as indirectly indexing the SoA, was strongest in the 
seven-choice condition and weakest in the fixed-choice condition. Second, Chapter 3 
manipulated the valence of action-outcomes while the number of actions was fixed to two 
alternatives. The findings of this study provided evidence that pleasant or desirable 
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outcomes lead to stronger sense of subjective control compared to unpleasant outcomes, 
in compliance with the notion of self-serving bias (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Miller & Ross, 
1975; Taylor & Brown, 1994). Thirdly, in Chapter 4, we examined how intentional 
binding and subjective judgments of control were influenced when the number of action 
alternatives was set to four and participants could perform free or instructed actions that 
produced either pleasant or unpleasant outcomes. The results of this study showed that 
both binding and subjective control over action-outcomes were stronger when actions 
were freely selected compared to when they were externally determined. Moreover, 
pleasant outcomes led to greater judgments of control.   
One important note to point out regarding the study of Chapter 2 is that the type of 
actions in each set of alternatives was the same. More clearly, the medium level always 
included the same three buttons among seven alternatives and the button in the no-choice 
was kept constant. Although the study in Chapter 4 ameliorated the design in that the 
specified key in the instructed condition was dynamically alternating among four 
different keys, this study did not include more diverse levels of choice. To expand on the 
issue at hand, a further objective is to investigate the SoA under conditions in which 
outcomes with different degree of pleasantness are produced by actions that are selected 
among dynamically changing types of actions available at varying choice-level. 
The study in the present chapter, therefore, aims to advance the designs of the 
previous studies such that the free-choice is more varied in terms of the number of action 
alternatives. More specifically, the number of available key alternatives was set at four 
levels varying from one (instructed) option to two, three, and four options. As in Chapter 
4, each key press could produce either a pleasant or an unpleasant chord after one of three 
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intervals (100 ms, 300 ms, and 500 ms) and between subjects, we obtained both the 
interval estimations of key press-chord delays and FoC ratings over the chords. Another 
important difference in the current study is that in a post-experiment task, participants 
rated how much effort they felt when producing the key presses in each choice-level 
condition. This was to explore whether the subjectively experienced effort in action 
selection could vary depending on the choice-level and whether a relationship between 
the measures of the SoA and subjective effort could be observed. We expected to find 
that interval estimations would systematically get shorter while the FoC ratings would 
increase as the choice-level increased from one to four. Regarding the valence of the 
outcome chords, we did not expect to find any differences in the perceived intervals 
between pleasant and unpleasant chords. As noted before, this prediction was based on 
our previous finding (see Chapter 4) that outcome valence did not influence the binding 
when the key presses and chords were not contingent. FoC ratings, however, were 
expected to be higher over pleasant than unpleasant chords in line with our previous 
findings reported in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.     
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
In total, 44 undergraduate students (14 male, 1 left-handed, Mage = 18.86, SD= 1.56) 
from Wilfrid Laurier University took part in the study. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either one of the interval estimation or the FoC rating tasks. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no hearing problems. The study was 
approved by the Research Ethics Board of Wilfrid Laurier University and participants 
CHAPTER 5     
107 
 
gave written informed consent prior to beginning the study. Compensation for 
participating in the study was 1 course credit.  
5.3.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was developed using Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, USA) 
software and run on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz). Participants sat approximately 
60 cm away from a 20 inch monitor (resolution: 1600x1200). Presentation of all stimuli 
was centered on a white background. Responses were made on a 5-key response pad as in 
Barlas et al. (2016). On this pad, four keys were placed on the right, left, up, and down 
side of the central key. An optical wheel mouse was used to indicate responses on visual 
analogue scales presented on the screen for interval estimation, FoC rating, and effort 
rating tasks. The interval estimation scale was ranged from 1 to 1000 ms and marked at 
50 ms intervals. FoC and effort rating scales were 6-point and marked 0.5 point intervals.  
Auditory stimuli consisted of a consonant (perfect fifth) and a dissonant (minor 
second) piano chords. These chords were selected based on the subjective pleasantness 
ratings obtained in previous studies (Barlas et al., 2016; Barlas & Obhi, 2014), according 
to which perfect fifth and minor second were rated as the most pleasant and unpleasant 
chords, respectively. These chords were recorded using Audacity 2.0.3, sampled at 44.1 
kHz with a 16 bit stereo format. Each chord was 1 s in duration and was presented at 60 
dB through the headphones. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Each group of participants were first familiarized with the instructions and the 
stimuli, and completed 15 practice trials. There were 288 trials in total for each of the 
interval estimation and FoC rating tasks. The trials were presented in a random order in 6 
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mixed blocks with 48 trials each. After completing each block, the experiment paused to 
allow participants to take a break upon their will, and continued after the experimental 
instructions for each task were reminded on the screen.   
Each trial began with a 1.5 s presentation of the image representing the central key 
on the response pad. Participants were told to rest their left index finger on the central 
key when this image was presented. The following screen displayed the target image 
showing the central key surrounded with varying number of keys, which was determined 
by the choice-level (see Figure 5.1). In the one-choice (instructed) condition, only one of 
four keys (right, left, up, down) was presented. Two-choice condition included one of six 
different two-key combinations (right-left, right-up, right-down, left-up, left-down, up-
down) and three-choice condition presented one of four three-key combinations (right-
left-up, right-left-down, right-up-down, left-up-down). Finally, in the four-choice 
condition all four keys were displayed by the target image. In the free choice conditions 
thus, participants were free to choose among two to four different options. The target 
image remained on the screen until one of four keys were pressed. Participants were told 
to respond as fast as possible and avoid giving stereotyped responses in the free-choice 
conditions. In case of an erroneous key press in the one-choice, two-choice, and three-
choice conditions, a warning message (“error in key press”) appeared on the screen and 
participants clicked on the screen to move on to the next trial. A valid response was 
followed by one of three delays (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) before one of two chords 
(perfect fifth, minor second) was presented for 1 s though the headphones. In the interval 
estimation task, participants were told that the delay between their key press and the 
onset of the tone could randomly vary between 1ms and 1000 ms and they were asked to 
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indicate their estimation of this delay using the interval estimation scale on the screen. No 
prior training was given for interval estimations. In the FoC rating task, a 6-point visual 
analogue scale (1: the lowest level of control; 6: the highest level of control) was 
presented at the end of each trial and participants were required to indicate the degree of 
self-control they felt over the production of the chord. They were told not to base their 
judgments on how fast or accurate were their key presses. For both measures, participants 
used the mouse with their right hand and moved the cursor to any point on the scale and 
clicked to indicate their temporal or FoC judgments. Inter-trial interval was set to 500 ms 
during which a blank screen was presented.  
Both the interval estimation and the FoC rating tasks were followed by the effort 
rating task which measured the perceived mental effort in choosing which key to press. 
This task consisted of two blocks of 48 trials (96 in total). The trial procedure was exactly 
the same as that in the interval estimation and FoC rating tasks with the exceptions that 
no chord was presented after the key presses and the trials ended with a 6-point effort 
rating scale displayed on the screen. Using this scale, participants indicated how much 
mental effort they experienced when choosing which key to press (1: very low; 6: very 
high).  
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed about the goal of the 
study and thanked for their time. 
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Figure 5.1 Schematic illustration of the tasks completed by each group of 
participants (upper panel) and the sample trial procedure in the interval estimation and 
FoC rating tasks demonstrated for each choice-level (lower panel).  
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5.3.4 Data processing 
5.3.4.1 Trial exclusion 
 For the interval estimation task, trials with RTs or interval estimations being three 
standard deviations away from the mean, or those with incorrect responses (pressing the 
wrong key in all but four-choice condition) were excluded (Mexcluded = 2.57%, SD= .84% 
of all trials). The same criteria (except the interval estimation criterion) were also 
processed in the FoC rating task data (Mexcluded = 2.33%, SD= 1.13% of all trials). 
5.3.5 Data analyses 
We used repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effects 
of choice-level (one, two, three, four) and valence (pleasant, unpleasant) on the interval 
estimations and FoC ratings. Combining the data from both interval estimation and FoC 
rating tasks, RTs were analyzed as a function of choice-level and key (right, left, up, 
down) while effort ratings were analyzed factoring in the choice-level. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used where Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated. Post hoc 
multiple comparisons3 were performed where differences across variable levels were 
examined. Additionally, two-tailed paired samples t-tests and one sample t-tests were 
conducted where appropriate. All data analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 
16.0) and the significance level was set to .05. 
                                                 
3 Since we had directional predictions (see page 106) indicating increased binding and FoC with increased 
choice-level based on the previous findings (Chapter 1 and Chapter 3), we did not perform Bonferroni 
correction on the multiple comparisons in this experiment. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Accuracy 
Mean proportion of selecting a valid key (in the one-, two-, and three-choice 
conditions) that is among the presented key alternatives was 99.11% (SD=1.05).  
5.4.2 Interval estimations 
We calculated the mean interval estimations for each condition (see Table 5.1) and 
ran a 4 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with choice-level (one, two, three, four), 
valence (pleasant, unpleasant), and delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) as within subjects 
factors. The analysis yielded significant main effects of both choice-level (F(3,63) = 3.37, 
p=.046, ƞ2 = .14) and delay (F(2,42) = 94.25, p<.001, ƞ2 = .82). Regarding the effect of 
choice-level, post hoc multiple comparisons showed that interval estimations in the four-
choice condition (M=427.90, SD=112.90) was significantly shorter than all three-choice 
(M=436.20, SD=114.49, p=.046), two-choice (M=440.67, SD=115.33, p=.010), and one-
choice (M=446.22, SD=113.73, p=.031) conditions (see Figure 5.2). The remaining 
comparisons were not significant (ps>.1). With respect to the interval estimations for 
each actual delay, post hoc tests revealed that interval estimations were systematically 
increased across 100 ms (M=320.39, SD=130.90), 300 ms (M=433.99, SD=104.22), and 
500 ms (M=558.86, SD=107.21) with differences being significant at all levels (all 
ps<.001). Although the perceived intervals were shorter with pleasant (M=433.33, 
SD=116.64) compared to unpleasant outcomes (M=442.17, SD=111.59), the main effect 
of valence was not significant (F(1,21) =1.07, p=.312). Additionally, two- or three-way 
the interactions among choice-level, delay, and valence were not significant (Fs<2, 
ps>.1).  
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To sum up, examination of the two main factors of interest, namely the choice-level 
and outcome valence showed that while the valence of the action-outcomes did not 
influence the interval estimations, participants perceived the action-outcome delays 
significantly briefer when they had the maximum number of key alternatives compared to 
fewer choice-levels.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Mean perceived intervals as a function of choice-level (* p<.05). Error 
bars represent SEM. 
Table 5.1 Means and standard deviations of interval estimations in each choice-
level, outcome valence, and actual delay condition. 
 Delay 100 ms 300 ms 500 ms 
Valence 
Choice-level 
Pleasant Unpleasant Pleasant Unpleasant Pleasant Unpleasant 
One 313.20 
(±134.26) 
321.38 
(±138.63) 
443.45 
(±104.38) 
338.59 
(±89.90) 
577.18 
(±111.39) 
583.53 
(±103.81) 
Two 329.39 
(±140.31) 
335.31 
(±129.13) 
417.49 
(±102.99) 
458.07 
(±119.07) 
543.65 
(±108.14) 
560.33 
(±92.32) 
Three 322.27 
(±127.55) 
328.99 
(±121.90) 
429.58 
(±116.66) 
424.55 
(±94.18) 
546.95 
(±112.29) 
564.90 
(±114.37) 
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Four 305.08 
(±137.82) 
307.50 
(±117.59) 
429.28 
(±97.76) 
430.95 
(±108.85) 
542.69 
(±106.10) 
551.89 
(±109.27) 
 
5.4.3 FoC ratings 
Similar to the interval estimations analyses, mean FoC ratings were calculated for 
each condition (see Table 5.2) and were subjected to a 4 x 2 x 3 repeated measures 
ANOVA with choice-level (one, two, three, four), valence (pleasant, unpleasant), and 
delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) as within subjects factors. The test revealed significant 
main effects of choice-level (F(3,63) = 9.11, p=.005, ƞ2 = .30) and valence (F(1,21) = 
26.43, p<.001, ƞ2 = .56). Post hoc multiple comparisons across choice-levels showed that 
FoC ratings were significantly higher in the four-choice condition (M=4.09, SD=1.00) 
compared to all three-choice (M=3.68, SD=.71, p=.005), two-choice (M=3.43, SD=.70, 
p=.007), and one-choice (M=3.02, SD=1.04, p=.005) conditions. Additionally, 
participants felt significantly more in control of the chords when they had three key 
alternatives compared to both two (p=.023) and one choice (p=.009) conditions. Finally, 
FoC ratings in the two-choice condition was significantly higher than the one-choice 
condition (p=.007). Thus, FoC ratings were systematically increased as the number of 
key alternatives was increased from one to four (see Figure 5.3). Regarding the main 
effect valence, we found that participants reported higher FoC ratings over the pleasant 
(M=3.97, SD=.83) than the unpleasant chords (M=3.14, SD=.89). The main effect of 
delay did not reach significance (F(2,42) = 3.66, p=.066, ƞ2 = .15) although the FoC 
ratings were systematically decreased as the delay increased from 100 ms (M=3.67, 
SD=.96) to 300 ms (M=3.61, SD=.80) and to 500 ms (M=3.39, SD=.82). Finally, two- or 
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three-way interactions among choice-level, valence, and delay were not significant 
(Fs<2, ps>.2).  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Mean FoC ratings as a function of choice-level (* p<.05). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
Table 5.2 Means and standard deviations of FoC ratings in each choice level, 
outcome valence, and actual delay condition. 
Delay 100 ms 300 ms 500 ms 
Valence 
Choice level 
Pleasant Unpleasant Pleasant Unpleasant Pleasant Unpleasant 
One 3.41 
(±1.27) 
2.85 
(±1.18) 
3.53 
(±1.07) 
2.66  
(±.94) 
3.29 
(±.97) 
2.40  
(±.82) 
Two 3.94 
(±.74) 
3.15  
(±.87) 
3.86 
(±.66) 
3.04  
(±.65) 
3.73 
(±.63) 
2.87  
(±.63) 
Three 4.19 
(±.70) 
3.39  
(±.96) 
4.18 
(±.60) 
3.37  
(±.65) 
3.89 
(±.67) 
3.05  
(±.69) 
Four 4.67 
(±.87) 
3.79 
(±1.10) 
4.60 
(±.81) 
3.62 
(±1.05) 
4.40 
(±.99) 
3.48 
(±1.19) 
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In summary, examination of the FoC ratings suggested that participants FoC over 
the outcome chords were increased as these chords were produced by freely selected than 
externally instructed key presses and when the chords were pleasant than they were 
unpleasant.  
5.4.4 Response times (RTs) 
We examined the RTs across interval estimation and FoC rating tasks by a 4 x 4 
repeated measures ANOVA with choice-level (one, two, three, four) and key (right, left, 
up, down) as within subjects factors. The test revealed significant main effects of choice-
level (F(3,120) = 9.88, p=.001, ƞ2 = .20) and key (F(3,120) = 34.30, p<.001, ƞ2 = .46). 
The interaction between choice-level and key was not significant (F(9,360)=1.80, p=.99). 
Regarding the main effect of choice-level, post hoc multiple comparisons indicated that 
RTs were significantly faster in the one-choice condition (M=629.44, SD=103.14) 
compared to all two- (M=669.62, SD=129.79, p<.001), three-(M=674.05, SD=151.81, 
p=.001), and four-choice (M=662.43, SD=154.77, p=.011) conditions. Moreover, RTs in 
the four-choice condition was significantly faster than that in the three-choice condition 
(p=.029). The remaining differences were not significant (ps>.3) (see Figure 5.4). 
Examination of the main effect of key showed that RTs were faster when pressing the 
right key (M=634.55, SD=131.72) compared to both up (M=691.78, SD=143.02, p<.001) 
and down (M=671.95, SD=135.21, p<.001) keys. Pressing the left key (M=637.25, 
SD=129.56) was also significantly faster compared to both up (p<.001) and down 
(p<.001) keys. Finally, pressing the down key compared to the up key was significantly 
faster (p=.010) (see Figure 5.5). 
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Figure 5.4 Mean RTs as a function of choice-level (* p<.05, ** p<.001). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Mean RTs as a function of key (* p<.05, ** p<.001). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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5.4.5 Effort ratings for key selection 
As we sought to examine the degree of mental effort felt when determining the key 
in each choice-level condition, we analyzed the mean effort ratings by a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with choice-level (one, two, three, four) as within subjects 
factor. Accordingly, the test showed that the main effect of choice-level was significant 
(F(3,129) =5.71, p=.014, ƞ2 = .18). Post hoc multiple comparisons suggested that 
participants felt significantly less effort for the key selection in the four-choice condition 
(M=2.50, SD=1.02) compared to all three- (M=2.88, SD=.64, p=.001), two- (M=3.04, 
SD=.70, p=.002), and one-choice (M=3.10, SD=1.05, p=.022) conditions (see Figure 
5.6). The remaining differences were not significant (p>.05) 
 
Figure 5.6 Mean effort ratings as a function choice-level (* p<.05). Error bars 
represent SEM. 
5.4.6 Key selection in the multiple choice conditions 
We also examined the frequency of selecting one of four keys in the multiple 
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were 26.88% (SD=9.42), 28.29% (SD=9.45), 23.94% (SD=10.75), and 20.59% 
(SD=9.08), respectively. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with key (right, left, up, 
down) as within subjects factor revealed a main effect of key (F(3,129) = 4.08, p=.008, 
ƞ2 = .09). Post hoc comparisons showed that the right key was selected more often than 
the down key (p=.010) and the left key was selected more often than the down key 
(p<.001). No other comparisons were significant (p>.1).  
5.4.7 Correlation Analyses 
5.4.7.1 FoC and effort ratings  
The relationship between FoC ratings and effort ratings was examined by running 
Pearson correlation analyses for each choice-level condition. The tests did not reveal any 
significant correlation between FoC and effort ratings (rs<.1, ps>.3). 
5.4.7.2 Interval estimations and effort ratings 
 We similarly examined the relationship between interval estimation and effort 
ratings and did not find any significant correlation between these two measures (rs<.3, 
ps>.1) 
5.4.7.3 Interval estimations and FoC ratings 
 We examined the relationship between the interval estimations and FoC ratings by 
subjecting the means of these measures in each choice-level (one, two, three, four) and 
valence (pleasant, unpleasant) condition to bivariate Pearson correlation analyses. The 
tests, however, did not reveal any significant correlations between these two measures of 
the SoA (rs<.2, ps>.2).  
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5.5 Discussion 
The SoA has been shown to be related to the origin of action selection (e.g., Barlas 
et al., 2016; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007; Wenke et al., 2009), freedom to choose among a 
varying number of action alternatives (Barlas & Obhi, 2013), and the valence of action 
outcomes (Barlas & Obhi, 2014; Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). In the 
current study, we examined the influence of both having a range of action alternatives 
(one, two, three, and four options) and the outcome valence (pleasant vs. unpleasant) on 
intentional binding and FoC ratings, taken as the two measures of the SoA. 
The results concerning the choice-level and the intentional binding effect showed 
that perceived intervals were systematically decreased as the number of action 
alternatives was increased from one to four. Importantly, significantly stronger binding 
(i.e., shorter estimation of the action-outcome delays) was observed in the four-choice 
condition compared to the remaining three-, two, and one-choice conditions while the 
restricted choice conditions (i.e., two- and three-choice) did not differ from the one-
choice condition. We obtained similar results in a previous study (Barlas & Obhi, 2013) 
in which the choice-level was manipulated between one, three, and seven options and the 
amount of binding was found to be strongest in the seven-choice condition compared to 
three- and one-choice (instructed) conditions. In that study, however, the three-choice 
condition did not significantly differ in the amount binding from seven- and one-choice 
conditions while in the present study we found that the highest number of choice (four) 
significantly differed from the lower number of choice conditions. One important 
difference between these two studies, with respect to the manipulation of choice-level, is 
that the restricted choice conditions in the present study presented alternating set of two 
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or three options out of four. In the earlier study, however, the three-choice condition 
included a fixed set of options out of seven. In the present study thus, participants had to 
adapt themselves to the varying alternatives of actions, which might have imposed a 
constraint that downgraded the freedom in these conditions compared to the fully free 
condition of selecting any key among four options. This is in fact an interesting question 
for future studies to investigate how constant versus varying set of action alternatives 
could influence the SoA. 
In terms of the brain correlates of free selections, previous neuroimaging studies 
have revealed greater activation in supplementary motor area (SMA) and rostral cingulate 
zone (RCZ) along with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior parietal lobe 
(IPL) when actions were freely selected as opposed to when the action was instructed 
(Cunnington et al., 2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Lau et al., 2004, 2006; Waszak et al., 
2005). Forstmann, Brass, Koch, and Cramon (2006), for example, examined the neural 
correlates of free choice which was varied such that participants were either instructed on 
which task to perform or were free to choose among two or three options. They found 
that RCZ, in particular, was strongly engaged in free choice conditions compared to the 
instructed condition.  
In another study (Van Eimeren et al., 2006), participants’ responses were guided by 
external visuospatial cues that indicated either an instructed response or presented two to 
four response options. The goal of this study was to determine the differences in the brain 
regions across the four choice-level conditions. Confirming the previous neuroimaging 
findings, the results showed increased activity in the rostral SMA and right DLPFC when 
free-choice conditions were contrasted with the instructed condition. However, there was 
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no difference in activation of these areas between four choice and restricted-choice (two 
and three options) conditions.    
Taken together, these neuroimaging studies suggest that a specific network of brain 
areas is associated with voluntary action selection. Greater activation in SMA in free 
choice of actions is particularly important for the current study as this area has been 
shown to be linked to the intentional binding effect (Cavazzana et al., 2015; Kühn et al., 
2012; Moore et al., 2010a). Moreover, Kühn et al. (2012) have provided evidence that 
activity in the SMA was positively correlated with the size of binding. The role of SMA 
in voluntary selection and its relationship with the binding effect, therefore, could explain 
the finding of the current study that the amount of binding was stronger in the four- 
compared to one-choice condition. However, the reason why we did not observe 
differences in binding between restricted choice conditions (two- and three-choice) and 
the one-choice condition is not clear. One speculation we can suggest, as mentioned 
above, is that perhaps the constantly alternating choice of actions presented in the 
restricted choice conditions rendered the selection much more constrained as compared to 
the four-choice condition. Indeed, our results with the RTs showed that the restricted 
choice conditions took longer respond relative to four- and one-choice conditions, which 
nicely replicates the finding of Van Eimeren et al. (2006). Longer RTs in these conditions 
might thus reflect a more effortful processing during the action selection. In fact, 
subjective ratings of mental effort experienced in action selection confirm this line of 
reasoning. More clearly, participants in our study reported the one-, two, and three-choice 
conditions as significantly more effortful compared to the four-choice condition.    
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Examination of the FoC ratings obtained in our study displayed a clear distinction 
in the subjective experience of control across the different choice-level conditions. More 
specifically, participants’ FoC over the outcome chords were systematically increased as 
the number of key alternatives was increased from one to four, and differences across all 
choice-levels were significant. These results not only confirm the view that self generated 
actions are inclined to yield stronger sense of control over their ensuing outcomes, but 
also demonstrate that the graded nature of freedom in action selection (Filevich et al., 
2013) can have significant impact on the subjective feeling of control. 
With respect to the influence of outcome valence on intentional binding, the current 
study did not confirm the findings of the previous two studies reporting stronger binding 
for pleasant versus unpleasant outcome chords (Barlas & Obhi, 2014) and reduced 
binding for negative compared to both positive and neutral outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013). In these studies, however, the relationship between actions and outcomes was 
contingent whereas in the present study, outcome chords were randomly produced by 
either one of four key options. In this case, the anticipations of outcomes generated by 
internal forward models (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2005; Wolpert 
et al., 1995; Wolpert, 1997) were probably either absent or lacking the specific 
information regarding the nature of the action outcomes. In our previous design of study 
(Barlas et al., 2016), the pleasant and unpleasant chords were also randomly produced by 
either free or instructed key presses and we did not the effect of outcome valence on the 
amount of binding. For the moment, it appears that for the outcome valence to influence 
binding, actions and outcomes must be contingent so that pre-movement predictions of 
the outcomes can be generated. Indeed, several views have noted the importance of 
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action-outcome contingency on intentional binding (Haggard, 2005; Moore & Haggard, 
2008; Moore, Lagnado, et al., 2009).  
 The effect of outcome valence on the subjective judgments of control, on the other 
hand, indicated that FoC ratings were significantly higher when the outcome chords were 
pleasant than they were unpleasant. This result confirms the previous studies in that 
positive or desirable outcomes yield stronger subjective sense of control (e.g., Barlas et 
al., 2016; Barlas & Obhi, 2014) over these outcomes, which could be accounted by the 
notion of self-serving bias (Bradley, 1978; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).  
Finally, FoC ratings have previously been found to be decreased with the longer 
key press-chord delays, supporting the importance of action-outcome intervals as a 
retrospective cue on the FoC judgments (Barlas et al., 2016; Chambon & Haggard, 2012; 
Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010). In the current study, 
although the changes in FoC ratings demonstrated a similar trend across three delays, the 
main effect of delay only approached significance. We do not interpret this result, 
however, as a null effect of the action-outcome delay on the FoC judgments. Before 
reaching a conclusion on the issue, we believe that a replication of the current study is 
needed.   
Taken together, the common finding for both measures of SoA was that both 
perceived intervals and FoC ratings showed stronger SoA when actions were freely 
selected among the highest number of action alternatives than when the choice of action 
was instructed. The outcome valence, at least in the present experimental context, seems 
to be more prevalent as a retrospective cue as observed by its impact on the subjective 
CHAPTER 5     
125 
 
judgments of control. Future studies should further investigate the interplay between 
choice-level in action alternatives and the effort involved in action selection.   
The goal of the following chapter is to examine the SoA under conditions where 
free and instructed actions are preceded by presentation of action images. As such, the 
experiment attempted to capture the scenario in which both free and instructed actions 
were performed under the potential influence of external choices of actions.  
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6.1 Abstract 
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience that one has control over 
their actions and the outcomes of these actions. Previous research has shown that 
subliminal priming of actions leads to enhancement of the feeling of control (FoC) 
judgments when these primes are compatible with the performed actions. In the present 
study, participants were supraliminally presented with images of actions (i.e., lifting 
either index or middle finger) or a neutral image (a blank rectangle) and performed either 
free or instructed actions. For the free actions, participants were free to lift either the 
index or the middle finger regardless of the preceding prime image (neutral or action-
prime) while the instructed actions required to perform either prime-compatible or prime-
incompatible actions. All actions produced a tone after a jittered delay. We obtained the 
estimates of perceived action-outcome intervals and FoC judgments over the outcomes. 
Additionally, we obtained self-reports of effort experienced in action selection. We found 
that both interval estimations and FoC ratings indicated significantly stronger SoA in the 
neutral-free condition compared to all remaining modes of action selection. Moreover, 
these two measures of the SoA were significantly correlated. Perceived effort ratings 
increased across the neutral-free, primed-free, prime-compatible, and prime-incompatible 
conditions. Importantly, neither interval estimations nor FoC ratings was correlated with 
response times and both were correlated with effort ratings only in the prime-
incompatible condition. Although further investigation is needed, our results suggest that 
freedom in action selection can outweigh the impact of selection fluency on the SoA.    
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6.2 Introduction  
Previous chapters (i.e., Chapters 2, 4-5) examined the influence of the source of 
action selection (i.e., free vs. instructed) and the choice-level on the SoA. In this regard, 
Chapter 4 directly examined the SoA in free versus instructed actions and found that both 
intentional binding and FoC ratings were greater when participants freely selected an 
action among four alternatives compared to when they performed an instructed action. 
With respect to the choice-level aspect of action selection, the study presented in Chapter 
2 varied the number of action alternatives (button presses) as low, medium, and high. The 
results showed that having the highest number of possible action alternatives resulted in 
the strongest binding of actions and outcomes compared to when there was only one 
option of action is available. The manipulation of choice-level was also applied in 
Chapter 5 by varying the number of action alternatives from one to four the effect of 
which was examined on both FoC ratings and intentional binding. The results of the 
study reported in Chapter 5 suggested that both binding and FoC ratings were greatest in 
the four-choice condition followed by three-choice, two-choice, and one-choice 
conditions. Overall, these results suggested that freedom to choose one’s action among 
several alternatives boosted the SoA compared to when one performs an instructed action 
or when the number of action alternatives is relatively lower. 
 In addition to the freedom and the choice-level aspects, another important facet of 
action selection is the effort expended to select one action over another – sometimes 
referred to as the fluency of action selection. On this topic, Wenke, Fleming, and 
Haggard (2010) examined the effect of subliminal priming of actions on feeling of 
control (FoC) ratings over unpredictable outcomes (color changes on the screen). The 
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prime images were left- and right-pointing arrows and participants were asked to press a 
left or right key in response to the target arrow. Critically, the primes and the targets 
could be either compatible or incompatible. The results showed that compatible primes 
facilitated the response times of key presses and more importantly, increased the FoC 
ratings over the outcomes. The authors suggested that the facilitation of action selection 
has an enhancing effect on the subjective FoC (see also Chambon & Haggard, 2012; 
Sidarus, Chambon, & Haggard, 2013, see Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014 for a 
review).  
In another study, the effect of action fluency was examined using both subliminal 
and supraliminal action-primes (Damen et al., 2014). The results showed that subliminal 
priming of actions led to stronger FoC over the outcomes when the primes were 
compatible with the actions compared to when they were incompatible. The awareness of 
the primes in the supraliminal priming condition, however, resulted in higher control 
ratings with the incompatible than compatible primes. Damen et al. (2014) suggested that 
this effect could be driven by that being aware of following external instructions 
suggested by the primes could undermine the SoA compared to disregarding these 
primes. In this study, however, actions were always freely selected in both supraliminal 
and subliminal priming conditions and thus, an important question remained whether the 
supraliminal primes could similarly influence the SoA for free versus instructed actions.  
In the current study thus, we examined the influence of freedom and fluency in 
action selection on the SoA. We used supraliminal action primes and participants 
performed either instructed or freely chosen actions. Accordingly, the action primes 
consisted of photos of a human hand performing one of two actions (i.e., lifting either the 
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index or the middle finger). Importantly, due to the nature of these primes, the 
presentation of them was considered akin to the scenario in which participants would 
observe someone else performing an action. Correspondingly, one of the most influential 
findings regarding the human motor system is that a specific neural network, namely the 
parietal premotor network, is activated not only when one performs an action but also 
when one passively observes others perform the same action (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, 
& Fogassi, 1996). This finding has lead to the development of several behavioral and 
neuroimaging paradigms to investigate the function of this mirroring system in, 
specifically, social contexts. One such paradigm is called the automatic imitation 
paradigm (Heyes, 2011) in which participants perform speeded movements in response to 
the cues presented together with action images on the screen. Importantly, participants’ 
responses can be either congruent or incongruent with these actions and the critical 
finding is that responses to the cues are slower and more erroneous when these cue 
require incongruent than congruent movements (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, 
Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Obhi, Hogeveen, & Pascual-Leone, 2011; Obhi 
& Hogeveen, 2013). This interference effect is suggested to be driven by suppressing the 
automatic activation of the corresponding motor representations of the observed actions.  
Taken together, the action primes used in the current study were thus considered to 
activate the corresponding action representations when participants viewed these primes. 
Importantly, participants had to maintain these action primes until a color cue appeared 
on the screen requiring participants to make speeded finger lift (index or middle) in 
relation to both the action primes and the color of the cues. More specifically, a white cue 
indicated that participants could freely choose which finger to lift regardless of the 
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preceding prime, which was either neutral (neutral-free selection) or an action image 
(primed-free selection). If the cue was green, however, participants had to perform the 
same finger lift as in the prime (prime-compatible selection) and finally, a red cue 
instructed to lift the alternative finger that was not lifted in the action prime (prime-
incompatible selection). Therefore, the compatibility between the automatic activation of 
the motor representations in response to the primes and the required responses indicated 
by the target cues were presumed to alter the degree of effort in action selection. This 
enabled us to examine the effect of selection fluency on both intentional binding and 
subjective judgments of agency, which has never been examined in one experimental 
setting. Moreover, obtaining these two measures of the SoA could also allow 
investigating the relationship between them.  
Accordingly, perceived action-outcome intervals and FoC judgments were obtained 
in two separate experiments in order to avoid any contamination between these two 
measures. In contrast to the previous studies in which action-outcomes were mapped to 
actions (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010), 
actions in our study produced the same tone throughout the experiment. This was to keep 
the focus of the study purely on the effects of action selection processes. Moreover, we 
obtained a subjective measure of perceived mental effort in a short task at the end of both 
interval estimation and FoC rating tasks. As such, we could examine differences in 
perceived effort across the experimental conditions. 
We predicted that the neutral-free condition would be perceived as the least 
effortful as this condition does not require the maintenance of any action due to the 
neutral prime. Also, the prime-incompatible condition was predicted to be rated as the 
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most effortful since the actions represented in the primes had to be maintained and then 
updated to give the prime-incompatible response. Our prediction about perceived effort in 
the primed-free condition was twofold. If participants tended to disregard the prime and 
perform prime-incompatible actions, we predicted that this condition could be perceived 
as more effortful compared to the prime-compatible condition. If, on the other hand, 
participants tend to choose the prime-compatible action more frequently then the primed-
free and the prime-compatible conditions would be perceived at similar effort levels.  
 Given that previous studies proposed that action selection fluency is a prominent 
factor affecting the SoA, we would predict that the conditions in which action selection is 
more fluent (i.e., less effortful, Chambon et al., 2014; Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, 
Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013) could yield shorter estimations of action-outcome intervals 
and higher FoC ratings compared to those taking more effort to select an action. More 
specifically, we at least expected to find that binding and FoC would be strongest in the 
neutral-free condition while the prime-incompatible condition-presumably the most 
effortful one- would lead to the weakest binding and FoC. The primed-free condition per 
se is closely relevant to Damen et. al’s study in which supraliminal primes were always 
followed by free selection of actions. In this condition thus, we would predict to find 
similar results with weaker SoA with compatible than incompatible free actions. 
However, since this is the only study we can refer to as employing supraliminal priming, 
this prediction does not have a strong basis. Regarding the prime-compatible condition, 
our prediction again was based on the previously noted relationship between selection 
fluency and the SoA. More clearly, we predicted that binding and FoC would be stronger 
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compared to the prime-incompatible condition while being weaker than, at least, neutral-
free condition.   
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
In total, we recruited 54 participants who were undergraduate students at Wilfrid 
Laurier University. 28 participants were assigned to the interval estimation task (6 male, 
2 left-handed, Mage = 18.32, SD= 1.42) while the remaining 26 participants completed the 
FoC rating task (4 male, 1 left-handed, Mage = 18.88, SD= 1.53). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no hearing problems. The study was 
approved by the Research Ethics Board of Wilfrid Laurier University and participants 
gave written informed consent prior to beginning the study. The compensation for 
participating in the study was course credits.  
6.3.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was developed using Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, USA) 
software and run on a Dell personal computer (3.07 GHz). Participants sat approximately 
60 cm away from a 20 inch monitor (resolution: 1600x1200). Action primes consisted of 
pictures of a hand lifting either the index or the middle finger (see Figure 6.1). These 
images were placed in a rectangle with a black border (size: 3.13” x 4.69”) and the 
neutral prime was the blank version of the same rectangle. Presentation of all stimuli was 
centered on a white background. Responses were made on a standard keyboard. An 
optical wheel mouse was used to indicate responses on visual analogue scales presented 
on the screen for interval estimation, FoC rating, and effort rating tasks. 
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6.3.3 Procedure 
First 28 participants completed the interval estimation task while the remaining 26 
participants were assigned to the FoC rating task. At the beginning of each task, 
participants were explained the task requirements and and shown the stimuli, and they 
completed 10 practice trials. The practice session was repeated when the experimenter 
observed failure in understanding the instructions (e.g., responses being slower than 2 s 
or too many erroneous trials). Each interval estimation and FoC rating task consisted of 
360 trials and was followed by a 24-trial effort rating task.  
Each trial began with the warning signal “New trial, get ready!” which remained on 
the screen for 1 s. The warning signal required the participants to press and hold down 
both “b” and “v” keys by their left index and middle fingers, respectively. This was 
followed by the fixation cross (500 ms) and then the prime image (500 ms) which could 
be either an action or a neutral prime (i.e., a blank rectangle). The target cue (a colored 
circle) was presented after a 150 ms following the prime. In response to the target cue, 
participants were told to respond as fast as possible by releasing either their index or 
middle finger off the corresponding key. Which key they would release depended on the 
color of the target cue. Accordingly, a green circle indicated that they should release the 
same finger as was lifted in the action prime (prime-compatible response), a red circle 
indicated that they should release the finger that was not lifted in the prime (prime-
incompatible response). Finally, a white circle indicated that participants could make 
their own selection of releasing either the index or the middle finger. The free response 
condition included trials in which the target screen was preceded by either an action 
prime (primed-free response) or a neutral prime (neutral-free response). In either case, 
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participants were instructed to make their own choice and not to give stereotyped 
responses. Each key release produced a short beep sound (1000 Hz, bit rate: 160 Kbps) 
after one of three different delays (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms). However, participants were 
told that for each trial, this delay was randomly picked within the range of 1 ms to 1000 
ms (1 s). The target cue remained on the screen until the tone was presented. At the end 
of each trial in the interval estimation task, they were asked to estimate the delay on a 
visual analogue scale which was marked at 50 ms intervals. To do so, they used the 
mouse with their right hand and moved the cursor to the point where they thought would 
correspond to their estimation. They were informed that they could click on any point on 
the scale including the values between two markers. No prior training was given for 
interval estimations. Inter-trial interval was set to 500 ms during which a blank screen 
was presented.  
The trials in the FoC rating task were exactly the same except that at the end of 
each trial, participants rated on 6-point visual analogue scale (1: low, 6: high) to indicate 
their subjective FoC over the production of the tone. They were encouraged to avoid 
basing their judgments on how fast or correct they respond in releasing the keys (see 
Figure 6.1). 
The combination of action selection mode (prime-compatible, prime-incompatible, 
primed-free response, unprimed-free response) and delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) 
levels were presented in a mixed and random order. Upon completion of each 48 trials, 
the experiment paused for the participants to take a break if they needed. After each 
break, participants pressed the space bar to continue and the next block of 48 trials started 
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after the presentation of a reminder that noted the color-response mapping and the 
requirement of responses to be as fast and accurate as possible.  
At the end of each task, participants completed another 24 trials in which they 
instead reported how (mentally) effortful it was for them to choose which finger to lift. 
They again used a 6-point visual analogue scale (1: low, 6: high) to indicate their 
perceived effort in each trial. In total thus, participants completed 384 trials in each of 
interval estimation and FoC rating tasks. For each trial in the experiment, response times 
(RTs) to release the key and responses on the interval estimation, FoC, and effort rating 
scales were recorded. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their time. 
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Figure 6.1 Illustration of the procedure in the interval estimation and FoC rating 
tasks. Participants performed either free, prime-compatible, or prime-incompatible key 
releases which produced a tone. In the interval estimation task, they estimated the delay 
between the key release and the tone while in the FoC rating task they rated their 
subjective FoC over the tone. Both tasks were followed by the effort rating task in which 
participants rated how effortful it was to choose which key to release. 
6.3.4 Data analysis 
For the interval estimation task, trials with RTs or interval estimations being three 
standard deviations away from the mean, and those with incorrect key release responses 
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were excluded (Mexcluded = 6.24%, SD= 3.63% of all trials). Participant exclusion criteria 
dismissed the data of participants who had more than 20% of all trials excluded or failed 
to demonstrate a monotonic increase in estimating the delay across 100 ms, 300 ms, and 
500 ms. The latter criterion resulted in the exclusion of two participants and thus the 
analyses of interval estimation task included twenty-six participants (5 male, 1 left-
handed, Mage = 18.38, SD= 1.55). 
For the control rating task, trials with RT being three standard deviations away 
from the mean and those with inaccurate responses were excluded (Mexcluded = 5.40%, 
SD= 4.22% of all trials). Similarly, participant exclusion criterion was concerned with 
those having the trial exclusion rate greater than 20% of all trials. 
We used repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effects 
of selection mode and action-outcome delay on accuracy, response times (RTs), interval 
estimations, FoC ratings, and perceived effort ratings. Data analyses for accuracy, RTs, 
and effort ratings were conducted across data from both tasks while the SoA measures 
were examined separately for each task. Post hoc multiple comparisons (Bonferroni 
corrected) were performed where differences across variable levels were examined. 
Additionally, two-tailed paired samples t-tests and one sample t-tests were conducted 
where appropriate. For each participant, we performed separate Pearson’s correlation 
analyses in order to examine the relationship between perceived intervals and RTs, effort 
ratings and RTs, and FoC ratings and RTs for each action selection mode. The correlation 
coefficients were then subjected to t-tests for the analyses across participants. The 
relationship among the remaining variables, i.e., perceived intervals, FoC ratings, and 
effort ratings, were analyzed subjecting participants’ means to Pearson’s correlation 
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analyses. All data analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 16.0) and the 
significance level was set to .05. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Accuracy 
Before excluding incorrect trials from further analysis, we examined the differences 
in accuracy between prime-compatible and prime-incompatible conditions. Mean 
accuracy in the prime-compatible condition (lifting the same finger as in the action 
prime) and in the prime-incompatible condition (lifting the finger that is resting in the 
prime) were 90 % (SD=.73) and 90% (±.82), respectively. We conducted a 2 x 2 repeated 
measure ANOVA with selection mode (prime-compatible, prime-incompatible) as within 
subjects factor and task (interval estimation, FoC rating) as between subjects factor. The 
test revealed neither a significant effect of selection mode (F<.1, p>.7) nor a significant 
interaction between selection and task (F<.1, p>.8). 
6.4.2 Response times 
Mean RTs for each selection mode displayed a gradual increase in the order of 
neutral-free (M=356.39, SD=166.88), prime-compatible (M=548.83, SD=77.84), primed-
free (M=570.66, SD=89.60), and prime-incompatible conditions (M=581.18, SD=82.08). 
RTs were subjected to a 4 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with selection mode 
(neutral-free, primed-free, prime-compatible, prime-incompatible) and released-finger 
(index, middle) as within subjects factors and task (interval estimation, FoC rating) as 
between subjects factor. The test revealed a significant main effect of selection (F(3,150) 
= 101.70, p<.001, ƞ2 = .67) and a significant interaction between selection and finger  
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(F(3,150) = 17.26, p<.001, ƞ2 = .26). The main effect of finger was not significant (p>.4) 
and there was no significant interaction with task (p>.8). Post hoc multiple comparisons 
for selection modes showed that RT in the neutral-free condition was significantly faster 
compared to all other conditions (all ps<.001) and RT in the prime-compatible condition 
was faster compared to both primed-free (p=.004) and prime-incompatible (p<.001) 
conditions. The difference between primed-free and prime-incompatible conditions was 
not significant (p>.1). In order to resolve the two-way interaction between selection 
mode and finger, we performed Bonferroni corrected paired samples t-tests to compare 
the differences between index and middle finger responses at each level of selection 
mode. The tests revealed that when participants performed prime-compatible actions, 
they responded faster when releasing index (M=532.94, SD=72.43) compared to middle 
finger (M=567.70, SD=83.26); t(51)= -5.61, p<.001. In contrast, releasing the index 
finger (M=602.47, SD=84.92) in the prime-incompatible condition was significantly 
slower than releasing the middle finger (M=559.88, SD=79.23); t(51)= 7.17, p<.001. The 
differences between releasing index and middle fingers in the neutral-free and primed-
free conditions were not significant (ps>.4; see Figure 6.2).  
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Figure 6.2 Mean RTs as a function of selection mode and released finger. Error 
bars represent SEM (*p<.05, **p<001).  
6.4.3 Perceived effort  
Mean effort ratings showed that participants perceived the key release selection in 
the prime-incompatible condition to be more effortful (M=3.68, SD=1.17) compared to 
prime-compatible (M=2.82, SD=.95), primed-free (M=2.52, SD=.95), and neutral-free 
(M=1.86, SD=.90) conditions. We analyzed the effort ratings by a 4 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with selection mode (neutral-free, primed-free, prime-compatible, 
prime-incompatible) as the within subjects factor4 and task (interval estimation, FoC 
rating) as the between subjects factor. The test revealed a significant main effect of 
selection mode (F(3,150) = 62.95, p<.001, ƞ2 = .56). There was no interaction with task 
                                                 
4 As a 4 x 2 ANOVA with selection mode and released-finger did not reveal any significant effects of or 
interactions with released-finger, we collapsed the finger levels. 
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(p>.7). Post hoc multiple comparisons showed that the neutral-free condition was 
perceived significantly less effortful compared to the primed-free (p<.001), prime-
compatible (p<.001), and prime-incompatible (p<.001) conditions. Similarly, the primed-
free condition was perceived as significantly less effortful compared to both the prime-
compatible (p=.014) and prime-incompatible (p<.001) conditions. Finally, the prime-
compatible condition was reported to be significantly less effortful than prime-
incompatible condition (p<.001; see Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3 Mean effort ratings in each selection condition. Error bars represent 
SEM. (*p<.05, **p<001).  
6.4.4 The SoA measures 
6.4.4.1 Interval estimations 
Mean interval estimations for each actual delay demonstrated a monotonic increase 
across 100 ms (M=253.08, SD=134.25), 300 ms (M=414.82, SD=125.82), and 500 ms 
(M=569.89, SD=172.04). Regarding the selection mode, participants perceived the key 
release-tone delay to be shorter in the neutral-free condition (M=385.22, SD=135.69) 
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compared to prime-compatible (M=417.59, SD=148.17), primed-free (M=419.51, 
SD=144.34), and prime-incompatible (M=428.07, SD=147.96) conditions. In order to 
examine the effects of selection mode and actual delay on the perceived intervals, we 
conducted a 4 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA5 with selection mode (neutral-free, 
primed-free, prime-compatible, prime-incompatible) and delay (100 ms, 300 ms, 500 ms) 
as within subject factors. The test revealed significant main effects of selection mode 
(F(3,75) = 7.79, p<.001, ƞ2 = .24) and delay (F(2,50) = 62.91, p<.001, ƞ2 = .72), and a 
significant interaction between selection mode and delay (F(6,150) = 5.54, p<.001, ƞ2 = 
.18). Regarding the main effect of selection mode, post hoc tests showed that participants 
perceived the key release-tone delay in the neutral-free condition to be significantly 
shorter compared to primed-free (p=.037), prime-compatible (p=.014), and prime-
incompatible (p=.022) conditions (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5). None of the remaining 
differences were significant (all ps>.8). Examination of the perceived differences among 
the delay levels were found to be significant at all levels (all ps<.001). Finally, we 
conducted three separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs by selection mode for 
each level of delay to resolve the selection mode x delay interaction. The tests showed 
that the main effect of selection mode was significant at all 100 ms, 300 ms, and 500 ms 
levels of the key release-tone delay (F(3,75) = 7.37, p<.001, ƞ2 = .23; F(3,75) = 4.88, 
p=.004, ƞ2 = .16; F(3,75) = 8.37, p<.001, ƞ2 = .25, respectively). However, multiple 
comparison tests to further examine the differences across selection modes at each delay 
                                                 
5 Factoring in released-finger did not reveal any significant effects and thus we reported the results of a 4 x 
3 ANOVA.  
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yielded mixed results. At 100 ms, the difference in the perceived intervals between 
neutral-free (M=230.36, SD=114.52) and primed-free (M=276.17, SD=145.13, p=.007) 
conditions and between primed-free and prime-compatible (M=247.39, SD=131.27, 
p<.001) conditions were significant. All other differences failed to reach significance (all 
ps>.2). At 300 ms, perceived interval in the neutral-free condition (M=388.60, 
SD=115.17) was significantly shorter than both primed-free (M=424.94, SD=126.51, 
p=.047) and prime-incompatible (M=430.44, SD=130.09, p=.042) conditions (all ps>.3 
for the remaining differences). At 500 ms, perceived interval was significantly shorter in 
the neutral-free (M=536.69, SD=177.38) condition compared to prime-compatible 
(M=590.07, SD=181.71, p=.002) and prime-incompatible (M=595.38, SD=167.69, 
p=.022) conditions. Additionally, perceived interval in the primed-free condition 
(M=557.42, SD=161.36) was significantly shorter than both prime-compatible (p=.035) 
and prime-incompatible conditions (p=.005). The remaining comparisons did not reveal 
any significant differences (all ps>.05). 
Overall, the analyses of perceived intervals between key releases and tones suggest 
that the size of temporal attraction and by extension, the strength of the SoA was greatest 
in the neutral-free condition in which participants were free to choose which key to 
release without being influenced by the action primes.  
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Figure 6.4 Mean perceived action-outcome intervals in the interval estimation task 
for each selection condition. Error bars represent SEM (*p<.05).  
 
Figure 6.5 Mean perceived action-outcome intervals in the interval estimation task 
for each selection and actual delay condition. Error bars represent SEM (*p<.05, 
**p<.001).  
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6.4.4.2 FoC ratings 
We calculated the mean FoC ratings for each delay and selection mode (see Figures 
6 and 7). Accordingly, participants reported stronger FoC over the tone when the key 
release-tone delay was 100 ms (M=4.97, SD=.59) compared to when it was 300 ms 
(M=4.52, SD=.77) and 500 ms (M=4.08, SD=1.15). Regarding the selection mode, mean 
FoC rating was reduced in the order of neutral-free (M=4.76, SD=.85), prime-compatible 
(M=4.51, SD=.81), primed-free (M=4.47, SD=.77), and prime-incompatible (M=4.34, 
SD=.92) conditions. In order to examine the effects of selection mode and actual delay on 
the FoC ratings, we conducted a 4 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with selection mode 
(neutral-free, primed-free, prime-compatible, prime-incompatible) and delay (100 ms, 
300 ms, 500 ms) as within subject factors. The test revealed significant main effects of 
selection mode (F(3,75) = 7.56, p<.001, ƞ2 = .23) and delay (F(2,50) = 15.37, p<.001, ƞ2 
= .38), and a significant interaction between selection mode and delay (F(6,150) = 3.41, 
p=.003, ƞ2 = .12).  
Post hoc tests comparing selection modes showed that participants felt significantly 
stronger control over the tone in the neutral-free condition compared to all primed-free 
(p=.016), prime-compatible (p=.026), and prime-incompatible (p=.011) conditions. 
None of the other differences was significant (all ps>.1). Examination of the FoC ratings 
across the delay levels showed that FoC rating was significantly higher when the delay 
was 100 ms than when it was 300 ms (p=.005) and 500 ms (p=.002). Additionally, FoC 
rating was significantly higher at 300 ms compared to 500 ms (p=.001). Finally, we 
performed three separate one-way repeated measures ANOVA to examine the effect of 
selection mode at each level of delay. The tests showed that the main effect of selection 
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mode on FoC rating was significant at all 100 ms, 300 ms, and 500 ms levels of the key 
release-tone delay (F(3,75) = 3.91, p=.012, ƞ2 = .14; F(3,75) = 8.66, p<.001, ƞ2 = .26; 
F(3,75) = 8.37, p<.001, ƞ2 = .25, respectively). Multiple comparison tests to examine the 
differences across selection modes at each delay showed that at 100 ms, the only 
significant difference was between neutral-free (M=5.15, SD=.53) and primed-free 
(M=4.86, SD=.54, p=.008) conditions (all ps>.2 for the remaining comparisons). At 300 
ms, FoC rating was significantly higher in the neutral-free condition (M=4.79, SD=.80) 
than all primed-free (M=4.49, SD=.72, p=.022), prime-compatible (M=4.49, SD=.73, 
p=.017), and prime-incompatible (M=4.29, SD=.84, p=.004) conditions (all ps>.09 for 
the remaining comparisons). Finally, at 500 ms, FoC rating was significantly higher in 
the neutral-free (M=4.34, SD=1.21) compared to prime-compatible (M=4.04, SD=1.15, 
p=.007) and prime-incompatible (M=3.87, SD=1.18, p=.002) conditions (all ps>.07 for 
the remaining comparisons). 
To summarize, the influence of selection mode on the FoC ratings was in the same 
direction as on the perceived intervals. That is, participants experienced stronger FoC 
over the tones when they freely chose which key to release in the neutral-free condition. 
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Figure 6.6 Mean FoC ratings for each selection mode. Error bars represent SEM 
(*p<.05).  
 
 
 Figure 6.7 Mean FoC ratings for each selection and actual delay condition (NF: 
neutral-free; PF: primed-free; PC: prime-compatible; PIC: prime-incompatible). Error 
bars represent SEM (*p<.05).  
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6.4.5 Action selection in free conditions 
In the neutral-free condition, participants chose the index finger at a ratio of 
55.89% (SD=20.76%), which was greater than chance level (t(51)=19.42, p<.001). We 
also examined whether the action primes in the primed-free condition biased participant’s 
selection of key release. We thus conducted a one sample t-test and found that the ratio of 
selecting the prime-compatible finger release (M=63.39%, SD=21.13%) was significantly 
greater than the chance level, t(51)=21.63, p<.001.  
6.4.6 Correlation analyses 
6.4.6.1 RTs and effort ratings 
For each participant, we performed Pearson’s correlation analyses to examine the 
relationship between RTs and effort ratings under each selection mode (neutral-free, 
primed-free, prime-compatible, prime-incompatible). Twenty-five participants out of 
fifty-two showed significant correlations between RTs and effort ratings in at least one 
condition. Mean Pearson correlations were 0.21, 0.30, 0.28, and 0.42 in the neutral-free, 
primed-free, prime-compatible, and prime-incompatible conditions, respectively. The 
overall correlation coefficient calculated by collapsing the action selection conditions was 
.48. We conducted two-tailed t-tests to examine the significance of the r values and found 
that in all but neutral-free condition, RTs and effort ratings were significantly correlated 
(neutral-free: t(51)=1.52, p=.135; primed-free: t(51)=2.22, p=.030; prime-compatible: 
t(51)=2.06, p=.044; prime-incompatible: t(51)=3.27, p=.001; overall: t(51)=3.87, 
p<.001). The relationship between RTs and effort ratings suggests that for each selection 
mode except the neutral-free condition, effort ratings were increased as it took the 
participants longer to respond (see Figure 6.8). 
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Figure 6.8. Overall correlation between RTs and effort ratings demonstrated for one 
participant. 
6.4.6.2 RTs and perceived intervals 
In the interval estimation task, fifteen participants out of twenty-six showed 
significant correlations between perceived intervals and RTs for at least one selection 
mode. On average, the variance in the perceived intervals accounted by RTs was 0.14 in 
the neutral-free, 0.15 in the primed-free, 0.10 in the prime-compatible, and 0.15 in the 
prime-incompatible condition. Overall correlation coefficient was .13. We performed t-
tests on these values and found that none of the correlations was significantly greater than 
zero. (neutral-free: t(25)=.69, p=.495; primed-free: t(25)=.74, p=.464; prime-compatible: 
t(25)=.49, p=.627; prime-incompatible: t(25)=.74, p=.464; overall: t(25)=.64, p=.526).  
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6.4.6.3 Effort ratings and perceived intervals 
In the interval estimation task, we analyzed the relationship between perceived 
intervals and effort ratings across participants6 for each selection mode and found a 
significant correlation in the prime-incompatible condition (r=.54, p=.005; see Figure 
6.9). Pearson’s correlations in the neutral-free (r=.17, p=.401), primed-free (r=.15, 
p=.456), and prime-compatible (r=.28, p=.168) were not significant. We also examined 
the overall correlation between effort ratings and perceived intervals and found a positive 
correlation approaching the significance level (r=.36, p=.074). The relationship between 
perceived intervals and effort ratings therefore suggests that perceived intervals were 
longer as the perceived effort was greater, which was more strongly pronounced in the 
prime-incompatible condition. 
                                                 
6 As the number of trials in the effort rating task was not equal to those in each condition in the interval 
estimation/FoC rating tasks, we could not perform within subject correlations. 
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Figure 6.9. Between subjects correlation between perceived intervals and effort 
ratings in the prime-incompatible condition. 
6.4.6.4 RTs and FoC ratings 
In the FoC rating task, seventeen participants out of twenty-six showed significant 
correlations between FoC ratings and RTs in at least one condition. Average correlations 
were -0.19 in the neutral-free, -0.05 in the primed-free, -0.12 in the prime-compatible, 
and -0.20 in the prime-incompatible condition. Overall correlation coefficient was -.16. 
Pearson correlations were then subjected to t-tests which showed that none of these 
correlations was significant (neutral-free: t(25)=-.94, p=.352; primed-free: t(25)=-.24, 
p=.808; prime-compatible: t(25)=-.59, p=.559; prime-compatible: t(25)=-1, p=.327; 
overall: t(25)=-.79, p=.435). The lack of a significant correlation between RTs and FoC 
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ratings suggest that participants did not make their FoC judgments based on their 
response performance.       
6.4.6.5 Effort ratings and FoC ratings 
We also examined the correlations (across participants6) between FoC ratings and 
effort ratings for each selection mode and found a significant correlation in the prime-
incompatible condition (r=-.41, p=.035; see Figure 6.10). Correlations in the neutral-free 
(r=-.15, p=.460), primed-free (r=.07, p=.739), and prime-compatible (r=-.35, p=.077) as 
well as overall correlation (r=-.21, p=.303) between effort ratings and FoC ratings were 
not significant. In the prime-incompatible condition thus, participants reported to have 
less control over the tone as they perceived it more effortful to choose which key to 
release. 
  
 
Figure 6.10. Between subjects correlation between FoC ratings and effort ratings in 
the prime-incompatible condition. 
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6.4.6.6 Perceived intervals and FoC ratings 
The last correlation analyses involved the examination of the relationship between 
the low (interval estimation) and high (FoC ratings) levels of the SoA. Matching the two 
groups of participants, we conducted Pearson’s correlation tests on the perceived 
intervals and FoC ratings for each selection mode. Accordingly, the tests revealed 
significant negative correlations in the neutral-free (r=-.40, p=.041), primed-free (r=-.58, 
p=.002), prime-compatible (r=-.57, p=.003), and prime-incompatible (r=-.51, p=.008) 
conditions. Additionally, overall correlation between perceived intervals and FoC ratings 
was found to be significant (r=-.57, p=.002). Since briefer perception of delays imply a 
stronger intentional binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002), negative correlations between 
perceived intervals and FoC ratings entail a positive relationship between these two levels 
of the SoA (see Figure 6.11).  
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Figure 6.11. Between groups correlations between perceived intervals and FoC 
ratings in the neutral-free, primed-free, prime-compatible, and prime-incompatible 
conditions. 
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6.5 Discussion 
Previous research has shown that subliminal priming of actions leads to 
enhancement in the feeling of control (FoC) judgments when these primes are compatible 
with the performed actions (Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 
2010). This finding is commonly interpreted as being driven by the facilitation of action 
selection processes when action primes are compatible with the performed actions 
compared to when they are incompatible (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 
2010). In the current study, we examined the influence of supraliminal priming of actions 
and one’s freedom in action selection on both implicit and direct measures of the SoA. 
Our design included four different modes of action selection which were determined by a 
post prime target cue. Based on the target cue and the preceding prime, participants 
performed either free or instructed actions which consisted of releasing either the index 
or the middle finger off the corresponding keys. Free conditions included neutral 
(neutral-free) and action primes (primed-free) while instructed conditions required the 
participants to perform either prime-compatible or –incompatible actions. All actions 
produced a tone and we measured temporal estimation of action-outcome intervals and 
subjective FoC judgments as the measures of the SoA, as well as RTs and perceived 
effort ratings.   
To begin with, examination of the subjective mental effort ratings across the modes 
of action selection revealed that participants’ perception of effort level was highest in the 
prime-incompatible condition, followed by prime-compatible, primed-free, and neutral-
free conditions. Although previous studies have considered incompatible action primes to 
be more effortful compared to compatible ones, no study thus far obtained a subjective 
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measure of mental effort in action selection. We suggest that the differences we found in 
perceived effort levels among four modes of selection were due to the varying mental 
load and processing involved across these conditions. Except for the neutral-free 
condition, for instance, all other conditions required at least the maintenance of the action 
representations induced by the action primes. In the primed-free condition, interestingly, 
participants perceived more effort compared to the neutral-free condition even though 
they were free to choose their own action. The difference between these two conditions 
suggest that although one is free in selection their action, being exposed to a prior action 
thought and maintaining it could make it more effortful to make a self-selection. Our 
further examination of the primed-free condition showed that participants chose to 
perform the prime-compatible action more frequently, indicating a strong bias driven by 
the primes. However, they also reported this condition as less effortful than the prime-
compatible condition in which they simply performed the same movement observed in 
the action prime. It could therefore be reasonable to suggest that being free to choose 
one’s action, even under the influence of an externally induced action selection, was 
perceived as less effortful compared to having to perform exactly the same action as 
instructed. If the mental processing load can be considered as a strong factor that leads to 
these differences in the effort ratings (e.g., Paas, van Merriënboer, & Adam, 1994) it is 
not surprising that performing prime-incompatible actions was rated as the most effortful 
one. This condition required the participants to both maintain and update prime-induced 
action representations. The prime-incompatible condition thus seems to involve greater 
mental load to be able to select an action. In short, our results suggest that mental load 
and freedom to choose one’s actions constitute two main factors that determine the 
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perceived effort level in action selection. However, this interpretation should be taken 
with caution. In a context where there are several action alternatives as opposed only two 
as in the current study, one might perceive it more effortful to make a self-selection than 
when the selection is readily specified by an external source. Future studies could 
examine this possibility. 
The influence of the mode of action selection was also observed on the RTs. 
Accordingly, slower RTs were observed in the prime-incompatible condition compared 
to the prime-compatible and neutral-free conditions. Additionally, participants were 
much faster in the neutral-free condition. Interestingly, RTs were similar in the primed-
free and prime-incompatible conditions, which might be driven by the strain in making a 
self-selection when the presence of an external action representation is a strong biasing 
factor. The finding that prime-incompatible actions took longer to respond compared to 
prime-compatible actions is in line with the previous findings (Chambon et al., 2013; 
Damen et al., 2014; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010). Importantly, we also found 
that participants’ perceived effort levels were correlated with the RTs in all except the 
neutral-free condition. This might suggest that RTs as the implicit indicator of effort and 
conscious judgments of effort denote the processing load of action selection in the same 
manner. That is, effort level in action selection can be indexed by both RTs and self-
reports of experienced effort. One might also argue that participants might have 
perceived more effort when their responses were slower. However, this view requires 
further investigation to clarify whether perceived effort is at all mediated by RTs. 
More critical to the focus of this study was the finding that the mode of action 
selection influenced both implicit and direct measures of the SoA. Firstly, we found that 
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the neutral-free condition in which action selection was not influenced by external action 
representations led to shorter perception of the action-outcome delays compared to 
performing actions under the influence of such representations. As noted before, greater 
temporal attraction observed on perceive action-outcome delays is interpreted as a 
stronger binding effect and implies stronger SoA (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, 
& Haggard, 2007; Ku, Brass, Haggard, & Kühn, 2012; Moore & Obhi, 2012; Wenke & 
Haggard, 2009). Therefore, our finding that perceived intervals were at shortest in the 
neutral-free condition can be interpreted as showing that the low level SoA was stronger 
when participants were purely free to choose which action to perform without the 
influence of external action representations.   
Crucially, the influence of action selection mode demonstrated the same trend on 
the FoC ratings. That is, participants reported stronger FoC over the outcomes in the 
neutral-free condition compared to all other conditions where an action-prime was 
presented. We also found that participants reported feeling less control as the action-
outcome delay was increased. This is consistent with previous studies noting that action-
outcome interval is a prominent retrospective cue that affects the FoC judgments 
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 
2010). Analyses of correlations between perceived intervals and FoC ratings revealed that 
in all action selection conditions, perceived intervals were significantly negatively 
correlated with FoC ratings. Conceptually, however, the relationship between these two 
measures is in the same direction as longer perceived intervals indicate weaker temporal 
binding and hence weaker SoA. In sum, both perceived intervals and FoC ratings 
demonstrate that the SoA was at strongest level in the neutral-free condition. We believe 
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that this is indeed an important finding as the relationship between low and high levels of 
the SoA has rarely been examined.  
Regarding the relationship between effort ratings and the SoA, we found that 
perceived intervals were increased and the FoC ratings were decreased as the perceived 
effort was at higher levels. However, for both perceived intervals and FoC ratings this 
relationship was significant only in the prime-incompatible condition. One potential 
reason we failed to find a strong correlation in all action selection conditions could be 
due to fewer number of trials per condition in the effort rating task. This is admittedly 
one limitation in our study that otherwise could allow a more clear picture of the 
relationship between perceived effort and the SoA. It is also crucial to note at this point 
that we cannot put forth the measure of perceived effort as the one and only indicator of 
action selection fluency. There could as well be implicit processes that determine the 
fluency without one’s awareness during action selection.     
Another important finding of the current study was that neither perceived intervals 
nor FoC ratings were correlated with the RTs. This not only supports the previous finding 
that FoC ratings were independent from participants’ response performance (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Damen et al., 2014), but also shows that perceived intervals were not 
related to the RTs either. Thus, it does not seem likely that these measures of the SoA 
were somehow influenced by the response speed.  
The critical question regarding these results is whether it was the least effort or the 
most freedom observed in the neutral-free condition that resulted in stronger SoA 
compared to all other modes of action selection. Although the data we report here might 
not be adequate to provide a far-reaching answer to this question, overall, the results of 
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the current study enable a deeper consideration of both freedom and fluency in action 
selection.  
There are several reasons to argue that freedom in action selection could be more 
influential on the SoA than selection fluency. First of all, our results showed that the SoA 
was indifferent across primed-free, prime-compatible, and prime-incompatible conditions 
although perceived effort levels among these conditions were different. In addition, 
except for the prime-incompatible condition, neither perceived intervals, nor FoC ratings, 
correlated with effort ratings. These results might strongly bear the notion that one’s 
freedom to choose an action without any external influence can bolster the SoA. The 
source of such influence could be considered from two perspectives. First, as previously 
noted, observation of the primes could automatically mirror the actions represented in 
these primes (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), thereby inducing externally determined selection of 
action. Second, the action primes in the current study could have resembled the presence 
of an external agent as they represented real movements. In other words, this apparent 
agent was present in all but neutral-free condition. Therefore, performing either 
compatible or incompatible actions in relation to what an eternal agent is doing, or even 
being free under the influence of this agent could undermine one’s SoA while there is an 
option to freely select an action without such an influence.  
Second, the importance of freedom and internal generation of action selection have 
been underscored by previous research. It has been pointed out, for example, that 
subjective nature of freedom in action selection can be graded depending on 
environmental factors (Filevich et al., 2013). In the current experimental context, 
specifically, primed-free condition included the presence of an externally specified 
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action, which could render this condition less free compared to the neutral-free condition 
in which internal action selection is not disturbed by external cues. Additionally, several 
neuroimaging studies showed that free and instructed action selections were associated 
with separate neural structures (Lau et al., 2004, 2006; Waszak et al., 2005) and 
internally generated action selections led to stronger SoA compared to externally induced 
action selections (e.g., Sebanz & Lackner, 2007). It reasonable, therefore, to suggest that 
freedom and self-generation in action selection constituted the most prominent cue 
influencing the SoA in the current study. 
Alternatively, one might argue that the neutral-free condition led to stronger SoA 
because action selection was the least effort taking, and therefore much more fluent in 
this condition. This view, however, requires an explanation for why the SoA was 
indifferent among conditions which varied in the effort level. One explanation could be 
that intentional maintenance of action representations might introduce a ceiling effect in 
the influence of action fluency on the SoA. More clearly, keeping an action goal in mind 
until one knows which action to perform could exert the maximum effort level and later 
processes such as updating the action goal as in the prime-incompatible condition might 
not introduce a significant difference in the SoA. This might explain why SoA did not 
differ among prime-free, prime-compatible, and prime-incompatible conditions as all 
these conditions required at least the maintenance of the action primes. This is indeed one 
important difference in our design compared to those employed in the previous studies. 
That is, the task in the current study required purposeful maintenance of the action primes 
until a symbolic target cue (i.e., not action related), appeared to indicate whether action 
selection could be free or bound to the prime. Earlier studies, however, used targets that 
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consisted of either one of the action primes and the task did not require intentional 
maintenance of the action primes (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Damen et al., 2014; 
Wenke et al., 2010). Therefore, the maintenance of action primes alone could have 
introduced the maximum distortion to the selection fluency, which could have hindered 
the influence of prime-compatibility on the SoA. However, we have to admit that this 
view is rather speculative and needs further investigation. 
We therefore conclude, for the above mentioned reasons, that our results can be 
best accounted by the notion of freedom in action selection. Nevertheless, further 
examination is required to identify how selection freedom and fluency are weighted in 
determining the SoA. Depending on the context, fluency or freedom could be more 
reliable cues to agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Thus, identifying the contextual 
modulation of the effects of freedom and fluency is an important question for future 
research. 
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SoA is an important aspect of self-consciousness and has significant 
connections to morality, taking responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions, 
and many physiological and psychological disorders. In recent years, therefore, a vast 
body of research has been devoted to the investigation of the underlying mechanisms 
and neural correlates of the SoA. The main insight provided by the relevant research 
is that the phenomenology of agency is bound to several underlying processes 
including sensorimotor processes, interpretation of causal relationships, cognitive 
judgments, beliefs, and environmental factors. Among these, relatively less 
considered contributors of the SoA are the processes involved in action selection and 
the valence of action-outcomes, which are fundamental to human actions. The 
experiments described in thesis thus aimed at shedding light on the role of these 
factors on the SoA. To achieve this, five experiments were conducted to examine the 
influence of manipulating one’s freedom to choose among a number of action 
alternatives and the perceived valence of action-outcomes. Importantly, the majority 
of these experiments used both indirect and direct measures of the SoA, and thereby 
enabled the examination of the relationship between these measures. Before 
presenting a comprehensive discussion on whether and how the present studies could 
contribute to the understanding of the SoA, the following section will summarize the 
key findings of five experiments (see also Table 7.1).  
7.1 Summary of the key findings 
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), the number of action alternatives was varied 
between one, three, and seven alternatives and the degree of intentional binding was 
examined across these three choice-level conditions. The results showed that the 
amount binding was parametrically increased as the choice space was increased from 
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one to three to seven options. Importantly, binding size was significantly greater in 
the seven-choice condition compared to the one-choice condition while the three-
choice condition did not differ from either the seven-choice and one-choice 
conditions.  
Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) investigated the role of perceived pleasantness of 
action-outcomes on both intentional binding and the degree of subjective control felt 
over these outcomes. Because the auditory stimuli used in this study were 
characterized as pleasant or unpleasant according to western tonal structure, both 
western and non-western participants were recruited. The results indicated that the 
temporal compression between actions and outcomes was greater with pleasant than 
unpleasant outcomes. However, this effect was observed only in the western group of 
participants. Subjective ratings of control over the outcomes, on the other hand, 
showed that both groups experienced stronger control over pleasant than unpleasant 
outcomes. 
In Experiment 3 (Chapter 4), participants could either freely select an action 
among four alternatives or perform the one that was externally specified. In addition, 
these actions could produce either pleasant or unpleasant outcomes. Again, both 
intentional binding and FoC ratings were measured. The results of this study showed 
that both binding and FoC ratings were greater when actions were freely selected than 
instructed. Additionally, pleasant outcomes led to higher FoC ratings than unpleasant 
outcomes, while the valence of outcomes did not influence binding. Interestingly, FoC 
ratings were also higher for the pleasant outcomes produced by freely selected actions 
than for those produced by instructed actions.  
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Table 7.1 Summary of the designs and main results of Experiments 1-5  
 
Experiment Manipulation 
Outcome 
Identity/ 
Temporal 
prediction 
Results 
Size of binding FoC ratings 
#1 
1) Choice level  
(one, three, and 
seven options) 
Predicted/ 
Predicted 
Greater in the 
seven-choice 
condition 
compared to the 
no-choice (one) 
condition 
N/A 
#2 
1) Outcome valence 
(pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) 
Predicted/ 
Predicted 
Greater with 
pleasant than 
unpleasant 
outcomes (for the 
western group) 
Greater with 
pleasant than 
unpleasant 
outcomes 
#3 
1) Action source 
(self vs. other) 
2) Outcome valence 
(pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) 
Unpredicted/
Unpredicted 
Greater in the 
free- compared to 
instructed-choice 
condition 
Greater in the 
free- compared to 
instructed-choice 
condition and 
greater with 
pleasant than 
unpleasant 
outcomes 
#4 
1) Choice level 
(one, two, three, 
and four options 
2) Outcome valence 
(pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) 
Unpredicted/
Unpredicted 
Greater in the 
four-choice 
condition 
compared to the 
remaining choice-
levels 
Increased with 
choice-level and 
greater with 
pleasant than 
unpleasant 
outcomes 
#5 
1) Selection mode 
(neutral-free, 
primed-free, prime-
compatible, prime-
incompatible) 
Predicted/ 
Unpredicted 
Greater in the 
neutral-free 
condition 
compared to the 
remaining 
conditions 
Greater in the 
neutral-free 
condition 
compared to the 
remaining 
conditions 
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The manipulation of choice-level was further elaborated in Experiment 4 by 
varying the number of action alternatives between one and four. As in Experiments 2-
3, action-outcomes could be either pleasant or unpleasant, and both intentional 
binding and subjective FoC ratings were measured. In addition, subjective judgments 
of the mental effort experienced in action selection were obtained in each choice-level 
condition. Consistent with the main results of Experiment 1, binding of actions and 
outcomes was found to be systematically enhanced as the choice-level was increased 
from one to four options. It was significantly stronger in the four-choice condition 
compared to all remaining choice-levels. FoC ratings also displayed a similar trend; 
participants reported gradually increased FoC over the outcomes along with the 
increments of action options. Moreover, differences in FoC were significant at all 
levels of choice. With respect to the effect of outcome pleasantness, the results 
confirmed those found in Experiment 3. More clearly, the valence of outcomes did 
not influence binding while FoC ratings were higher for pleasant compared to 
unpleasant outcomes. Finally, participants reported experiencing significantly less 
effort in choosing an action in the four-choice condition compared to the remaining 
choice-levels.    
Experiment 5 used supraliminal priming of actions and participants performed 
free and instructed actions in response to a target cue. The instructed actions were 
either compatible or incompatible actions in relation to the action-primes. In the free 
conditions, participants were free to perform one of two actions after being presented 
with either an action-prime or a neutral prime. In this study, intentional binding, FoC 
ratings, and subjective effort ratings were measured. The results showed that both 
intentional binding and subjective control were significantly stronger when 
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participants performed free actions that were preceded by no action-prime compared 
to the remaining free-choice (primed) and instructed conditions. Importantly, these 
two measures of the SoA were significantly correlated. Finally, perceived effort in 
action selection was increased in the order of neutral-free, primed-free, prime-
compatible, and prime-incompatible conditions.  
From a broad perspective, these findings indicate that one’s freedom to choose 
an action from a set of action alternatives has a crucial impact on the SoA. In addition 
to the factors related to action selection, perceived pleasantness of action-outcomes 
has also indispensable impact, particularly on the explicit judgments of agency. The 
following two sections will consider the potential mechanisms through which freedom 
and choice level in action selection, and the valence of action-outcomes could 
influence the SoA.  
7.2 The role of action selection processes on the SoA 
Previous research examining the role of action selection processes has mainly 
focused on the influence of selection fluency on the subjective reports of the SoA. 
This line of research has shown that subliminal priming of actions facilitated action 
selection when these primes were compatible with the actions, which in turn enhanced 
the subjective control felt over action-outcomes (Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 
2013; Wenke et al., 2010). These findings also indicated that action selection 
processes prospectively contribute to the SoA as these processes take place before the 
action is executed and are independent from the predictability of action-outcomes 
(e.g., Chambon et al., 2013).      
The present thesis approached the study of the role of action selection processes 
from different perspectives. One aspect examined the SoA when, one is either free to 
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choose among a fixed set of actions, or when one must perform an instructed action. 
This scenario was more directly established in Experiment 3 and Experiment 5. Both 
of these experiments suggested that intentional binding and subjective judgments of 
control were enhanced when one freely determines which action to perform relative to 
following the action instructions. In Experiment 3, importantly, the effect of freedom 
on binding was independent from the valence of the outcomes. This supports the view 
that processes involved in action selection, specifically one’s freedom to choose an 
action in the context of Experiment 3, can be considered to inform the SoA 
prospectively (Chambon et al., 2013). Furthermore, Experiment 5 showed that 
freedom in action selection without any external influence (by presentation of action 
primes) can significantly strengthen the SoA compared to when one makes a free 
selection under the influence of external selection of actions. The second dimension 
related to the action selection processes was concerned with rendering the number of 
action alternatives from one to several. In this regard, Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 
examined the effect of choice level on the SoA and the overall results suggested that 
the highest number of action alternatives boosted both intentional binding and 
subjective feelings of control.  
Intuitively, the finding that freedom and having the highest number of choice 
alternatives can strongly influence the SoA is not surprising. But how exactly could 
these factors involve in the mechanisms contributing to the SoA, particularly to 
intentional binding and subjective judgments of control?  
One interpretation of these results can be based on the neural correlates of free 
versus instructed actions and choice. Previous research suggested, for instance, that 
SMA is a key structure involved in internally generated action selection (Cunnington 
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et al., 2002; Filevich et al., 2013; Lau et al., 2004, 2006; Waszak et al., 2005). 
Critically, this area has also been shown as a strong candidate for mediating 
intentional binding (Cavazzana, Penolazzi, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2015; Kühn, 
Brass, & Haggard, 2012; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). In 
addition, rostral SMA and right DLPC have been found to show increased activity 
when two to four free-choice conditions were contrasted with instructed conditions 
(Van Eimeren et al., 2006).  
In line with these findings indicating differences in the neural correlates of free 
versus instructed actions, the affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek, 2007) 
provides a more specific account of processing the selection of actions. This model 
proposes that a final selection of action is the result of preceding inhibitory and 
excitatory processes that dynamically operate among different action representations. 
The competition between these representations within fronto-parietal circuits 
ultimately results in inhibition of all representations except the one with strongest 
activation. In this view, the activation strength of the selected action’s representation 
would increase in parallel to the number of competing representations. In other words, 
the greater the choice space the greater the activation of the ultimately selected action. 
Thus, the affordance competition hypothesis would also suggest that free selection 
among several action alternatives would imply stronger endogenous processing 
compared to having few or no options. Therefore, both neural correlates of self-
generated actions, particularly SMA, and greater internal processing with higher level 
of choice could provide a viable explanation for stronger binding found in 
Experiments 1, 3-5 when selection of actions was determined freely and with the 
availability of maximum number of alternatives.  
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Similar mechanisms could also explain the enhancement of subjective agency 
judgments under free and high choice level conditions (Experiments 3-5). More 
specifically, neural correlates of subjective judgments of agency have been reported to 
involve several brain areas including TPJ, IPL, SMA, ACC, and the DLPFC (David, 
Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Fukushima, Goto, Maeda, Kato, & Umeda, 2013; Sperduti, 
Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011). The majority of these areas also engage in action 
monitoring and detection of discrepancies between both action alternatives and 
predicted and actual outcomes (Chambon et al., 2013; David et al., 2008). It would 
thus be reasonable to suggest that involvement of these areas in the free selection and 
high level of choice conditions would be stronger, and thus lead to enhancement of 
subjective judgments of agency. Additionally, higher level thoughts concerning one’s 
state and degree of freedom could also be influential on subjective judgments. More 
clearly, one could consider themselves more strongly in control when the context 
allows freedom to choose and presents several alternatives of actions as opposed to 
when one’s choice is limited by external instructions.  
It therefore appears that both prospective cues operating at the stage of action 
selection, and higher level beliefs in possessing stronger control when one has 
freedom to choose an action can affect subjective judgments of control. As the former 
operates before the action execution and production of outcomes, these processes 
could be argued to contribute prospectively to the agency judgments (Chambon et al., 
2013). Higher level thoughts, on the other hand, would imply more strongly the 
contribution of retrospective processes on subjective judgments of control. At this 
point, nonetheless, it is important to note that the present results cannot definitively 
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distinguish whether the influence of freedom and choice level on judgments of control 
was driven through prospective or retrospective processes (or a combination of both).   
A final remark on the notion of action selection processes and fluency of action 
selection is in order. As noted before, previous studies suggested that dysfluency of 
action selection reduces the subjective ratings of control (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; 
Chambon et al., 2013; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). The 
assumption purported in these studies was that the conflict between the primed and 
target action representations would decrease the fluency of action selection. In fact, 
recent studies seeking to elucidate the neural correlates of this assumption found 
supportive evidence that activity in IPC was increased with the input from DLPC that 
signals conflict monitoring (Chambon et al., 2013), as in the case of when actions 
primes and target actions are incompatible. In addition, disruption of IPC by TMS 
diminished the difference in judgments of control between compatible and 
incompatible primes (Chambon, Moore, & Haggard, 2014), suggesting that this area 
is causally related to the construction of agency judgments.  
Regarding these studies, it is important to note that the notion of effort or 
selection fluency was only determined by the compatibility of action representations 
prior to action execution. The subjective aspect of effort experienced during action 
selection under various circumstances, however, was not considered. The former 
notion of effort can be considered as being in effect at the stage of action selection 
while the subjective judgment of effort is constructed after the action execution and 
refers to how effortful one perceives selecting an action. For the sake of simplicity, 
we call these two forms of effort “prospective” and “subjective” effort, respectively. 
Could prospective and subjective effort similarly influence the SoA? Two 
CHAPTER 7 
174 
 
experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) in the present thesis attempted to address these 
questions by obtaining subjective ratings of mental effort experienced during action 
selection. Although the results of these studies did not reveal a clear statistical 
relationship between perceived effort and the SoA, the critical finding was that free-
choice conditions were perceived as the least effort taking compared to decreased 
choice-level and instructed conditions. In particular, Experiment 4 showed that the 
effort ratings were systematically decreased as the number of action alternatives was 
varied from one to four. Note that the same trend was also observed with binding, 
demonstrated by increased estimates of action-outcome interval as the choice-level 
was varied from one to four. Similarly, in Experiment 5, participants experienced the 
least effort in choosing an action in the neutral-free condition where their choice was 
not preceded by an action prime. In this experiment, effort ratings were also varied by 
performing either prime-compatible or prime-incompatible actions, with higher effort 
experienced in the latter condition. The trend in binding was again similar, if not the 
same, as that of perceived effort across selection mode conditions, with greatest 
binding observed in the neutral-free condition followed by prime-compatible, primed-
free, and prime-incompatible conditions.   
At this moment, there are two important points to note. First, we do not argue 
that freedom entails effortless processing of action selection. Rather, it could be the 
case that when actions and outcomes are not contingent (as in Experiments 3-4) or 
when outcomes are indistinctive across different actions (as in Experiment 5), free 
selection of an action might be perceived as less effortful than following action 
instructions. This is most probably due to the fact that in the free-choice conditions 
(Experiments 3-4), processing of outcomes in relation to their causal actions was not 
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involved in the selection processes. For instance, when one cannot predict the 
outcome of one of several actions or when several actions all produce the same 
outcome, one’s ultimate decision on which action to take would be less likely to rely 
on the identity of outcomes compared to when each of these actions is contingently 
related to a distinct outcome. 
Second, although the finding of Experiment 5 - that perceived effort was higher 
in the prime-incompatible condition compared to the prime-compatible condition -
seems to parallel previous views of (prospective) effort in action selection (Chambon 
& Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Wenke et al., 
2010), the present studies do not provide adequate evidence that prospective and 
subjective effort measure the same construct. However, they at least show that the 
notion of effort in action selection cannot be limited to the compatibility of action 
representations; the relationship between actions and outcomes as well as the number 
of alternative actions could also determine how fluently selection processes operate. 
Therefore, further investigation is required to advance the understanding of how 
prospective and subjective effort as well as effort and fluency might be related, and 
what other factors determine these aspects of action selection.  
To sum up, overall results of Experiments 1, 3-5 suggest that freedom and 
choice level aspects of action selection prospectively contribute to intentional binding, 
whereas the influence of these aspects on subjective judgments of control can be 
driven by either prospective processes active during action selection or retrospective 
thoughts regarding the link between one’s freedom in action selection and their sense 
of control. Furthermore, Experiments 4-5 pave the way for studying the notion of 
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effort in action selection and its relationship with the SoA in a more comprehensive 
framework.  
7.3 The role of outcome valence on the SoA 
The contribution of outcome valence on the SoA is another topic of study that 
has received little attention. Only few studies directly examined whether the valence 
of action-outcomes could alter intentional binding and subjective judgments of 
agency. One such study used negative, neutral, and positive vocalizations as action-
outcomes and showed that intentional binding was reduced with negative compared to 
neutral and positive outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). 
In the present thesis outcome valence was examined within different contexts in 
Experiments 2-4. In all of these studies, action-outcomes consisted of consonant and 
dissonant piano chords that are respectively regarded as pleasant and unpleasant 
sounding chords (Dell’Acqua et al., 2006; Dellacherie et al., 2011; Plantinga & 
Trehub, 2013; Shapira Lots & Stone, 2008). However, this characterization and 
preference for consonance have been suggested to be acquired through learning and 
could be specific to western music structures (Plantinga & Trehub, 2013; Vassilakis, 
2005). In Experiment 2 thus, we recruited both western and non-western groups of 
participants and examined the influence of outcome pleasantness on intentional 
binding and FoC ratings over the outcomes. Interestingly, the results regarding the 
degree of binding showed that the non-western group was indifferent to the valence of 
outcomes while the western group displayed greater binding between pleasant 
compared to unpleasant outcomes and actions. Notably, this result highlights the 
importance of cross-cultural research in cognitive psychology. With respect to the 
FoC ratings, however, both groups reported having stronger control over pleasant than 
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unpleasant outcomes. The following two experiments (Experiments 3-4), recruiting 
only western participants, and confirmed these results in FoC ratings. However, the 
results with binding did not reveal any difference between pleasant and unpleasant 
outcomes, which is discussed further below.  
Based on the current studies and previous views, the most plausible explanation 
for feeling greater control over pleasant outcomes is linked to the notion of self-
serving bias, which refers to the tendency to attribute the cause of desirable or 
positive-compared to negative- outcomes to the self (Bradley, 1978; Campbell & 
Sedikides, 1999). Furthermore, the current studies suggest that this effect can be 
observed in FoC ratings regardless of whether the outcomes are predicted 
(Experiment 2) or unpredicted (Experiments 3-4). Thus, subjective judgment of 
control over outcomes is more likely to be informed retrospectively by the valence of 
these outcomes.  
With respect to the influence of valence on intentional binding, the 
methodological differences across the three experiments might account for the mixed 
findings. One important difference in this regard was that outcomes were contingent 
to their corresponding actions in Experiment 2 while they were unpredictable in 
Experiments 3-4. In the study by Yoshie and Haggard (2013), negative, neutral, and 
positive outcomes were presented in separate blocks and thus the identity of outcomes 
was as well predictable. The second difference was concerned with the temporal 
predictability of action-outcomes. Accordingly, the action-outcome interval was fixed 
to 250 ms in Experiment 2 while in Experiments 3-4, it was varied among 100 ms, 
300 ms, and 500 ms. Therefore, the lack of either the identity or temporal prediction 
of outcomes in Experiments 3-4 could have undermined the influence of valence on 
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intentional binding. With respect to the prediction of outcome identity, several views 
have highlighted the importance of action-outcome contingency on intentional 
binding (Haggard, 2005; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, et al., 2009). 
However, other accounts have provided evidence that the size of binding did not 
differ between when the outcome identity was predicted versus when it was 
unpredicted (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). It might therefore be the absence of 
temporal predictability of outcomes that precluded the effect of valence on intentional 
binding in Experiments 3-4. Yet, this remains as an open question to be further 
explored by manipulating temporal predictability and valence within the same setting. 
To recap, the overall results of Experiments 2-4 suggest that subjective 
judgments of control have a strong propensity to be influenced by outcome valence, 
whereas binding seems to be dependent on other factors such as temporal and identity 
predictions. The finding that subjective agency judgments were greater for pleasant 
than unpleasant outcomes regardless from the predictability of timing and identity of 
outcomes indicates that this effect is constructed retrospectively. Questions remain 
open, however, with regard to whether the absence of these predictions could have 
undermined the effect of valence on binding.  
7.4 Relationship between intentional binding and FoC ratings 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the two-level account of the SoA proposed that the 
implicit measures of the SoA (i.e., intentional binding and sensory attenuation) might 
index the low level SoA while the explicit self-reports quantify the high level of SoA 
(Synofzik et al., 2008). The critical question regarding this distinction is then whether 
the implicit and explicit measures of the SoA are related and correspondingly, 
whether they rely on similar or distinct mechanisms.  
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One line of view put forward that subjective judgments of agency and 
intentional binding might rely on distinct mechanisms (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; 
Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Obhi & Hall, 2011; Strother, House, & Obhi, 2010; Wen, 
Yamashita, & Asama, 2015). Wen et al. (2015), for example, examined the influence 
of arousal and action-outcome delays on both subjective judgments of agency and 
intentional binding. They found that arousal had enhancing effect on intentional 
binding while it did not influence the subjective judgments. Additionally, longer 
action-outcome delays increased the binding effect while weakening subjective 
control. In another study (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), intentional binding and sensory 
attenuation were measured in operant (participants’ key presses produce a tone) and 
observational conditions (participants passively hear the tones). After each block of 
operant condition, participants rated on a scale to indicate their subjective judgement 
of control over the tones. According to the results, binding and sensory attenuation 
effects were observed in the operant condition as expected. However, examination of 
the relationship among these measures indicated that neither of these measures was 
correlated with another.  
The present thesis probed this issue by measuring both intentional binding and 
explicit judgments of agency in Experiments 2-5. While these measures were obtained 
as within-participants in Experiment 2, the following experiments conducted a 
between-participants approach in order to avoid any potential influence between these 
measures. The relationship between intentional binding and subjective judgments of 
agency can be considered in terms of i) whether they are similarly influenced by 
applied experimental factors and ii) whether there is a statistically significant 
correlation between them. Based on the previous views, as noted above, it appears 
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that differences in the effects of experimental factors on the two measures (Wen et al., 
2015) or a non-significant correlation between them (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014) could 
indicate that these two measures of the SoA rely on different mechanisms.  
Within this framework, the results of Experiment 2 showed that although 
binding and FoC ratings were not correlated, pleasant outcomes enhanced both 
binding and FoC control ratings in the same direction for the western group. For the 
non-western-group, on the other hand, binding was found to be indifferent to the 
outcome valence while the FoC ratings displayed a similar trend to that in the 
western-group. In Experiment 3, having freedom to choose one’s actions increased 
both binding and FoC ratings whilst the valence of action-outcomes influenced only 
the FoC ratings. Similarly, Experiment 4 showed that binding and FoC ratings were 
increased as the choice level varied from one to four, but the outcome valence 
influenced only the FoC ratings. In addition, binding and FoC ratings in these two 
studies were not found to be correlated. Finally, in Experiment 5, one’s being free in 
choosing their action without any external influence on their choice similarly boosted 
intentional binding and FoC ratings and these measures were significantly correlated. 
 Therefore, these four experiments present rather mixed results regarding the 
relationship between intentional binding and FoC ratings. At the very least, however, 
it appears that the relationship between the two measures relies on the context of 
variables and processes (e.g., prospective and postdictive) that could be affected by 
these variables (see Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2). Considering the present context of 
experiments (i.e., Experiments 2-5) thus, it could be contended that when the variable 
of interest (e.g., manipulating choice and freedom) operates through prospective 
processes (e.g., Chambon et al., 2013), both intentional binding and FoC ratings could 
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similarly be influenced. If the manipulation is subject to retrospective processes, such 
as varying the valence of action-outcomes, it is more likely to influence the FoC 
ratings than intentional binding, as the latter is suggested to be driven largely by the 
prospective and predictive processes (Haggard, 2005; Moore & Haggard, 2008; 
Moore, Lagnado, et al., 2009).      
 
Figure 7.1 Schematic illustration of the processes through which freedom, 
choice-level, and outcome valence are suggested to influence the FoC judgments. The 
present findings demonstrate that the influence of freedom and choice-level could 
influence FoC judgments through either (or both) prospective and postdictive 
processes. The effect of outcome valence was found to be independent from the 
predictability of the action-outcomes, which suggests that FoC was influenced by 
outcome valence through the postdictive processes. 
 
 
Freedom &  
choice-level 
SoA (FoC) 
Prospective 
processes 
Outcome 
valence 
Postdictive 
processes 
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Figure 7.2 Schematic illustration of the processes through which freedom, 
choice-level, and outcome valence were shown to influence binding. The present 
findings demonstrate that the influence of freedom and choice-level could influence 
binding through the prospective processes. The influence of outcome valence, 
however, appears to depend on the predictability of action-outcomes. Experiments 2-4 
showed that pleasant outcomes affected binding only when outcomes were predicted, 
indicating that binding relies heavily on the prospective processes. 
7.5 Limitations and future directions 
Although the present thesis proposed a strong relationship between the SoA and 
one’s freedom and choice space in action selection, the current manipulations 
resemble a limited variety of scenarios that could be experienced in real life. In 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 5, for instance, all action alternatives produced a fixed 
outcome whereas most human actions are distinguished in the outcomes they produce. 
For example, one might choose to do work at a specific time instead of cooking 
Freedom &  
choice-level 
SoA (Binding) 
Prospective 
processes 
Outcome 
valence 
Predicted Unpredicted 
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dinner. These two actions would obviously yield different outcomes. From the 
perspective of the dynamic theory of intentions (Pacherie, 2008; see section 1.5), the 
D-intentions guiding these two actions would encode different contents (i.e., getting 
some work done vs. having the dinner ready). In this sense, the content of D-
intentions in the current experimental contexts are more likely include the goal “to 
participate in the experiment and receive course credits” while the manipulations of 
freedom and choice-level target at P-intentions and M-intentions as they both involve 
in the selection of actions. A real-life scenario to which the context in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 5 could be similar is, for instance, choosing to drive or to bike in 
order to go to the park- as they both yield the same outcome. Overall, although 
pressing keys in the current experimental contexts are not comparable to the more 
complex actions such as driving or biking, the present thesis showed that varying the 
choice-level in even such simple actions can alter the SoA.  
Given these limitations, several future studies could be conducted to extend the 
scope and findings of the present experiments. The role of action selection processes 
could be further investigated, for example, by mapping each of several action 
alternatives with a distinct outcome. This would render the design more ecologically 
valid as most human actions are related to their outcomes and they involve the 
realization of a specific goal (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Elsner et al., 2002; Haggard, 
2008; Herwig et al., 2007). Within such a design, choice level or freedom as well as 
the value of outcomes could be manipulated to examine the potential interaction 
between these factors more clearly. This design could also reveal further aspects of 
the relationship between perceived effort in action selection and choice level. More 
clearly, one aspect of effort in selection as demonstrated in this thesis was that free 
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and highest choice conditions were subjectively perceived as the least effort taking. 
On the other hand, if free selection among several alternatives involved a deeper 
processing of differential outcomes of actions, perceived effort in this case could be 
greater compared to performing an externally instructed action. 
Another line of research could delineate further the neural correlates of fluency 
in action selection and its relationship with choice level. Previous research has shown 
that DLPFC and AG displayed increased activity when selection fluency was 
disrupted by incompatible action primes (Chambon et al., 2013). Importantly, AG has 
also been shown to signal discrepancies between predicted and actual outcomes of 
actions (Farrer et al., 2003, 2008). Moreover, RCZ was found to be engaged in 
selection of a number of task sets (Forstmann et al., 2006). The involvement of these 
areas could be examined further in a setting where choice level and predictability of 
action-outcomes are manipulated.  
The body of experiments in this thesis could also be adapted to examine 
delusions of agency such as those observed in schizophrenia (Frith & Friston, 2013; 
Frith, 2005). The majority of people with schizophrenia experience the passivity 
phenomena triggered by the belief that some external agent is in control of their 
actions and thoughts. Recent work has begun to employ the paradigms used in SoA 
research to identify the characteristics of aberrant agency experienced by these 
patients. In this vein, it was found that perceived times of action and outcomes are 
hyper-bound in schizophrenia (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010). Additionally, 
sensory attenuation indexed by the N1 suppression was shown to be weakened 
compared to healthy controls (Ford, Mathalon, Kalba, et al., 2001; Ford, Mathalon, 
Heinks, et al., 2001). These abnormalities in the markers of agency were commonly 
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attributed to impairments in predictive mechanisms and overreliance on retrospective 
processes (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2005; Synofzik & Voss, 
2010). These assumptions on the impairments in schizophrenia could be advanced by 
further examining the role of action selection processes on intentional binding and 
judgments of control. Although predictive mechanisms are suggested to be flawed, it 
would be interesting to determine whether prospective cues such as the choice level 
and freedom in action selection could similarly influence intentional binding and FoC 
ratings in these individuals. Research concerned with disorders of agency could also 
prove useful to the advancement of diagnostic methods. For example, intentional 
binding measures could be applied to individuals (e.g., those with genetic 
predisposition or schizoid personality) who are susceptible to schizophrenia to 
identify the differences in binding compared to healthy individuals.   
Finally, cultural differences in how individuals with different backgrounds 
experience the SoA would provide an additional avenue to examine whether the 
suggested mechanisms involved with the SoA could be shaped by sociocultural 
factors. This line of research could also illuminate the understanding of the 
relationship between cultural norms of morality and taking responsibility over one’s 
actions. For instance, cultures can vary in the characteristic of their self-construal, i.e. 
how individuals perceive themselves in relation to others (Hazel Rose Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that individuals with the independent view of the self tend to be more self-
focused and autonomous in one’s needs or goals while those with interdependent self-
construal regard these values in connection with the others in their culture (Markus & 
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Kitayama, 1991; Kitayama & Park, 2010 ). In this context, it would be interesting to 
examine agency across these cultures with different self views.        
7.6 Conclusions 
The present thesis investigated the influence of freedom and choice level in 
action selection and the valence of action-outcomes on the SoA. The foremost finding 
of the thesis studies is that both intentional binding and subjective judgments of 
agency are enhanced when one freely selects an action among a number of 
alternatives. Additionally, the degree of intentional binding and explicit agency were 
increased proportionally to the number of action alternatives available in the context. 
While these effects on intentional binding appear most likely to be driven by the 
prospective processes involved prior to action selection, it is possible that both 
prospective processes and high level inferences related to one’s degree of freedom 
could have contributed to the results with the subjective judgments of agency. 
Examination of the influence of outcome valence demonstrated greater degree of 
control felt over pleasant compared to unpleasant outcomes. Importantly, this effect 
was found to be independent from the predictability of the outcomes. Regarding 
intentional binding, however, the current set of results suggests that the predictability 
of either the timing or the identity of outcomes might determine whether outcome 
valence can influence binding. More clearly, pleasant outcomes lead to greater 
binding than unpleasant outcomes provided that these outcomes were associated to 
specific actions and occurred at predicted times. When either of these dimensions is 
absent, binding was found to be insensitive to outcome valence. The present research 
has also provided some degree of evidence that the influence of valence on intentional 
binding could be amenable to cultural differences, which might potentially pave the 
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way for future research to investigate cultural differences in agency. Finally, 
examination of the relationship between intentional binding and subjective judgments 
of agency showed that although freedom and choice level similarly influenced both 
measures, correlation analyses in the majority of studies did not reveal a significant 
relationship. Therefore, the overall results of the present studies support the notion 
that situational factors surrounding actions determine the contribution of predictive, 
prospective, and retrospective mechanisms to intentional binding and subjective 
judgments of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2009, 2013). Among 
these factors, the present thesis highlights that one’s freedom in action selection and 
the availability of various action alternatives can strongly influence the SoA. 
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Appendix A 
 
Demographic questionnaire used in Experiment 2 
P#_____ 
1. Age: 
2. Gender:      Female  Male 
3. Handedness:      Right  Left 
 
4. Country of birth: ______________________ 
 
5. How long have been living in Canada (years)?__________________ 
 
6. Please rate each group of countries indicating how much you 
like/prefer listening to their music and how much you are exposed to it 
compared to others: 
Canada/USA/Europe 
Preference  : 1__2__3__4__5__6__7__8__9__10 
Exposure : ______hours a week 
 
 
Asia/Africa/Middle East 
Preference : 1__2__3__4__5__6__7__8__9__10 
Exposure : ______hours a week 
 
7. Have you had any musical training? 
Yes  No 
 
 
8. If yes, please indicate the following: 
A) How long was the training? 
 
B) Which instruments can you play (Please list the instruments and the 
average length of time you play per week)? 
Instrument     hours (a week) 
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
__________________    ____________  
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Appendix B 
 
FoC rating scale used in Experiments 3-5 
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Appendix C 
 
Effort rating scale used in Experiment 4 
 
 
 
 
Effort rating scale used in Experiment 5 
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Appendix D 
Interval estimation scale used in Experiments 3-4 
 
 
 
 
 
Interval estimation scale used in Experiment 5 
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